




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THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA

BY
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CAPTAIN SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY; COLONEL FIFTH UNITED
STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR;
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AND "THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO"

WITH MAPS

IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. II



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THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA

VOLUME TWO

CHAPTER X

THE SAILING AND DISEMBARKATION OF THE FIFTH CORPS ¹

WITH Cervera's squadron bottled up in Santiago Harbour by Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley, the way was clear for a military expedition to Cuba. American soldiers were needed to overcome the Spanish troops at Santiago and to close in on Cervera's squadron from the land side, while Sampson with a superior naval force stood ready at the mouth of the harbour to fall upon the Spanish warships should they attempt to escape. Accordingly, on May 30, Major-General Shafter, in command of the Fifth Army Corps at Tampa, Florida, received orders to go with his "force to capture the garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing the harbor and fleet." But as military affairs at Tampa at this time were in a confused state, it was several days before the

¹ See Map 7.

details for the embarkation of the Fifth Corps could be arranged. By June 8, however, all the troops were aboard the transports and the fleet was actually under way, when suddenly there came an unexpected delay. Word was received at Washington that two Spanish cruisers, accompanied by torpedo-boat destroyers, had been seen by the converted yacht *Eagle* on the night of June 7, near Nicolas Channel. As the Nicolas Channel is almost directly on the route to Santiago, this news was alarming; and though it seemed scarcely possible that these Spanish cruisers could have slipped out of Santiago Harbour without the knowledge of Admiral Sampson, yet, so long as there was the least doubt concerning the matter, it seemed hazardous to send out transports loaded with troops without a powerful escort. Consequently the transports were recalled and steps were at once taken to ascertain whether the report was correct.

Positive information¹ having been received from Admiral Sampson in the course of a few days that

¹ Although Admiral Sampson felt sure that the six ships of Cervera's squadron were in the harbour, the Navy Department still had some little doubt. Accordingly, Lieutenant Victor Blue, United States Navy, was assigned the task of going ashore to obtain positive information in regard to the matter. After a daring journey through the enemy's country he passed through the Spanish lines and reached a hilltop, where he saw and counted Cervera's six ships. Returning successfully, he reached the coast on June 13 and communicated the information to Admiral Sampson.

Cervera's six ships were still in the harbour of Santiago, the expedition, on June 14, again set sail. It consisted of thirty-two transports loaded with troops, two water tenders, and three lighters. Its strength, as given in General Shafter's official report, was 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men. It consisted of the following commands:

FIRST DIVISION (*Brig.-Gen. Kent*).

First Brigade. <i>Brig.-Gen. Hawkins.</i>	{	6th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Egbert.</i>
		16th Infantry. <i>Colonel Theaker.</i>
		71st New York Volunteers. <i>Colonel Downs.</i>
Second Brigade. <i>Colonel Pearson.</i>	{	2d Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Wherry.</i>
		10th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Kellogg.</i>
		21st Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. McKibbin.</i>
Third Brigade. ¹ <i>Colonel Wikoff.</i>	{	9th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Ewers.</i>
		13th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Worth.</i>
		24th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Liscum.</i>

¹ Colonel Wikoff was not placed in command of the Third Brigade until June 21, the day before the army landed. Previous to that time Colonel Wikoff had been in command of the 22d Infantry and Lieutenant-Colonel Worth in command of the Third Brigade.

SECOND DIVISION (*Brig.-Gen. Lawton*).

First Brigade. <i>Colonel Van Horn.</i>	{	8th Infantry. <i>Major Conrad.</i>
		22d Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Patterson.</i>
		2d Mass. Volunteers. <i>Colonel Clark.</i>
Second Brigade. <i>Colonel Miles.</i>	{	1st Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Bisbee.</i>
		4th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Bainbridge.</i>
		25th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Daggett.</i>
Third Brigade. <i>Brig.-Gen. Chaffee.</i>	{	7th Infantry. <i>Colonel Benham.</i>
		12th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Comba.</i>
		17th Infantry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Haskell.</i>

CAVALRY DIVISION (*Major-Gen. Wheeler*).

First Brigade. <i>Brig.-Gen. Sumner.</i>	{	3d Cavalry. <i>Major Wessells.</i>
		6th Cavalry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Carroll.</i>
		9th Cavalry. <i>Lieut.-Col. Hamilton.</i>

Second Brigade.
Brig.-Gen. Young.

{ 1st Cavalry.
Lieut.-Col. Viele.
 10th Cavalry.
Major Norvell.
 1st Volunteer Cavalry.
Colonel Wood.

In addition to the three divisions mentioned, an independent brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Bates, which had sailed from Mobile and joined General Shafter at Tampa, formed a part of the expedition. It consisted of the following commands:

Independent Brigade.
Brig.-Gen. Bates.

{ 3d Infantry.
Colonel Page.
 20th Infantry.
Major McCaskey.
 One squadron 2d Cavalry.
Major Rafferty.

The only mounted troops of the expedition were those comprising the squadron of the Second Cavalry in General Bates' brigade. Two squadrons only of each regiment of General Wheeler's cavalry division sailed to Cuba; the third squadron of each regiment remained at Tampa to take care of the horses, which were left behind, because there was not room for them on the transports. Armed with their carbines, the troopers of the cavalry division fought on foot throughout the campaign.

The field artillery consisted of four light batteries of four guns each, four five-inch siege rifles, four seven-inch howitzers, eight field mortars, four Gatling guns, one revolving cannon, and one pneumatic dynamite gun. A battalion of engineers, a signal corps, and a balloon detachment also accompanied the expedition.

Besides the general officers mentioned, Major-General Joseph C. Breckenridge, U. S. Volunteers, Inspector-General U. S. Army, and Brigadier-General William Ludlow, U. S. Volunteers, accompanied the expedition. The latter, upon the arrival of the Fifth Corps off Santiago, was assigned to command the first brigade of Lawton's division, taking the place of Colonel Van Horn, who, in boarding one of the vessels during a rough sea on the day before the army landed, received an injury which resulted in his death a few months later. The Chief Commissary of the expedition was Colonel John F. Weston; the Chief Quartermaster, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. Humphrey; the Chief Engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel George McC. Derby; and the Chief Signal Officer, Major Frank Greene.

The transports were met outside the harbour of Tampa by the *Annapolis* and several other small war vessels, and were escorted by them southward to the Tortugas, where they found awaiting them the battleship *Indiana*, commanded by Captain Taylor, who thereupon took over the command of the convoy from Commander Hunker of the *An-*

napolis. The direction taken was southeastward from the Tortugas around the eastern end of Cuba. Under the instructions received from the Navy Department, Captain Taylor was anxious to hurry forward some of the swifter transports in order to arrive before Santiago at the earliest possible moment; but General Shafter, unwilling to divide his army, objected to this movement. The effort was therefore made to keep the transports united; but, on account of the great inequality in their speed, it was not completely successful. There was a good deal of straggling, which caused the vanguard to arrive at its destination several hours in advance of the slower transports. On the night of June 16 one of the lighters broke loose and was lost at sea; otherwise the voyage was uneventful. No enemy appeared, and nothing occurred to depress the spirits of the American troops, who were filled with enthusiasm and high hopes of success. On June 20 the expedition reached Sampson's fleet off the mouth of Santiago Harbour.

Immediately after receiving his orders General Shafter began to study the situation in order to find out what he could about the *terrain* and climatic conditions of Santiago and the surrounding country. For this purpose he read and reread the experiences of the English army during the siege of Havana in 1762. He read, likewise, an account of the expedition of 1741, in which British troops had failed to take Santiago by marching overland from

Guantanamo. He obtained valuable information also from two native Cubans who sailed with him, one of whom was a civil engineer who had assisted in making surveys in the vicinity of Santiago Harbour. Upon his arrival off Santiago he received from General García additional information of great value to him in planning the campaign.

In order to follow intelligently the different steps of the Santiago campaign one should know something of the topographical features of the theatre of operations, as well as the strength and positions of the opposing armies.

In Santiago Province the principal cities are Santiago and Guantanamo in the southern part, Manzanillo in the western part, and Holguin, Sagua de Tanamo, and Baracoa in the northern and eastern parts. In the vicinity of Santiago the coast of Cuba is hilly and mountainous. Extending a distance of more than twenty miles on each side of Santiago Harbour there is a mesa-like ridge, varying in elevation from one hundred and fifty to two hundred and fifty feet. This ridge is very steep on the sea side and in many places is broken into terraces by outcropping ledges of limestone. Here and there this terraced mesa, which in some places forms the coast-line and in others lies three or four hundred yards back of the shore, is cut into bluffs by a series of ravines, through which pass the streams that carry the large rainfall to the sea. Behind the ridge are foothills, which along some

parts of the coast extend to the water's edge and overlap the limestone formation. Back of these hills, at a distance of five or six miles from the coast, is the Sierra del Cobre range of mountains.

The first place of importance east of the entrance of Santiago Harbour is Fort Aguadores, which is situated about three miles from Morro Castle, at the point where the San Juan River cuts through the ridge; the second is Siboney, a small railroad town lying about seven miles farther eastward; and the third is the mining town of Daiquiri, five miles still farther eastward. The two principal landing places west of the entrance are the small harbour of Cabañas, which lies about two miles west of Socapa Battery, and the small cove of Guaicabon, which lies two miles still farther westward, near Punta Cabrera. Cabañas is about ten miles from the city of Santiago by the road, or rather by the trail, which, leaving the coast at this small harbour, passes through Cruz del Miradero, and thence continues around the head of the bay and enters the city from the northwest. Siboney is almost exactly the same distance from Santiago by the direct road which passes through Las Guasimas, Sevilla, El Pozo, and San Juan.

At none of these places is there safe anchorage for vessels. But as the ridge and the hills present an almost insurmountable barrier to an army attempting to land anywhere else on that coast, an invading force must either disembark at these

places or go to Guantanamo Bay, thirty-seven nautical miles east of Santiago Harbour.

In the vicinity of Santiago, as well as on the coast, the country is hilly, and at that time was so densely covered with tropical trees and a thick undergrowth that troops could not advance except along the trails and narrow eroded roads, which were almost the only means of communication between Santiago and the surrounding towns. About Santiago there were few bridges and no good roads. Owing to a lack of repairs and to the sticky nature of the clayey soil when wet, the roads were almost impassable during the rainy season. Through constant use and the erosion of years, they had, in fact, become mere trails winding around the hills or along the beds of watercourses, or through ravines and cuts so narrow in places that only pack trains could pass.

No railroads connected any of the principal cities of the province, but near Santiago two short lines of railroad were in operation. One, twenty-two miles long, starting from the water front on the west edge of the city, ran north beyond the city limits; thence, turning northeast, ran to the town of El Cristo, from which there were two lines, one extending northwest through Moron and Dos Caminos to San Luis, the other northeast to Songo. The second, starting from Las Cruces on the east side of the bay, a mile southwest of Santiago, ran to Fort Aguadores on the seashore, four miles from

Santiago; thence, crossing the San Juan River and turning eastward, ran along the shore a distance of seven miles through Sardinero and Jutici to Siboney, and thence turning northeast ran inland about four miles to the Juragua iron mines. From Daiquiri, which lies on the coast five miles east of Siboney, another short and unimportant railroad extended inland two or three miles to some iron mines.

The towns of Daiquiri and Siboney were connected by a single trail that passed through an otherwise impenetrable growth of scrubby trees, brushy undergrowth, and trailing vines. Both towns are open roadsteads with a rocky shore line. Neither affords any shelter from the ocean storms or from the winds that blow during the Summer from southeastward during the daytime and produce a heavy swell on shore.

Between Siboney and Sardinero, along the shore, there is a long narrow strip of level country over which ran the railroad. This level strip averages three or four hundred yards in width, and behind it, almost parallel to the shore line, is a part of the long flat-topped ridge already described. This particular part of the ridge lying behind the railroad has its beginning at Fort Aguadores, and terminates opposite Siboney, where a gap in the hills extends northward to the interior. The ridge here has an average height of about one hundred and fifty feet, and is cut through at Sardinero

and Jutici by two small streams that flow into the sea.

On June 21, the day before the American army landed, there were in the province of Santiago 36,582 Spanish soldiers.¹ In and about the city of Santiago and the harbour, and along the railroad running to Siboney, were 9430; at El Cristo, Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano were 2666; at Guantanamo, 5992; at Manzanillo,² 8668; at Holguin, 8364; at Baracoa, 742; and at Sagua de Tanamo, 720.

Including the 2666 Spanish soldiers that were occupying Songo, Moron, Dos Caminos, San Luis, and Palma Soriano, which places are situated but a few miles from Santiago, on or near the railroad running north from the city, there were in the vicinity of Santiago and upon the two short lines of railroad leading thence, 12,096 Spanish soldiers, the greater part of whom could have been concentrated in an emergency within a few hours upon any point at or near Santiago, Siboney, or Daiquiri.

The Spanish troops of the province, with the exception of the 8364 soldiers at Holguin, formed a separate army corps. This corps, numbering 28,218 officers and men, was commanded by General Arsenio Linares, whose headquarters were at Santiago.

¹ See Appendix F.

² On the following day, June 22, Colonel Escario with 3660 officers and men left Manzanillo for Santiago.

The number of armed Cuban insurgents then in the province of Santiago was about five thousand.¹ As they were greatly scattered and held possession of no important place, it is difficult to give their positions with accuracy. There were probably a thousand roaming about the interior of the province watching the Spanish troops at Guantanamo, Manzanillo, and Holguin, and probably four thousand in the vicinity of Santiago and Daiquiri, and at Aserraderos, on the coast eighteen miles west of Santiago Harbour. The Cuban forces of the province were under the command of General Calixto Garcia.

Upon the arrival of the Fifth Corps off the entrance to Santiago Harbour, Captain Chadwick, United States Navy, Admiral Sampson's chief of staff, boarded the *Segurança*, on which were the headquarters of General Shafter, and explained to him the situation from a naval point of view. Shortly afterwards Admiral Sampson came aboard and held a conference with the general. At this conference the admiral and his chief of staff called attention to the topographical features of the coast, pointed out the places suggested for the landing on both sides of the Morro, and urged strongly that an assault be made on the enemy near the mouth of the harbour. Admiral Sampson also informed the general that he had received on his flagship the day before a visit from General Garcia,

¹ See Appendix A.

who was then near Aserraderos with a part of his command, and that the Cuban general had made a request for General Shafter, upon his arrival, to visit him on shore, explaining that he made such a request because the trip to the flagship on that day had made him very seasick. The *Segurança* therefore proceeded to the vicinity of Aserraderos, where General Shafter, Admiral Sampson, and several members of their respective staffs landed and held a conference with General Garcia and his subordinates, Generals Rabi and Castillo.

At this conference General Garcia informed General Shafter that he thought there were about twelve thousand Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity, and that about five thousand of them were in position between that city and Daiquiri. General Castillo stated that he had five hundred Cuban soldiers at a small town about three miles east of Daiquiri, and that there were three hundred Spanish soldiers at Daiquiri, six hundred at Siboney, one hundred and fifty at Jutici, one hundred at Sardinero, and one hundred and fifty at Fort Aguadores. During the discussion General Garcia stated that in his opinion Daiquiri would be the best place for landing the American troops; and as General Shafter himself, after a careful study of the situation, had about reached the same conclusion, he thereupon definitely determined to begin the disembarkation at Daiquiri and to march thence directly against the city of Santiago.

In accordance with this plan, it was then and there arranged that on the morning of the 22d a feint of landing should be made at Cabañas, two miles west of the entrance of the harbour, while the real landing was being made at Daiquiri; that just prior to the disembarkation the navy should shell the landing places on both sides of the harbour; and that prior to and during the disembarkation a Cuban force under General Castillo should attack the Spanish forces at Daiquiri, while General Rabi supported the feint at Cabañas.

Preliminary to the carrying out of this plan, General Shafter arranged to have about five hundred insurgents transferred from Aserraderos to General Castillo's command near Daiquiri, and he requested that general to take his forces on the morning of the 22d, and, if possible, defeat the Spanish at Daiquiri, or intercept and capture them, if they attempted to escape when the navy shelled the place. He also arranged that about five hundred insurgents should take part in the feigned attack on Cabañas, and that the remainder should be assembled by June 24 at the landing near Aserraderos, whence they were to be conveyed by the navy to Siboney and there be disembarked.

After returning from this conference, which lasted about an hour, both General Shafter and Admiral Sampson began to take measures for carrying out the operations agreed upon. June 21 was spent in perfecting arrangements for the disembarkation;

and, as previously planned, five hundred and sixty-two¹ Cuban insurgents were transported by the navy from Aserraderos to the vicinity of Daiquiri to reënforce General Castillo's command. On that day, too, General Shafter's order governing the disembarkation of his army, though dated the 20th, was promulgated. It was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. SEGURANÇA,
AT SEA, June 20, 1898.

GENERAL ORDERS, NO. 18.

1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper commanders, troops will disembark in the following order:

First. The Second Division, Fifth Corps (Lawton's). The Gatling gun detachment will accompany this division.

Second. General Bates' brigade. This brigade will form as a reserve to the Second Division, Fifth Corps.

Third. The dismounted Cavalry Division (Wheeler's).

Fourth. The First Division, Fifth Corps (Kent's).

Fifth. The squadron of the Second Cavalry (Rafferty's).

Sixth. If the enemy, in force, vigorously resists the landing, the light artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by the battalion commander, and brought to the assistance of the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron.

2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations

¹ See Appendix I.

(with coffee ground), canteens filled, and one hundred rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils will be left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company.

3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and constituting a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs will remain aboard ship until the landing be accomplished and until notified that they can land.

4. The chief quartermaster of the expedition will control all small boats, and will distribute them to the best advantage to disembark the troops in the order indicated in paragraph 1.

5. The ordnance officer, Second Lieutenant Brooke, Fourth Infantry, will put on shore at once, one hundred rounds of ammunition per man, and have it ready for distribution on the firing line.

6. The commanding general wishes to impress officers and men with the crushing effect that a well-directed fire will have upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly enforce fire discipline, and will caution their men to fire only when they can see the enemy.

7. Major John W. Dillenback, Second Artillery, will, in addition to his duties as commander of the light-artillery battalion, act as chief of artillery of the expedition.

By command of MAJOR-GENERAL SHAFTER,

E. J. MCCLEARNAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the same day that General Shafter's order was promulgated, Admiral Sampson issued the

following instructions to govern the fleet during the disembarkation of the Fifth Corps:

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON,
UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, 1ST RATE,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA,
June 21, 1898.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

1. The army corps will land to-morrow morning, the entire force landing at Daiquiri. The landing will begin at daylight, or as soon thereafter as practicable. General Castillo with a thousand men coming from the eastward of Daiquiri will assist in clearing the way for an unopposed landing by flanking out the Spanish forces at that point.

2. Simultaneously with the shelling of the beach and blockhouses at Daiquiri, the Enseñada de los Altares [Siboney] and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Santiago, and the small bay of Cabañas, about two and one-half miles to the westward of Santiago, will be shelled by the ships stationed there for that purpose.

3. A feint in force of landing at Cabañas will be made, about ten of the transports, the last to disembark their forces at Daiquiri, remaining during the day or greater part of the day about two miles to the southward of Cabañas, lowering boats, and making apparent preparations for disembarking a large body of troops; at the same time General Rabi, with five hundred Cuban troops, will make a demonstration on the west side of Cabañas.

4. The following vessels are assigned to bombard the four points mentioned above:

At Cabañas, the *Scorpion*, *Vixen*, and *Texas*.

At Aguadores, the *Eagle* and *Gloucester*.

At the Enseñada de los Altares [Siboney], the *Hornet*, *Helena*, and *Bancroft*.

At Daiquiri, the *Detroit*, *Castine*, *Wasp*, and *New Orleans* — the *Detroit* and *Castine* on the western flank, the *Wasp* and *New Orleans* on the eastern flank. All the vessels named will be in their positions at daylight.

5. Great care will be taken to avoid the wasteful expenditure of ammunition. The firing at Daiquiri will begin on signal from the *New Orleans*.

At Cabañas it is probable that after a few minutes, unless the firing is returned, occasional dropping of shots from the smaller vessels will be sufficient, but the semblance of covering a landing should be maintained, the ships keeping close in.

At Aguadores and the Enseñada de los Altares [Siboney], the same rule should prevail. At Daiquiri, the point of actual landing, vessels will of course use their artillery until they have reason to believe that the landing is clear. They will take care to make the firing deliberate and effective. As General Castillo's column approaching, from the eastward, is likely to come within range of the guns, sharp-eyed quartermasters with good glasses will be stationed to look out for the Cuban flag, and care will be taken not to direct the fire toward any point where that flag is shown.

6. The *Texas* and *Brooklyn* will exchange blockading stations, the *Texas* going inside to be near Cabañas. The *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* will retain their blockading positions, and keep a vigilant watch on the harbor mouth. The *Indiana* will take the *New Orleans*' position in the blockading line east of Santiago, and between the flagship *New York* and the shore.

This is only a temporary assignment for the *Indiana* to strengthen the blockading line during the landing, and avoid any possibility of the enemy's breaking through should he attempt to get out of the port.

7. The *Suwanee*, *Osceola*, and *Wampatuck* will be prepared to tow boats. Each will be provided with two five or six-inch lines, one on each quarter, each long enough to take in tow a dozen or more boats.

8. These vessels will report at the *New York* at 3 A.M. on June 22, prepared to take in tow the ship's boats, which are to assist the landing of troops, and convey them to Daiquiri.

9. The *Texas*, *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *New York*, and *Indiana* will send all their steam cutters and all their pulling-boats, with the exception of one retained on board each ship, to assist in the landing. These boats will report at the *New York* at 3 A.M.

10. Each boat, whaleboat, and cutter will have three men; each launch five men, and each steam cutter its full crew and an officer for their own management. In addition to these men, each boat will carry five men, including one capable of acting as coxswain, to manage and direct the transports' boats. Each steam launch will be in charge of an officer, who will report to Captain Goodrich. Care will be taken in the selection of boat keepers and coxswains to take no men who are gun-pointers or who occupy positions of special importance at the battery.

11. Unnecessary oars and *impedimenta* should be removed from the pulling-boats for the greater convenience of the transportation of troops, but each boat should retain its anchor and chain.

12. Captain C. F. Goodrich, commanding the *St. Louis*, will have, on the part of the navy, general charge of the landing.

13. The *New Orleans* will send her boats to report to Captain Goodrich upon her arrival at Daiquiri.

14. The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action, and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that attempt will be made soon.

WILLIAM T. SAMPSON,

Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief,

U. S. NAVAL FORCE, NORTH ATLANTIC STATION.

The disembarkation of the Fifth Corps began at Daiquiri on the morning of June 22 as ordered. After Daiquiri, Siboney, Fort Aguadores, and Cabañas had been shelled by the navy, General Lawton's division, which had assembled opposite the landing place, began immediately to disembark by means of small boats and steam launches. As there was a scarcity of small steam craft and lighters, and but one small wharf at the landing, the disembarkation at Daiquiri was somewhat difficult, but through perseverance, caution, energetic work, and the help of the navy, the troops continued to land successfully throughout the day. Most of the horses and mules were also landed; they were thrown overboard and made to swim

ashore. By night about six thousand men had disembarked; nearly the whole of General Lawton's division, most of General Bates' brigade, and one brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division. Meanwhile General Kent's division made a feint of landing at Cabañas, while General Rabi with a small Cuban force made a demonstration against the town.

No attempt was made by the Spaniards to oppose the disembarkation. General Castillo's Cuban troops were found at Daiquiri; but they had failed to intercept or capture the two or three hundred Spanish soldiers that had been occupying the place. In fact, early in the morning before the disembarkation began these Spanish troops withdrew from the town and retired to Firmeza without opposition.

No sooner was General Lawton's division landed than it received orders to push forward to Siboney. Though the narrow trail leading thither passed through several very strong defensive positions and might have been easily defended, yet no opposition was offered to General Lawton's movement. Early in the morning of the 23d the head of his column reached Siboney. There he found a Spanish force of five or six hundred men, but they made no effort to defend the place. The only opposition they offered was to fire a few shots at long range before retiring towards Sevilla on the Santiago road. General Castillo's Cuban troops that had come with General Lawton from Daiquiri

followed the Spanish troops from Siboney, and in a skirmish with their rear-guard one Cuban was killed and eight or nine wounded. The Spaniards had three killed and six wounded. During that day and the following night, while the disembarkation was going on at Daiquiri, the remainder of Lawton's division and a part of Wheeler's division arrived at Siboney.

Meanwhile, as the Spaniards had been driven from Siboney, General Shafter decided to disembark part of his command there; this would enable him to bring his base of operations five miles nearer Santiago. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 23d, General Kent's division began to land. As there were no landing facilities at Siboney, not even a wharf, the men waded through the surf to the beach, and horses and mules were made to swim ashore as they were at Daiquiri. Nevertheless, good progress was made in landing both men and animals. During the night of the 23d and the following day the disembarkation was continued at both Siboney and Daiquiri. On the 24th General Garcia's command, numbering 2978¹ officers and men, arrived at Siboney, but they were not all landed until the next day. A part of General Kent's division was also landed on the 25th. This practically completed the disembarkation of the army, but great difficulties were still encountered in unloading quartermaster,

¹ See Appendix I.

hospital, and subsistence stores. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the chief commissary and chief quartermaster it was impossible, owing to the lack of landing facilities, wharves, lighters, and steam launches, to unload supplies fast enough to furnish the army with several days' rations in advance. "It was not until two weeks after the army landed," says General Shafter, "that it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for daily consumption."

The loss of the lighter that had broken away during the voyage and of others sent to Santiago by the Quartermaster Department was keenly felt by General Shafter. This loss would have been irreparable had not the navy furnished the army with boats and steam launches, and in other ways assisted it in the disembarkation, so that, notwithstanding the difficulties encountered, all the troops and transportation were put ashore with the loss of but two men and forty animals.

The first important step in General Shafter's campaign was now ended. His army was on Cuban soil. It would soon meet a brave enemy. It would soon encounter deadly diseases. Could it live? Would it perish? Would it conquer or be conquered?

COMMENTS

ALONG the south coast of Cuba, in the vicinity of Santiago, there were but a few places where General

Shafter could disembark his army. As there is no landing place at the mouth of Santiago Harbour, and as the *terrain* on both sides of the entrance consists of rocky heights which rise about two hundred and forty feet above the sea level, and as these heights were occupied by Spanish troops and fortified by batteries, no opportunity was offered for the disembarkation of the army at that point.

At Fort Aguadores, three miles east of the entrance, there is a small inlet at the mouth of the San Juan River where a landing could be made by one or two vessels at a time. But the ridge, which is cut through by the river at this point, and the surrounding heights, which rise abruptly on the sea side, so enclose the landing that it would have been impossible to find sufficient room there to disembark any considerable portion of the army. But even had a part of the army landed there, it would have been utterly impossible to carry by assault the high, rough, wooded country between that point and the Morro. Furthermore, the place is naturally so strong that with a few troops and a field piece or two, it could be held indefinitely against almost any force attacking it from the sea.

But there were three other places where the army could be disembarked: Guantanamo Bay, thirty-seven nautical miles east of Santiago Bay, Cabañas and Guaicabon on the west side of the entrance to Santiago Harbour, and Siboney and Daiquiri on

the east side of the entrance. It will be instructive to point out the advantages and disadvantages that these different places offered for the disembarkation of the invading army and as bases of operations for an attack upon Santiago.

The harbour of Guantanamo was large enough to admit all the army transports, and sufficiently well protected to offer shelter from the hurricanes so frequent on that coast. Besides, the harbour was then in possession of United States marines, which fact would doubtless have enabled a landing to be made there with little difficulty.

But if General Shafter had disembarked his army at Guantanamo Bay and attempted to march overland to Santiago, he would have had to defeat the 5992 Spanish soldiers at Guantanamo city, situated twelve miles inland from the head of the bay; otherwise they could have attacked his rear, or cut his line of communications, and have destroyed his base of operations the moment he pushed forward from the landing towards Santiago. Undoubtedly it would have been necessary to fight them, and, whatever the outcome, this would have caused delay, which would have enabled the deadly fevers to fasten themselves upon the American troops. The attempt to carry out this plan might even have led the Spaniards to send troops from Santiago across the country to reënforce those at Guantanamo.

Inasmuch as the English in 1741 had been unable to make a successful overland campaign against

Santiago from Guantanamo Bay when the city was practically defenceless and scarcely any opposition was offered by the Spaniards, it seemed improbable that General Shafter's army, numbering less than seventeen thousand men, should succeed in the undertaking when there were nearly six thousand soldiers at Guantanamo city, and more than twelve thousand at and in the vicinity of Santiago. In truth, this course would most probably have proved fatal to the American army, and so far as known General Shafter never for a moment thought of adopting it. In fact, a correct interpretation of the orders under which he was acting precluded his taking this course so long as there was a less difficult course open to him. It will be remembered that he was ordered to capture the garrison at Santiago and to assist in capturing Santiago Harbour and the Spanish fleet. The garrison at Santiago, and not the garrison at Guantanamo, was General Shafter's objective.

In considering the landing places nearer Santiago, it will be noted, first, that none of them was sufficiently sheltered to protect the transports during the disembarkation; secondly, that a landing and the establishment of a base of operations sufficiently near the entrance of the harbour would have received the protection of the American warships that were watching its mouth; and, thirdly, that a disembarkation begun at either of two places near each other, if successful, would most probably

have been continued at both; for as soon as the first division of the army landed at either place it would certainly have attempted to drive the enemy from the other, in order to increase the number of landing places and to give more room for the operations of the army. Thus a landing successfully begun at Cabañas or Guaicabon would most probably have been continued at both places. So, likewise, a landing begun at Daiquiri meant in the end a landing at both Daiquiri and Siboney.

Inasmuch as Cabañas and Guaicabon were only two miles apart, and the former but two miles from the mouth of Santiago Harbour, it would have been necessary — if General Shafter had disembarked his army there — either to attack and defeat the Spanish troops along the west side of the entrance or to leave a containing force there to hold them in check, while the main army pushed on to Santiago; for unless one or the other of these courses had been taken, it is evident that the Spaniards in possession of Socapa Battery and the west side of the neck of the channel could have pushed forward from these positions to threaten or destroy the American base of operations at Cabañas and Guaicabon.

Had a containing force been left to watch the west side of the entrance, it would have been necessary to detach a strong force from the main army for that purpose; for unless the American commander knew that his base of operations was

well protected, an attack against the garrison of Santiago with the remaining portion of the army would have been attended with great risk. Moreover, this plan, since it necessitated the division of his army, would have greatly weakened his effective forces and given the Spaniards, with their interior position, aided by the shipping in the harbour, a splendid opportunity to hold one part of the American army in check with a small containing force while they massed overwhelming forces against the other part.

The advantage which this plan would have given the Spaniards will perhaps be better appreciated if we glance at the map of Santiago Harbour and the country immediately surrounding it, and imagine one-third, or thereabouts, of the American army acting as a containing force to protect the base of operations at Cabañas and Guaicabon and the line of communications leading thence to Santiago city, while the other two-thirds, around and beyond the north end of the harbour, is in position, facing south and west, opposite the city and garrison of Santiago.

The position here described would have been a weak one; first, because the American army would have been divided into two parts not within supporting distance of each other; secondly, because the Spaniards in and about Santiago and the harbour, being centrally situated with respect to the American forces, would have had the advantage of interior lines; thirdly, because the line of

communications leading from the rear of the American army at Santiago around the north end of the bay to the base of operations at Cabañas and Guaicabon would have been so inadequately protected by the American army in front of Santiago that it could have been severed without difficulty by Spanish troops coming from San Luis or Manzanillo.

Had the attempt been made to defeat the Spanish troops along the west side of the entrance to the harbour before pushing on to Santiago, delays would have occurred which would most probably have been fatal to the entire undertaking; and, furthermore, no advantage would have resulted except that of making the base of operations temporarily secure. Inasmuch as the channel was commanded by Spanish warships inside the harbour and by Spanish troops on the east side of the entrance, it is evident that the American forces attacking from the west side only could not have advanced farther than the channel. It is evident also that the American warships could not have entered the harbour until the Spanish forces on both sides of the entrance had been defeated and the mines removed from the channel; and, even then, with the Spanish warships commanding the narrow entrance, the operation would have been difficult and hazardous.

But an attempt to defeat the Spanish forces on both sides of the entrance would have necessitated

an entirely different plan of campaign. In that case it would have been necessary to abandon the direct attack upon the garrison and city of Santiago and to make the Spanish batteries at the mouth of the harbour the principal objective. And for this purpose it would have been necessary to divide General Shafter's forces and to disembark them on both sides of the entrance at points widely separated from each other.

It will be remembered that both Admiral Sampson and his chief of staff were very anxious to have General Shafter make his principal attack upon the batteries and Spanish troops at the entrance of the harbour instead of moving directly upon Santiago. It was natural, of course, that the admiral should wish to have the Spanish troops at the entrance defeated, and the mines removed from the channel, in order that the American warships might enter. With the entrance in possession of the United States troops, the opportunity would have been offered Admiral Sampson of entering the harbour and of crushing the Spanish fleet with overwhelming forces. And, moreover, with the American fleet once inside and the Spanish fleet destroyed or captured, Admiral Sampson would have been in a position to play a great part in the land campaign against Santiago. In a few hours his battleships could have destroyed the city; if need be, could have reduced it to ashes, and made it, as well as many of the surrounding

field fortifications, utterly untenable for the Spanish army.

But however meritorious the plan of attacking the Spanish troops at the mouth of the harbour seemed to Admiral Sampson from a naval point of view, there were strong military reasons why the plan should not have been followed.

The plan would have necessitated the division of General Shafter's army into two parts in order that both sides of the entrance to the harbour might have been attacked. Again, it would have necessitated the disembarkation of one part of the army at Cabañas and Guaicabon and the other at Siboney and Daiquiri; for there were no points nearer the entrance than these places where any considerable portion of the army could have been landed. Still, again, it would have necessitated a further division of forces of that portion of the army landing at Siboney and Daiquiri, inasmuch as it would have been necessary to station a considerable force upon the Siboney-Sevilla-Santiago road to guard the base of operations and repulse any attack from the direction of Santiago, while the remaining part of this portion of the divided army moved forward to attack the mouth of the harbour.

That such a plan, necessitating such a division of forces, would have been the height of folly will perhaps be better appreciated by a more detailed discussion of this supposititious situation. The division of the American army into two parts

would have greatly weakened its fighting power. It would have necessitated the guarding of two bases of operations instead of one; and with Santiago Bay intervening between the parts, the Spaniards could have brought overwhelming numbers against either part without any danger of an attack from the other. In this central position, with the aid of the shipping in the harbour, there would have been offered to the enemy an opportunity of massing greatly superior forces in turn against either part of the American army, and thus, by overwhelming each part separately, of defeating them in detail.

In making a campaign against divided forces, a skilful commander will nearly always detach a containing force to hold one part of the divided army in check, while he masses his remaining forces against the other. But in the case we are now considering, with an impassable obstacle separating the two parts of the American army, no containing force would have been needed to hold either part in check, while the Spanish forces were being massed against the other. Only by abandoning the plan of attacking both sides of the entrance and by reëmbarking could the part which was not engaged go to the assistance of the part which was engaged. Inasmuch, then, as a containing force would not have been needed, it was evident that the Spanish commander could have used his entire force at the point of attack. "The

sole use of a containing force," says Hamley, "is to prevent a union of the enemy's parts. If it is not necessary to this purpose it will be better employed at the point of attack."

But there were other than strategical reasons that made this plan wholly impracticable. On both sides of the entrance to the harbour the hills and ridges are so rugged, and the bluffs so precipitous, and the *terrain* so cut up by ravines and so covered with scrubby trees, underbrush, and trailing vines, that it was almost impossible for troops to reach the entrance by marching along the coast; and the only road leading thither was one on the east side of the harbour from Santiago to Morro Castle. But the direction of this road was such that it would have been available only for troops attacking from the direction of Santiago; and, moreover, being narrow, and passing through defiles and cuts and other strong defensive positions, it could have been easily held with a few troops. Again, any plan of campaign which had for its first objective the Spanish batteries at the mouth of the harbour would have made it necessary for the troops to occupy positions where, without overcoming the greatest difficulties, they could not have been supplied with water.

There can be no question but that a division of General Shafter's army into two parts and an attack upon both sides of the entrance to the harbour would have been a fatal mistake. With more than

thirty-six thousand Spanish troops in Santiago Province and more than twelve thousand of them in the vicinity of Santiago, General Shafter could not afford to take the risk of dividing his small army of seventeen thousand men. Good strategy required that he should keep his forces united and be prepared when the critical time arrived to strike a powerful blow. In that fever-stricken country his only chance of success was to move with the greatest possible speed against the garrison at Santiago and to strike it with all his power. He could not afford to delay and allow the fevers to do their deadly work. He could not afford to be turned from his main object by any side issues. He could not afford to adopt any plan that necessitated a division of his forces. With united forces, detaching only those troops that were absolutely necessary to hold his base and protect his flanks, he might possibly win a victory; with divided forces he would most surely fail. In the concentration of his efforts, in the power and impetuosity of his attack, lay his only hope of victory.

The plan of disembarking the Fifth Corps at Daiquiri and Siboney and of advancing thence directly against the garrison and city of Santiago offered greater advantages to General Shafter than either of the other plans.

Inasmuch as Siboney was fully ten miles from the mouth of the harbour, and the country lying east of the entrance as far as the San Juan River

was almost wholly impracticable for the movement of troops, there was little or no danger of an attack from that direction upon the American base of operations at Siboney and Daiquiri. Consequently, only a very small containing force was needed to watch the enemy and protect the base of operations from an attack in the direction of the mouth of the harbour, while the main forces were pushing on towards Santiago along the Siboney-Sevilla road.

As Santiago is situated on the east side of the north end of the bay, the road leading directly thither from Siboney was no longer than the road leading thither from Cabañas on the west side of the harbour. In fact, the Siboney-Sevilla road was the most available and most direct route that an army could take in going to Santiago from the coast. It was evident, too, that the railroad from Siboney through Fort Aguadores and thence to Santiago, though less direct than the Siboney-Sevilla road, might, under certain conditions, be utilized in an advance upon the city.

An examination of the map will show that General Shafter's army in position in front of Santiago completely covered his base of operations at Siboney. His line of communications — the Siboney-Sevilla road — was directly in his rear; so that, even if defeated, his army could have fallen back along this road with little or no danger of being cut off from its base of operations.

This fact will become still more apparent if we remember that in this position of General Shafter's army there was very little if any danger of an attack upon his line of communications or base of operations from troops coming from Guantanamo. First, because the country northeast of Siboney, being rugged and mountainous, was easy to defend, and almost impassable for troops; secondly, because the main road from Guantanamo to Santiago did not cross the Siboney-Sevilla road, but lay a considerable distance to the north of it, entering the city from the direction of El Caney.

But the most important strategical advantage obtained by selecting Siboney and Daiquiri as the base of operations remains to be considered. The twelve thousand Spanish soldiers at Santiago and the six thousand at Guantanamo were only forty-eight miles apart by wagon road. As the Spanish troops at Guantanamo were nearer Santiago than any other large body of troops in the province, it was most natural to suppose that in case of an attack upon Santiago every effort would be made to march the troops, or a portion of them, overland from Guantanamo to reënforce those at Santiago. Indeed, it seemed most probable that the Spaniards would begin a general concentration of their forces towards Santiago the moment they became aware that this city was to be General Shafter's objective. This being true, it is plain that General Shafter's army, operating in front of

Santiago from Siboney as a base, would be in a most favourable position to prevent the junction of the Spanish army at Guantanamo with that at Santiago. In case the Spanish army at Guantanamo had attempted this movement General Shafter, from his intervening position, could have pushed slightly northward, seized the Guantanamo-Santiago road, and prevented the junction. This position would have given the American commander the opportunity of detaching a containing force to hold one Spanish army in check while he massed his remaining forces against the other. In this way he would have been able to outnumber each separately upon the battlefield, and thus, perhaps, have been able to defeat both in detail.

It might seem that an army operating against Santiago from Cabañas and Guaicabon as a base would have been in a favourable position to prevent, in a similar manner, reënforcements coming from Manzanillo from joining the garrison at Santiago; but such would not have been the case, for the reason that an army in front of Santiago would not have occupied an intervening position between Manzanillo and Santiago, nor would it have protected in that case its line of communications or covered its base of operations.

In short, the American army operating from Siboney against Santiago was most favourably situated, not only for protecting its line of communications and covering its base of operations, but also

for preventing the garrison of Guantanamo from joining that of Santiago.

Although the plan of disembarking the Fifth Corps at Daiquiri and Siboney and of advancing thence directly against the garrison and city of Santiago offered greater advantages to General Shafter than any other plan, nevertheless, his chances of success in that case would have been very small had the Spaniards exercised wise generalship in improving their opportunities.

If the hills and ridges about Daiquiri and Siboney had been fortified even with hastily constructed field-works and held with ten or twelve hundred soldiers with a few field guns, a disembarkation at these places would have been very difficult if not altogether impossible. Behind the crests of these ridges and hills the Spanish troops could have found perfect shelter against any attack from the sea, and at any moment they could have crawled forward to the crests and have poured a deadly fire into any force attempting to land.

It might be replied to this that the warships could have brought such an overwhelming fire against these positions that they would have become untenable. The answer is that troops cannot be driven out of positions of this kind by the fire of big guns alone. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the American warships could have definitely located the positions of the Spanish troops along the crests had the latter exercised

skill in concealing themselves and used smokeless powder in attacking the land forces.

As a matter of fact the hills and ridges about Daiquiri and Siboney are so well suited for defence that in a few hours they could be made almost impregnable against any frontal attack. Take, for instance, the long ridge lying three or four hundred yards back of Siboney. This ridge is perfectly adapted for a strong defensive position against an attack from the sea. It is, in fact, a natural fortification, its crest a natural parapet. It commands the landing completely, and the sea also to a considerable distance from the shore, and has an open field for fire in its front.

It is believed that a battery of field guns and four or five hundred Spanish soldiers posted on this ridge, displaying the well-known courage of their nation—that splendid courage which they subsequently displayed at El Caney and San Juan Hill—could have prevented the landing of General Shafter's army at Siboney, even though it had been supported by all the warships of the United States navy. And so, likewise, at Daiquiri, though here, perhaps, twice the number indicated above would have been required to hold in check the Cubans and at the same time prevent the disembarkation of the American army.

But there were other strong reasons why the Spaniards should have made an effort to prevent the disembarkation of General Shafter's army. In

the first place, because the most critical time during the entire campaign through which the American army passed was during its disembarkation. At that moment its hands were tied, and consequently it possessed little or no striking power. Until the troops were landed they were practically harmless, and for a considerable time before the landing they would have been under the fire of the Spanish troops. In the second place, because a sufficient Spanish force was available for occupying the strong natural positions in front of Siboney and Daiquiri. In fact, with the exercise of ordinary skill and energy, the greater part of the 12,096 Spanish troops at and about Santiago and the harbour, and on or near the railroads leading thither, could have been concentrated, probably within twenty-four hours, certainly within forty-eight, upon any landing point in the vicinity of Santiago.

Such being the case, it is obvious that at the very beginning the Spanish commander was offered a splendid opportunity, by a concentration of troops at the landing, of preventing entirely the disembarkation of General Shafter's army, and later, when the disembarkation was partially completed, of concentrating an overwhelming Spanish force against a fractional part of the American army.

To this plan of operations one might reply that the Spanish commander did not know in advance where the American army would land; and that as the American navy was shelling a number of places

on both sides of the Morro, there was nothing to indicate which place General Shafter would select for a landing. The answer is that the strongest kind of strategical reasons pointed to the fact that the landing would be attempted in the vicinity of Siboney and Daiquiri, and that there might easily have been assembled from the Spanish forces in the vicinity of Santiago twelve or fifteen hundred men opposite Siboney and Daiquiri, and three or four hundred opposite each of the other landing places near the Morro, and that these troops would probably have been able, unaided, to prevent the landing. Certainly they would have been able, under the most unfavourable circumstances, to cause sufficient delay to give the remaining Spanish troops the opportunity of concentrating at the landing points.

Before closing these comments it is proper to remark that the aid given by the Cuban insurgents in the disembarkation of the Fifth Corps was, on the whole, disappointing. Though General Castillo had five hundred insurgents only a few miles east of Daiquiri, and though he received on the 21st five hundred and sixty-two more, yet the two or three hundred Spanish soldiers at Daiquiri were permitted to withdraw to Firmeza on the morning of the 22d practically unmolested. It would seem that with this strong force General Castillo might have surrounded and captured this small Spanish force during the night of the 22d, or at least have

intercepted and captured it early in the morning, and then, pushing forward to a position in rear of Siboney, might have intercepted and perhaps captured the five or six hundred Spanish soldiers when they were driven back from that place by the vanguard of the American army.

The truth is that the insurgents did little or no hard fighting at this time or afterwards. Though they were of considerable aid to General Shafter in reconnoitring and in watching and harassing the Spanish columns, they could not be depended upon to close with the enemy and fight till one or the other was defeated or crushed. Nor could they be depended upon to prosecute in a systematic manner any particular military operation that required severe fighting or great sacrifices. In fact, at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, after they had been fighting for three years, they held no important city, had captured no important stronghold, had won no important battle.

But, nevertheless, it must not be inferred that they had no appreciable effect upon the result of the campaign. On the contrary, their efforts were of great help to General Shafter, and had, particularly in one case which will be pointed out later, an immense bearing upon the final result.

The sailing of this expedition to Santiago and its successful disembarkation at Daiquiri and Siboney were in many respects remarkable events in the history of the United States. It was the first time

that an expedition of this size and the second time that an expedition of this kind had ever left the American shores. Though numbering less than seventeen thousand soldiers, it contained the greater part of the regular forces of the United States army. Of the twenty-five regiments of regular infantry all but seven sailed in the expedition. Of the ten regiments of cavalry more than half were represented. Of the seven regiments of artillery, two of which had not then been organized, the batteries of three were present. On the other hand, there were in the expedition but three regiments of volunteers. Practically this was an army of regular soldiers commanded by regular officers. On the whole, it was thoroughly drilled and highly disciplined; well fitted to win a great victory and, if need be, to endure great hardships. Among its numbers were many excellent soldiers: some, old in the service, ripe with the experiences of the past, yet filled with the ambition and courage of youth; others, young in years but full of promise. Some destined soon to fall and die, others destined to survive and conquer. Many there were, too, among the number, who, after the bloody work of El Caney and San Juan, would live to carry the Stars and Stripes to victory in the far-away Philippines. Some there were who would die there, and others, who, surviving both campaigns, would live to bear the flag victoriously even unto the very gates of the Chinese capital.

CHAPTER XI

LAS GUASIMAS ¹

BEFORE describing the active operations leading up to the fight at Las Guasimas, it is necessary to say a few words regarding the condition and situation of the Spanish forces at Santiago. At the outbreak of the war not only was the city of Santiago inadequately supplied with provisions, but the troops in that vicinity had only sufficient rations to last a few days. Moreover, Santiago was passing through a monetary crisis. The notes of the Spanish Bank were greatly depreciated, and both gold and silver were scarce. The army at Santiago had not been paid for several months. The officers of the army and the subsistence and medical departments did not receive their pay for May, June, and July, 1897, until January, 1898. The pay of the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers for March, 1897, had not been received until October of that year, and their pay for April, 1897, was not received until May, 1898. Moreover, these payments were made in notes on the Spanish Bank worth only sixty-four cents in gold on the dollar; but after communication with Havana by sea had been cut off, they brought in

¹ See Maps 7 and 8.

the Santiago market but thirty-five cents on the dollar in silver. These facts made the merchants of Santiago extremely cautious. Fearing that their stock of provisions might at any moment be confiscated by the army, they adopted the plan of getting rid of what they had without making any effort to lay in a new supply.

On April 21 a small English schooner entered the harbour of Santiago from Jamaica with a cargo of butter, potatoes, onions, and corn meal, which were quickly peddled out for a good price. The steamer *Mortera*, on April 25, brought into the city a supply of provisions, which consisted of one hundred and fifty head of beef cattle, one hundred and eighty thousand rations of flour, one hundred and forty-nine thousand of peas, one hundred and ninety-seven thousand of rice, seventy-nine thousand of beans, and ninety-six thousand of wine. This was the only effort made by General Blanco to send supplies to Santiago, although there were in the harbour the Spanish merchant vessels, *Mejico*, *Mortera*, *San Juan*, *Reina de los Angeles*, and *Tomas Brooks*, which from the declaration of war on April 21, to May 18, when the first hostile ships appeared off Santiago, could have gone to neighbouring islands and returned with impunity. On May 7 the German steamer *Polaria*, bound for Havana but prevented by the blockade from entering that port, put in at Santiago with fourteen thousand sacks of rice and three hundred sacks

of barley. Inasmuch as the needs of the troops of the city and of the surrounding towns amounted to about three hundred and sixty thousand rations a month, not to mention the needs of the inhabitants of the city, it will be seen that the provisions on hand, with the exception of rice, of which there was a great abundance, were scarcely sufficient to last the troops a month.

Early in April Captain-General Ramón Blanco informed General Arsenio Linares that the Americans intended to land an army at some point on the coast of eastern Cuba for the purpose of making an attack on the city of Santiago, and recommended the construction of batteries at both Santiago and Guantanamo to repel attacks by sea and to check any bands of insurgents that might operate in conjunction with the Americans. It was arranged that General Linares, whose headquarters were at Santiago, should go to Havana for a conference with General Blanco; but owing in a great measure to the rapidity with which events succeeded one another, there was no opportunity for such a visit. General Blanco, however, a few days later informed Linares that Marina's brigade and sufficient provisions to last the Spanish troops at Santiago for four months would be sent him.

After some correspondence between Blanco and Linares in regard to the advisability of concentrating the garrisons of Sagua de Tanamo, Baracoa, and Guantanamo at Santiago, it was decided to

remove only a part of the troops occupying these places. Accordingly, General Linares ordered three companies of the Cordoba regiment from Sagua de Tanamo and Baracoa to Guantanamo, and six companies of the Talavera regiment from Guantanamo to Santiago. On April 20, the very day that the Spanish Minister in Washington demanded his passports, Blanco informed Linares that Marina's brigade would not go to Santiago, but that a company of engineers and another of sappers would be sent. Prior to the blockade of the port no further efforts were made to reënforce the garrison at Santiago, except to move a few troops from the inland towns near the city to positions immediately surrounding the harbour; but early in June, when the blockade had been completely established and when it became evident that the Americans would make a land attack against Santiago, it was announced from Havana that two or three battalions were to be ordered from Holguin to Santiago. This, however, was not done. About this time, too, General Linares considered the matter of bringing a battalion of infantry, a section of mountain artillery, and half a company of engineers, from Guantanamo to Santiago, but for some reason the order for this movement was never issued.

On June 22, the day the American army began landing at Daiquiri, a column of Spanish troops, numbering thirty-six hundred and sixty officers

and men, under the command of Colonel Federico Escario, left Manzanillo for Santiago. These troops arrived at Santiago on July 3, and with the exception of a thousand sailors, who were landed from Cervera's squadron on the very day that General Shafter's army began its disembarkation, they were the only reënforcements received by the garrison of Santiago after the arrival of General Shafter's army.

When the Americans landed, the Spanish army at and in the immediate vicinity of Santiago, and in the six inland towns of El Cristo, Songo, Dos Caminos, Moron, San Luis, and Palma Soriano, comprised the following forces:

	Officers and men
Cuba (Santiago) regiment	12 companies . . . 1,644
Asia regiment	8 companies . . . 1,096
San Fernando regiment .	6 companies . . . 822
Porto Rico regiment . .	6 companies . . . 822
Talavera regiment . . .	6 companies . . . 822
Constitución regiment .	6 companies . . . 822
Mobilized troops . . .	16 companies . . . 2,192
Engineers and sappers .	3 companies . . . 411
Siege artillery	1 company . . . 137
Mountain artillery . . .	1 battery (2 guns) . 50
Civil Guards	1 company . . . 137
King's regiment (cavalry)	2 troops . . . 200
Signal corp	1 section . . . 72
Volunteers and firemen .	6 organizations . . 1,869
Guerillas	7 or 8 organizations . 1,000
Sailors	8 companies . . . 1,000
Total forces, including sailors	 13,096 ¹

¹ See Appendix F for a discussion of the sources of the above facts.

General Linares' plan of defence comprised three lines of observation: the first along the coast from Punta Cabrera to Daiquiri; the second, to the northward of the city, extending from Palma Soriano through San Luis, Dos Caminos, Moron, El Cristo, and Songo, to Socorro; and the third to the westward of the harbour, extending from Punta Cabrera to El Cobre by way of Monte Real, and thence northeastward along the mountain passes of Coralillo, Ysleno, Euramadas, and Boniato to El Cristo. Along and within these lines of observation about twelve thousand ninety-six soldiers and about one thousand sailors occupied the following positions:

At Punta Cabrera, Monte Real, El Cobre, and at Mazamorra connecting with Socapa, there were eight companies of the Asia regiment and one mobilized company; at Socapa Battery and the batteries at the mouth of the harbour, one company of the Cuba regiment, one mobilized company, one company of siege artillery, one company of sappers, and a detachment of the Signal Corps; at Daiquiri, Siboney, Firmeza, and Vinent, and along Juragua railroad from Aguadores to Siboney, six companies of the Talavera regiment, three mobilized companies, and one company of engineers (railroad troops); at Santiago along shores of bay, at mountain passes northwest of city, along railroad to El Cristo, and at El Caney and Cuabitas, eight companies of the Cuba regiment, eight mobilized

companies, four companies of the San Fernando regiment, four companies of the Porto Rico regiment, three companies of the Constitución regiment, three organizations of guerillas, two of which were mounted, one section of mountain artillery (two guns), one company of engineers, and several organizations of city volunteers and firemen; at Palma Soriano, San Luis, Dos Caminos, Moron, El Cristo, and Songo, three companies of the Cuba regiment, two companies of the San Fernando regiment, two companies of the Porto Rico regiment, three companies of the Constitución regiment, three mobilized companies, one company of Civil Guards, two troops of the King's regiment (cavalry), and several organizations of guerillas, two of which were mounted.

The eight companies of sailors that had been disembarked from Cervera's squadron were stationed as follows: one company at Socapa, two companies at San Miguel de Parades, four companies near Dos Caminos del Cobre, and one company at Las Cruces.

The problem before General Linares was to hold the city and harbour, to prevent intrusions of the insurgents, and to keep the Americans from landing on either side of the bay. Large detachments were maintained at Palma Soriano and along the railroad connecting San Luis, El Cristo, and Songo in order to preserve this cultivated section, upon which the inhabitants of Santiago depended in

great measure for their vegetables and fruits. The pipe line leading from the reservoir at Cuabitas to Santiago was guarded to preserve the water supply of the city. The pipe line along the Juragua railroad, extending from Firmeza to the Juragua docks at Las Cruces, was guarded to preserve the water supply for the ships in the harbour.

Towards the last of April the Spanish engineers, assisted by the infantry, began fortifying the land side of Santiago. So rapidly was this work executed that at the time the American army landed more than four thousand yards of ditches and trenches were completed. These field works, consisting generally of two or three lines of trenches and breastworks protected in front by barbed-wire entanglements, occupied the crests of the hills and ridges immediately surrounding the city, and formed a fortified district with its two extremities resting on the bay. The trenches were dug deep with perpendicular sides, and in many cases the excavated dirt had been carried away, so that at a distance of four or five hundred yards no sign of the work on the hilltops was visible.

At nearly all other points within this theatre of operations where troops were stationed trenches were dug along the heights and commanding positions, and a line of blockhouses, constructed originally as a protection against the insurgents, extended around the city, along the railroads, and into the mineral region of Juragua and Daiquiri.

These blockhouses, each of which was capable of holding from six to twelve soldiers, afforded very good protection against infantry fire, but were not sufficiently strong to withstand artillery.

Such was the condition of the Spanish forces at Santiago, and such were their positions when on June 22 the American warships began the bombardment of Daiquiri, Siboney, and other points of the coast preparatory to the disembarkation of General Shafter's army. On the morning of the bombardment the two companies of the Talavera regiment and one mobilized company at Daiquiri and Vinent retired upon Firmeza to avoid being surrounded by Castillo's forces. At the same time three companies of the Porto Rico regiment and three companies of the San Fernando regiment were hurried forward from the outskirts of Santiago to reënforce the troops at Siboney.

But later in the day General Linares, who was still at Santiago, having learned that the vanguard of the American army, which had landed that morning at Daiquiri, was rapidly pushing forward to Siboney, decided to evacuate both Siboney and Firmeza, and to fall back upon Sevilla, about three miles northwest of Siboney, on the direct road connecting that town with Santiago. Accordingly, he ordered the detachments at Jutici and Sardinero to retire upon Aguadores and to blow up the railroad bridge after crossing the San Juan River at that point. He also ordered General Rubin, who

was in command of the troops in the mineral region, to withdraw his forces from Siboney and Firmeza to Sevilla, to which place he himself set out early on the morning of the 23d, taking with him two rapid-fire guns and about sixty mounted and fifty dismounted guerillas. Rubin's forces, which had been harassed by the Cubans under Castillo during the march, arrived early in the day and found General Linares awaiting them.

The Spanish troops were arranged in three lines: the first, comprising three companies of the Porto Rico regiment and one mobilized company, occupied a strong natural position along a ridge, or rather a range of hills, which, just southeastward of Sevilla, crosses the main road leading from Santiago to Siboney. The second line, comprising three companies of the San Fernando regiment, a company of engineers (railroad troops), about eighty guerillas, and two rapid-fire Krupp guns, was on the plain of Sevilla, a short distance in rear of the first line. The third line, comprising five companies of the Talavera regiment, one mobilized company, and about thirty mounted guerillas, was placed at Redonda to protect the Spaniards against a flank and rear attack coming along the trails from Jutici and Sardinero to El Pozo.

General Linares was for a short time with the second line, but during the day established his headquarters at El Pozo. General Rubin had immediate command of all the forces. Major Alcañiz

commanded the first line, Colonel Borry the third.

The Spanish forces had scarcely taken their positions when Castillo's troops, who had annoyed General Rubin during the march, attempted to envelop the first line by attacking it in front and on the right flank, but they were speedily repulsed. In the afternoon the Cubans, with increased numbers, made a second attempt, but Major Alcañiz having been reënforced by a company of the San Fernando regiment, a company of engineers, and two rapid-fire guns from the second line, easily repelled the attack.

In the meantime General Linares, having become apprehensive lest the Americans should push forward along the railroad to Aguadores and, with the aid of the fire of the warships, force a crossing of the San Juan River at that point and thence march to Santiago, decided not to make a determined stand at Sevilla, but to withdraw the Spanish forces to the intrenched positions immediately surrounding Santiago. Accordingly, on the evening of the 23d General Linares sent General Rubin the following instructions:

Pozo, June 23, 1898.

The peasants handed me the paper which you wrote me, and since a quarter to five we have heard the firing of small arms and then of cannon.

Charge Colonel Borry to guard well the trail or road to Redonda where he is encamped, then the troops of the line, in case Sardinero is found to be occupied, can take said Redonda road.

I have sent to Santiago for all the pack mules and ten carts, which will be at your encampment at half-past seven or eight o'clock. Have the sick and the supplies ready that they may proceed at once to Santiago with the same escort which brings the pack mules.

Arrange to eat breakfast to-morrow where you are, and afterwards you will receive orders.

LINARES.

TO GENERAL ANTERO RUBIN.

The orders were:

After eating breakfast you will march with the entire column to Santiago, retiring from your position by echelons with due precaution and the deliberation necessary to repel effectually any attack of the enemy.

The Talavera battalion will proceed to Sueño, where it will find an official who will indicate the positions it will occupy.

The Puerto Rico battalion with the two mobilized companies of the mineral region will proceed to Cañadas and there receive orders as to the points they will occupy ; and the San Fernando battalion will proceed to Centro Benéfico to receive similar instructions. The section of artillery will report to the quarters at Dolores ; the section of engineers will go to Cruces and take up quarters in the offices of the mining company.

LINARES.

Anticipating that the troops of the first line might be attacked in force before these orders could be carried out, General Rubin, early on the morning of the 24th, brought forward two companies of the Talavera regiment from the third

line as an additional reënforcement, and began preparations to send his sick to Santiago. On the same morning he received the following additional orders:

Pozo, June 24, 1898.

NOTE: The captain of engineers is to return to Santiago with the convoy of sick and to report to Colonel Caula.

You have already received orders to retreat, which is to be done an hour after the convoy of sick has started with its escort of two mobilized companies and one of the Talavera Regiment.

The *impedimenta* will retire first; and on its arrival at Santiago, the escort will go to the points designated, and with the three echelons of Puerto Rico, San Fernando, and Talavera you will make the retreat, alternating by echelons in such manner that when the forward echelon leaves a position the other two will be in position, until arriving at Santiago. I shall wait here.¹

LINARES.

TO GENERAL RUBIN.

Meanwhile, there were rapidly taking place on the American side certain movements which in a few hours were to bring about a sharp engagement between a portion of General Rubin's forces and two small American columns. On the afternoon and night of the 23d General Wheeler, who commanded the dismounted cavalry division of General Shafter's army, and who was bent on

¹ See Appendix T.

getting his troops to the front as rapidly as possible, had pushed forward General Young's brigade abreast or in advance of General Lawton's division at Siboney. Learning from General Castillo that the Spanish troops had retired and intrenched themselves along a ridge near Sevilla, General Wheeler decided to push forward Young's brigade and attack them.

The main road from Siboney to Santiago runs in a northwesterly direction along a small valley and then ascends some three hundred feet to a gap in the hills at a point called Las Guasimas just in front of Sevilla, where it turns westward and thence runs to Santiago. To the left of this road a trail ascends the ridge just behind Siboney and, passing over the high and rough ground on the west edge of the valley, joins the main road at Las Guasimas. The road is an ordinary Cuban highway, eroded and narrow; the trail is a mere bridle path. The road and trail, after passing through dense thickets of trees, underbrush, and trailing vines, unite just behind the ridge where the Spaniards had intrenched themselves.

General Young's plan of attack was to advance along the road early the next morning with a squadron of the First Cavalry, a squadron of the Tenth Cavalry, and four Hotchkiss mountain guns, four hundred and sixty-four men in all, while Colonel Wood, with two squadrons of the First Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders), numbering

about five hundred¹ men, and two rapid-fire Colt automatic guns, moved forward along the trail. General Castillo was to support the attack with eight hundred Cubans, and had promised to be ready to start at five o'clock the next morning.

General Young, being ready to move at half-past five, sent an officer to notify Castillo, but the officer soon returned with the information that the Cuban general was asleep and his sentries would not allow him to be awakened. Young then gave the order to advance. His column started along the road at a quarter before six o'clock, and a few minutes later Wood's column moved forward along the trail.

At half-past seven Young's advance guard discovered the Spaniards on the ridge near the gap through which the road passes. Young halted his command, placed his Hotchkiss battery in position, and deployed his troops; but in order to allow the Rough Riders, who were following a more difficult route, time to reach the Spanish position, he waited a few minutes before beginning the attack. During the delay General Wheeler rode up, but made no changes in the disposition of the troops.

At about eight o'clock Young opened the fight with his Hotchkiss guns, and almost immediately

¹ According to a return dated June 20, made on board the transport, the strength of the First Volunteer Cavalry was thirty-three officers and five hundred and seventy-eight men; but when the regiment advanced upon Las Guasimas a detachment of about one hundred men was left behind to look after the baggage and supplies.

began to push forward his troops through the dense jungle in their front. The Spaniards, who had been instructed to retire "with due precaution and the deliberation necessary to repel successfully any attack of the enemy," replied with rifle volleys from behind their intrenchments, supplemented at intervals by discharges from their rapid-fire guns. So frequent were the volleys and so hot was the fire upon the Hotchkiss guns that Young ordered them under cover for a time, and General Wheeler sent back a message to General Lawton for reënforcements, saying that he had encountered "a bigger force of the enemy than he had anticipated."

But the brave men of that little band of "regulars" did not hesitate for a moment. Laboriously, in the sweltering heat, through the dense undergrowth, across the wire fences, they crept steadily forward nearer and nearer to the Spanish position. They fired few shots, but there was determination in their faces and courage in their hearts. Although the Spaniards were shooting high and the dense thickets prevented the Americans from being seen, yet a number of them fell; but, undismayed, the troopers continued to press on until they finally reached a position close under the Spanish intrenchments. Here they opened a heavy fire, and with the courage always shown by the American "regulars" on and up they went to the very crest of the Spanish position.

Meanwhile Colonel Wood's column, which had approached within a short distance of the outposts in front of the Spanish position, was moving cautiously along the trail with Captain Capron's troop as an advance guard. About half-past seven o'clock Capron sent back word that he thought he had discovered a Spanish outpost. Wood had scarcely deployed half of his troops when, suddenly, the advance guard encountered a sharp fire at short range. Captain Capron and a sergeant were killed and three privates were wounded. A Cuban guide at the head of the column fled, and the Cuban drivers of the mules that carried the Colt guns in the rear of the column also ran away, leaving the animals to wander about in the jungle.

Deploying to the right of the trail to get in touch with Young's column, and to the left to outflank the enemy, Wood pushed his troopers forward as rapidly as possible through the dense tropical jungle, driving the Spanish outposts before him. From their intrenched positions the Spaniards were for the most part firing by volleys. They were using smokeless powder, and it was difficult to locate them, and though a large proportion of the shots went high, some forty odd Americans were hit. Nevertheless, though Wood's men were untried volunteers, they continued to press steadily forward with eagerness, determination, and courage.

Thus the fighting progressed until the right of the Spanish line was forced back and Wood's men came in sight of the Spaniards on the ridge directly in front of Young's advancing troopers. At this stage of the engagement the fire of the Rough Riders struck the flank and rear of the Spaniards on this ridge, and this fire, together with the fierce attack of Young's column in their front, drove them from their intrenched position before the Americans came to close quarters.

On General Rubin's failure to repel the attack, the Spaniards immediately retired upon Santiago and the Americans occupied the field, but were too much exhausted by their exertion and the withering heat to pursue the enemy, even had it been wise to do so. Thinking that the Spaniards might be pursued, General Linares himself took position at El Pozo with the artillery until Rubin's entire force had passed.

In this engagement the Americans had about nine hundred and sixty-four officers and men; the Spaniards had in their three lines about two thousand and seventy-eight ¹ officers and men, but only fifteen hundred ² took part in the fight — their entire first line and most of their second. The Americans

¹ See Appendix S.

² "En los combates de las Guásimas (Guásima-Sevilla) tomaron parte 1500 hombres con dos piezas de artillería. Las bajas fueron; 3 oficiales y 9 de tropa muertos y 24 heridos de tropa." — Spanish government's statement. See Appendix A. General Rubin's total command, including the two companies at Aguadores, numbered about 2352 officers and men. See Appendix S.

had one officer and fifteen men killed and six officers and forty-six men wounded. The Spaniards had three officers and seven men killed and eighteen men wounded.³

Castillo had not appeared during the action, but after it was over a column of Cubans belonging to his command came on the field. About an hour after the fight ended the Ninth Cavalry arrived and relieved Young's outposts; it was followed almost immediately by Chaffee's brigade, which General Lawton, in anticipation of a fight near Sevilla, had ordered forward even before receiving Wheeler's request for reënforcements.

COMMENTS

GENERAL LINARES' troops were in a wretched condition for entering upon a campaign. Soldiers cannot be expected to win victories when they are

³ The entire Spanish loss at Las Guasimas on the 23d and 24th of June was three officers and nine men killed and twenty-four men wounded (See Appendix A). Referring to the number of Spaniards killed at Las Guasimas, Colonel Roosevelt in "The Rough Riders" says: "Captain O'Neill and I went over the ground very carefully and counted eleven dead Spaniards, all of whom were actually buried by our burying squads. There were probably two or three men whom we missed, but I think our official reports are incorrect in stating that forty-two dead Spaniards were found, this being based upon reports in which I think some of the Spanish dead were counted two or three times. Indeed I should doubt whether their loss was as heavy as ours, for they were under cover, while we advanced often in the open, and their main lines fled before we could get to close quarters."

ill paid and ill fed. Hunger is not conducive to heroism.

Early in April General Blanco had promised to send sufficient provisions to last the troops at Santiago four months, but he sent scarcely enough to last them one month. There was no good reason why he should not have fully complied with his promise; nor was there, even after the declaration of war, any good reason why the five Spanish merchant vessels which lay in the harbour of Santiago from April 21 until the first hostile ships appeared off the harbour on May 18, should not have been compelled to go to Jamaica and bring back sufficient supplies to last the troops several months. There was, indeed, in this matter an inexcusable lack of foresight and energy on the part of both Blanco and Linares. The fact that the army at Santiago happened to have an abundance of rice was due in no part to their efforts, but to the circumstance that the German steamer *Polaria*, loaded with this cereal and destined for Havana, was compelled, on account of the blockade of western Cuba, to put in at Santiago.

Linares' forces should by all means have been strongly reënforced before the arrival of General Shafter's army. Early in April General Blanco had informed Linares that the Americans intended to land an army on the coast of eastern Cuba for the purpose of making an attack on Santiago. This gave him fully two weeks before war was

declared in which to send reënforcements from Cienfuegos or Havana to Santiago. But though his correspondence with Linares shows that he realized the importance of speedily sending troops there, he failed to send even Marina's brigade, which he had promised.

That the Americans had at this time no intention of making an attack on Santiago is not, in this connection, a matter of any consequence. The point is that Blanco believed that to be their intention, and so informed his subordinate, and yet he made scarcely any effort to prepare for the expected emergency. Practically the only reënforcements sent to Santiago prior to the beginning of the blockade on May 28 were six companies of the Talavera regiment from Guantanamo, numbering about 850 officers and men. Although there were at the beginning of the blockade 5592 Spanish soldiers at Guantanamo, forty-eight miles distant from Santiago by wagon road, 8364 at Holguin, eighty-five miles distant, and 8668 at Manzanillo, one hundred and ten miles distant, none of these troops were sent to Santiago in time to take part in any of the battles of the campaign. It was not until the arrival of General Shafter's army at Santiago on June 20, fully three weeks after the beginning of the blockade, that Escario's column, numbering 3660 officers and men, was ordered to Santiago. But this column did not arrive until July 3, two days after the battles of El Caney and

San Juan. What an opportunity there was here for concentration! What an opportunity for generalship!

The greater part of the garrisons of Guantanamo, Holguin, and Manzanillo should have been concentrated at Santiago at least a week or ten days before the arrival of Shafter's army. The closing in of the American squadrons on Cervera's squadron on May 28 and June 1 must have removed all doubts in the minds of Blanco and Linares that the Americans would make a land attack against that city. Though Escario's column was harassed by the insurgents during its entire journey, it marched from Manzanillo to Santiago in twelve days, averaging about nine miles a day. At the same rate of speed a column from Guantanamo could have arrived at Santiago in less than six days, and one from Holguin in less than ten. Had two-thirds of each garrison been ordered to Santiago at the beginning of the blockade, more than fifteen thousand soldiers would have been added to Linares' army by June 10. This would have raised his total strength in that immediate vicinity to more than twenty-seven thousand men. Inasmuch as the troops actually there, even though poorly handled, made the accomplishment of Shafter's task extremely difficult, it does not seem possible that the Americans could have been successful had Linares received the reënforcements mentioned above. Again, had even Escario's

column been ordered from Manzanillo a few days earlier, it would have arrived at Santiago in time to take part in the battles of El Caney and San Juan. Since, as will be shown later, only seventeen hundred Spanish soldiers actually took part in those two hard-fought battles on July 1, one can scarcely imagine that the Americans could have been victorious had the 3579 soldiers of Escario's column been present. Victory was clearly within the grasp of the Spaniards had their generals exercised even mediocre ability. It required no Napoleon, no Wellington, no Grant, no Lee, to see this. Every soldier saw it then; every soldier sees it now. And the pity of it all is, that such brave men as the Spanish soldiers showed themselves to be, should have been required to sacrifice their lives under such incompetent leadership. Battles cannot be won without the concentration of forces; this is the foundation of all successful war; it is the A B C of a soldier's education. If a general has not the wisdom to concentrate his forces when the opportunity offers; if he has not the wisdom to make even an effort to outnumber his enemy on the battlefield, he might as well acknowledge himself beaten at the start. The Spaniards are all brave; but bravery, unless it is mixed with brains, will not carry a man far in the profession of arms.

The importance of concentration was most impressively illustrated again and again by Bonaparte

in his masterly campaign in Italy in 1796-1797. Take one of many instances. In July, 1796, Marshal Wurmser with seventy-two thousand Austrians was attempting to drive the French army of forty-five thousand men out of Italy. With his main army divided, Wurmser was advancing on either side of Lake Garda to attack Bonaparte. At this time twelve thousand Austrian troops were being besieged in the fortress of Mantua by a division of the French army numbering ten thousand men. This left Bonaparte but thirty-five thousand men to meet the sixty thousand Austrians. His plan was to concentrate his forces at the foot of Lake Garda, hold back one of the Austrian columns with a small containing force, and concentrate his remaining forces against the other column; but even then he saw he would not be able to outnumber his enemy on the battlefield. He therefore immediately raised the siege of Mantua, ordered the division there to spike their guns, burn their gun carriages, bury their projectiles, and hasten to join him at the foot of Lake Garda. He thus brought superior forces upon the battlefields of Lonato and Castiglione, and by this means defeated the Austrians and hurled them back into the Tyrol. He then resumed the siege of Mantua.

This act shows what desperate means Bonaparte saw fit at times to adopt in order to concentrate his troops and bring a superior force upon the

battlefield. In this campaign he defeated six Austrian armies sent successively against him. Though each army was larger than his own, yet he outnumbered his enemy on every battlefield except Rivoli and Arcole; and even in these two battles he had every soldier present who could be spared from other important points in the theatre of operations. To fight a battle with inferior forces when there are in the theatre of operations idle troops that can be concentrated on the battlefield shows a serious lack of strategical ability. It is not enough that troops should fight well when they reach the battlefield; it is also necessary that they be got there on time and in sufficient numbers. Herein is the test of a general's ability as a strategist. If he fails in this, he is likely to fail in all.

The fight at Las Guasimas may be correctly described as an advance guard action of the Americans and a rear guard action of the Spaniards, in which only nine hundred and sixty-four Americans and fifteen hundred Spaniards took part. The records show that the Spanish general had no intention of making a determined stand there. In fact, on the previous day he had given the order to withdraw and to fall back on the strongly intrenched positions immediately surrounding Santiago. It is clear now that if General Wheeler had not pushed forward so hurriedly from Siboney, no engagement would have taken

place at Las Guasimas. It is also clear that if General Linares had attempted to hold that position, and had brought upon the battlefield the two thousand and seventy-eight officers and men in that immediate vicinity, and his soldiers had fought with the same determination and courage that they afterwards displayed at El Caney and San Juan, it would have required the united efforts of the entire American army to dislodge them. On July 1, when only seventeen hundred Spanish soldiers were fighting at El Caney and San Juan against more than nine times their number, the Americans found great difficulty in driving them from their intrenchments.

But at the time it appeared to the Americans that the Spaniards at Las Guasimas were very anxious to maintain their position; and the fact that they were apparently driven back after two or three hours of determined fighting greatly encouraged the American troops. At the outset of a campaign nothing is more inspiring to a soldier than victory; nothing more depressing than defeat. An early success always encourages him to greater effort; it arouses his enthusiasm, raises his hopes, quickens his blood. Hardships are cheerfully endured, and difficulties, which at first appeared insurmountable, dwindle into insignificance.

As previously pointed out, General Linares should have made an effort to prevent the landing of the Fifth Corps. He had sufficient troops at

Daiquiri, Siboney, and at other points in the immediate vicinity to accomplish this object;¹ but having failed even to attempt this, he should then have made a determined stand at Las Guasimas. There were several excellent reasons why Linares should have fought the decisive battle of the war at this place.

First: The position was *naturally* very strong. The range of hills here is almost at right angles to the main road leading from Siboney to Santiago; and it rises about two hundred and fifty feet above the valley along which the road passes in reaching this point. The country between these hills and Siboney, and also to the right of the position, between La Redonda and the railroad, is so rugged and covered with such a thick growth of trees, brush, and trailing vines, that it would have been very difficult for the Americans to attack intrenched lines upon the crests of these hills. Had this position been occupied by an adequate force and a determined stand made, the American army, while waiting for the necessary supplies and transportation to be unloaded preparatory to making an attack, would have been compelled to take up a cramped defensive position around Siboney,

¹ Writing of the disembarkation at Daiquiri, Colonel Roosevelt in "The Rough Riders" says: "The country would have offered very great difficulties to an attacking force had there been resistance. It was little but a mass of rugged and precipitous hills, covered for the most part by dense jungle. Five hundred resolute men could have prevented the disembarkation at very little cost to themselves."

where there would have been much difficulty in supplying the command with water.

Second: The position was *strategically* very strong. Had the Spanish forces been massed there, Shafter could not possibly have advanced upon Santiago until he had driven them from that position. It would not have been possible for him to reach Santiago by marching north from Siboney and Daiquiri for the purpose of making a turning movement against the left flank of the Spaniards; for such a movement would have completely uncovered his base of operations. In that case Linares, by pressing forward and seizing Siboney and Daiquiri, could have sealed the fate of Shafter's army. Nor would it have been possible for Shafter to reach Santiago by moving westward and then northward along the railroad; for this movement would also have completely uncovered his base of operations at Siboney. Moreover, had such a movement been attempted, Shafter would doubtless have found great difficulty in forcing a crossing of the San Juan River at Aguadores; but even had this much of the movement been successful, there would have been no chance whatever of his cutting off the communications of the Spaniards with Santiago or of reaching the city by this route; for the reason that when two armies are in such a position on a theatre of operations that the movements of both or of either expose the communications of one or the other, that

army whose communications are first exposed will invariably turn back to fight for its communications rather than press on to further successes. Had this principle of strategy been known to Linares, it might have been of inestimable value to him; for while occupying this position, he could have cast aside all anxiety as to his communications and concentrated on the battlefield all the available troops at Santiago, knowing that the Americans could not possibly reach the city by operating along the railroad without first defeating him. That this principle was not known to him is very evident from the fact that the reason he gave for withdrawing his forces from Las Guasimas was, that he feared the Americans would push forward along the railroad and cut his communications with Santiago.

The fact is, that so long as the Spanish army was occupying a defensive position at Las Guasimas and the American army was covering its base of operations at Siboney, the only possible way that the latter could defeat the former and reach Santiago was to make a frontal attack. Of course, if Shafter had had sufficient mounted troops he could, while making a frontal attack, have sent them around the left flank of the Spaniards and in this way, perhaps, have so threatened their communications with Santiago that Linares might have been compelled to fall back to save himself from being cut off from his base of operations; but the only mounted troops that

Shafter had was a squadron of the Second Cavalry, numbering two hundred and eighty-eight men.

Linares, occupying a strong position at Las Guasimas, where his enemy was limited to a frontal attack, would have had an immense advantage in the battle, for the difficulties of frontal attacks have been enormously increased by the effectiveness of the modern military rifle. Soldiers armed with this weapon and occupying intrenched positions are able to hold a line easily against six or eight times their number advancing to attack them.¹

One hundred years ago a smooth-bore musket was the principal weapon used in battle. Its effective range was barely two hundred yards, its extreme range three hundred yards, and the bullet in going that distance rose to a height of one hundred and twenty-nine yards. The path of the bullet, the trajectory, was a curve shaped as is shown in Figure A.

The extreme range of the magazine rifle² with which the United States army is now armed, is 4781 yards, or nearly three miles. That is to say, it shoots nearly sixteen times as far as the old smooth-bore musket. At a range of one thousand yards the bullet shot from this magazine rifle rises

¹ The above statement, of course, has reference to an advancing enemy that can be seen. In the Russian-Japanese War night attacks were frequently resorted to, the contests being decided by the bayonet, very much as they were in the days of Wellington and Napoleon.

² The Mauser and Krag Jorgensen were only slightly inferior to the new United States magazine rifle.




Figure B.

$ab = 7 \text{ yds.}$




Figure C.

$EF = 1 \text{ yd}$





Figure D.

$JK = 415 \text{ yds.}$



but seven yards high, the trajectory being almost flat, as indicated in Figure B.

The dangerous space — that is, the space in the plane of fire where a man standing on the ground would be struck by the bullet — would be much greater for the weapon having the flatter trajectory. The dangerous space for the old smooth-bore musket at a range of three hundred yards is represented by the parallelogram $E F G H$ in Figure C. The dangerous space for the new United States magazine rifle aimed at about the middle point of a man at three hundred yards distant is represented by the parallelogram $\mathcal{F} K L M$ in Figure D. In the first case, a man standing at any point of the line $E F$ would be hit; and in the second case, at any point of the line $\mathcal{F} K$. In other words, the dangerous space for the new United States magazine rifle fired at an object three hundred yards distant would be about four hundred and fifteen times the dangerous space for the smooth-bore musket fired at the same object.

Again, the United States magazine rifle can be aimed and fired with considerable accuracy eight times in twenty seconds. In the Civil War it took about twenty seconds to load, aim, and fire the rifle then in use. In fact, without pausing to give time for accurate aim, it took sixteen seconds by the watch to give the commands in a proper manner. They were: (1) *Load*; (2) *Handle cartridge*; (3) *Tear cartridge*; (4) *Charge cartridge*; (5) *Draw*

ramrod; (6) *Ram*; (7) *Return ramrod*; (8) *Cast-about*; (9) *Prime*; (10) *Shoulder arms*; (11) *Ready*; (12) *Aim*; (13) *Fire*.¹

This enormous increase in power of the modern military rifle, due partly to the bullet's greater initial velocity, which gives much greater range and dangerous space, and partly to the greater rapidity of fire, has made frontal attacks against intrenched positions almost impossible of execution.

Again, the position at Las Guasimas was strategically strong, because, so long as the Spaniards occupied it, the Americans could not intercept any reënforcements that might be sent from Guantnamo along the main road to Santiago. When it is remembered that there were at Guantnamo, only forty-two miles from the battlefield of Las Guasimas, nearly six thousand soldiers, the greater part of whom could in a few days have joined Linares, the importance of holding a position which would have facilitated such a movement becomes apparent. Then again, so long as Linares held Las Guasimas, there was no danger of his being cut off from the cultivated region to the north of Santiago, upon which his troops depended for their vegetables and fruits; nor was there any danger of Santiago's being cut off from its water supply at Cuabitas.

But the chief merit of Las Guasimas as a

¹ Before the end of the war this long command was shortened somewhat.

battlefield, resulting in great measure from its position, strategically, with respect to Santiago, Siboney, and Daiquiri, the cultivated region, the Juragua railroad, and the Guantanamo-El Caney wagon-road, was that Linares could, without jeopardizing for the time being a single interest, have concentrated there at least three-fourths of the troops which were in and near Santiago. It was necessary to leave eight hundred or a thousand soldiers at the mouth of the harbour and two or three hundred at Aguadores; but with the exception of these, practically all the soldiers immediately around Santiago and in the cultivated region, and all the sailors that had been disembarked from Cervera's squadron, could have been concentrated on the battlefield of Las Guasimas. And if Linares had known that Garcia's Cuban forces had embarked from Aserraderos and landed at Siboney, as he ought to have known but did not know, he could, a little later, have also brought on the battlefield the eight companies of the Asia regiment and one mobilized company, which were on the west side of the bay in the vicinity of Punta Cabrera, Monte Real, and Mazamorra. There was no difficulty in any of the movements here suggested, nor was there any risk attending them. Prior to the disembarkation of the Fifth Corps practically all the Cuban insurgents were in the vicinity of Aserraderos and Daiquiri, under Generals Garcia and Castillo; afterwards they occupied a position near Siboney. Only a

few were in the cultivated region, and scarcely any immediately about the city of Santiago.

If Linares had concentrated all his available troops as indicated above, he would doubtless have won the battle; but even if he had lost it, he would at least have had the comforting thought that he could not have won it in any other position; for it should have been evident, even to him, that the moment he retreated from Las Guasimas, he threw away the opportunity of concentrating all his available forces on a single battlefield. When he fell back to Santiago, he had to occupy the long line of intrenched positions surrounding the city, and had to extend his left to El Caney in order to protect his water supply at Cuabitas, and to prevent the Americans from seizing the railroad connecting Santiago with the cultivated region. In other words, he gave up a strong position, where he could have fought the decisive battle of the campaign with all the advantages in his favour, and fell back to a position where he was compelled to extend his line and scatter his forces.

But there were other good reasons why Linares should have made a determined stand at Las Guasimas. In two or three weeks the fevers incident to that climate would have begun to weaken greatly the American troops. Every effort should therefore have been made to prolong the struggle. The best way to have done this was to fight at Las Guasimas; and if defeated there, to fall back

a short distance, intrench, and fight again. By repeating this operation Linares would have had a powerful auxiliary in the deadly fevers, which would have made efficient fighting on the part of the Americans next to impossible. The able commander perceives the advantages to be derived from his surroundings; nothing escapes him; he sees how the mountains, the hills, the valleys, the climate, the storms, the fevers, can be made to serve him.

Again, there was another strong reason why Linares should have made his principal effort at Las Guasimas instead of falling back to the intrenched positions surrounding Santiago. Armies which have allowed themselves to be shut up in a fortified city have nearly always been lost unless they received outside help. The history of investments from Alesia down to Port Arthur proves this. It was so at Vicksburg, when General Pemberton, against the advice of General Joseph E. Johnston, allowed himself to be enclosed in that fortified city. It was so at Metz in the Franco-Prussian War, when Bazaine allowed himself to be shut up in that city. And it was so at Santiago, when Linares, without attempting either to prevent the disembarkation of the Fifth Corps or to make a decided stand against it, hastily withdrew to the intrenched positions surrounding the city. "Among all the relations between fortress and field army," says Von der Goltz, "the latter must

make it a supreme rule *never to allow itself to be thrown into a fortress*. Even to pass through it is dangerous, because the army may be kept prisoner there against its will. *Fortresses protect the troops they contain, but, at the same time, anchor them to the spot. An army can be easily got behind fortifications, but only with difficulty back into the open field, unless it be that strong help from without lends a hand.*" When the commander of an army is hard pressed, and there is near at hand a fortified city with provisions and water within, the temptation is great to seek security there. Second-rate generals accept such opportunities, but in doing so they make fatal mistakes. The great masters of the art of war manœuvre for position, and decide upon the open battlefield the fate of their fortresses and their armies, or select, if possible, a strong position where they themselves become the besiegers. Napoleon never allowed himself to be besieged, although often when hard pressed he had opportunities of withdrawing his army into a fortified city. If Linares had made a determined stand at Las Guasimas and had rapidly called to his aid all the available troops in the vicinity of Santiago, and had handled them with military skill, Shafter's army in its cramped position, where it could move neither to the right nor to the left, would, if not successful in the first great trial of strength, have become itself the besieged army.

From this discussion it seems clear that if the

greater part of the garrisons at Guantanamo, Holguin, and Manzanillo had been concentrated at Santiago, and properly supplied with provisions, the chances of success would have been overwhelmingly in favour of the Spaniards; and, even with the situation as it actually was when the Fifth Corps landed, if Linares had brought his available troops on the battlefield of Las Guasimas, and had there maintained his position on the defensive until the arrival of Escario's column, then, after waiting a little longer for the fever to do its deadly work, had taken the offensive against the Americans, Shafter's army would have been almost certainly defeated and captured. In that case the campaign would have been indefinitely prolonged. Cervera's ships could have then remained in the harbour with comparative safety; and it is not out of reason to suppose that before a second American army could have landed and fought its way to the city, a hurricane might have driven away the vessels of Sampson's fleet and allowed Cervera to escape.

CHAPTER XII

EL CANEY AND SAN JUAN¹

IT was General Shafter's intention, before advancing upon Santiago, to take up strong positions near Siboney with all his forces until the transportation and necessary supplies could be landed. With this purpose in view he issued, early on the morning of the 24th, the following order:

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. SEGURANÇA,
OFF DAIQUIRI, June 24

TO DIVISION COMMANDERS:

The Commanding General directs me to say it is impossible to advance on Santiago until means to supply troops can be arranged. Take up strong positions where you can get water and make yourselves secure from surprise or attack.

General Lawton's division will be in front ; Kent's near Juragucito (Siboney), where he disembarked ; Wheeler's near Daiquiri ; Bates' command where it will be in support of Lawton.

Very respectfully,

E. J. MCCLERNAND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

But this order could not be carried out, for, before it was received General Wheeler had, early on the

¹ See Map 9.

morning of the 24th, pushed Young's brigade forward from Siboney to attack the enemy at Las Guasimas. Nevertheless, the victory resulting from this premature movement not only deprived the Spaniards of a strong position and greatly encouraged the Americans, but it gave the army a good camping ground well to the front, where an abundant supply of good water could be obtained. On the 25th Shafter, in expressing to Wheeler his gratification at the victory, directed him not to make another forward movement without orders.

General Shafter now began to assemble his forces at Sevilla, where they were to occupy strong positions until they could be properly supplied with rations and transportation preparatory to making an attack on Santiago. As the different organizations went forward they were ordered to report to General Wheeler, the senior officer at the front. General Shafter himself remained on board the *Segurança* until the supply departments were organized.

Wheeler's division took up a position near Sevilla, and just beyond it was Lawton's division with Chaffee's brigade in front. On the 24th Hawkins' brigade of Kent's division was sent forward, and was followed on the 26th by the other two brigades of the division. On the 25th the four mounted troops of the Second Cavalry, under Major Rafferty, marched from Daiquiri to Sevilla, and shortly afterwards the four light batteries under Major

Dillenback, which were disembarked at Daiquiri on the 25th and 26th, were fitted out and pushed to the front. On the 25th General Bates was directed to place his brigade at Siboney, and to send out a strong detachment along the railroad towards Aguadores, and to put as large a force as possible at work repairing the roads from Siboney to Sevilla. General Garcia's forces, which had landed on the 25th, took up a position in the rear of the American troops along the Siboney-Sevilla road. The Thirty-third Michigan and a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan arrived on the 27th and were disembarked at Siboney. These troops, numbering about 1365 officers and men, were a part of General Duffield's brigade, which had been ordered to Santiago from Camp Alger, Virginia. The remainder of the brigade, consisting of the Ninth Massachusetts and two battalions of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, about 1630¹ officers and men, arrived at Siboney on July 1.

As there was not room enough near Sevilla for all the troops to camp comfortably, Shafter gave Wheeler permission to move some of them a little nearer the enemy's position, but cautioned him not to bring on another engagement. Accordingly,

¹ The strength of the Thirty-third and Thirty-fourth Michigan and Ninth Massachusetts was not reported at the date of sailing, but the Thirty-third Michigan mustered in 44 officers and 978 men, the Thirty-fourth Michigan 50 officers and 980 men, and the Ninth Massachusetts 47 officers and 896 men, making a total of 2995 officers and men.

on the 26th, Lawton moved his division about three miles nearer Santiago. Wheeler's division took position immediately in the rear of Lawton, and Kent's division occupied the ground around Sevilla. Up to this time there had been only a few Cuban soldiers in advance of Lawton's division, but on the 29th the whole of General Garcia's command was moved to the front of the American army.

While these movements were being carried out General Shafter was using every possible means to land his batteries, transportation, and supplies, and to get them to the front. In this undertaking he encountered many difficulties, due not only to the confusion and lack of system with which the loading had been done at Tampa, but to the scarcity of small boats and inadequate landing facilities, and the necessity, right at the start, of transporting the supplies several miles inland.

Orders were issued requiring each organization on going to the front to carry three days' rations; but as this was not always done, and as several days elapsed before any means of transportation could be got ready, a number of organizations had to send back details of soldiers on foot for supplies. On the 25th, however, the pack trains were fitted out and began carrying rations from Siboney and Daiquiri. As the army was only five or six miles inland, it was thought that the pack mules could carry forward sufficient supplies until the greater part of the commissary, quartermaster, and

hospital stores could be disembarked; but on the 26th it was found that this method of transportation was inadequate. Urgent orders were therefore given Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrey, the Chief Quartermaster, to put ashore immediately sixty-six wagons. These wagons were at once loaded with rations and forage and hurried to the front. During the next two days more of the wagons were landed, but, owing to a lack of mules, the illness of many of the teamsters, and a scarcity of competent men to fill their places, many were still left in the holds of the transports when the army went forward to Santiago.

On the 24th orders had been given that when the transportation was put ashore it should be distributed as follows: twenty-five wagons and one pack train to each of the three divisions—Wheeler's, Lawton's, and Kent's; five wagons to Bates' independent brigade; one wagon to each mounted troop; one wagon to each battery of artillery; fifteen wagons and one pack train as an ammunition train; and the remaining wagons and one pack train as a corps train.

This assignment soon proved unsatisfactory. With the transportation divided into independent wagon trains, all of which had to pass over a narrow muddy road, there arose so much confusion and delay that a reassignment of the transportation became necessary. Accordingly, all transportation, except two pack trains allowed each division,

was placed under Captain Edward Plumber, Tenth Infantry, who kept it, when not on the road, at field headquarters, where a depot of supplies and ammunition was established. Captain Plumber received his orders direct from the Commanding General, who kept him constantly informed as to where the transportation was most needed. This arrangement, which on the whole probably worked as satisfactorily as any that could have been devised, continued throughout the campaign.

Every morning the wagons not needed to supply the troops at the front were sent to the main depots at Siboney and Daiquiri for supplies. Those that went to Siboney returned on the same day, and those that went to Daiquiri returned on the following day. By this arrangement all empty wagons were going in one direction in the morning, and all loaded wagons were returning in the afternoon. The command could have been supplied with full rations of every kind if the roads had been good, but owing to their bad condition, they often became blocked by broken down or stalled wagons, which frequently caused the train to arrive so late at night that it could not depart the next day. Delays, too, were often caused by swollen streams. Moreover, about ten days or two weeks after landing, the teamsters and packers began to be stricken with fever. The sick teamsters were replaced by soldiers, but it was not so easy to find suitable men to take the place of the packers. For this reason

there were times when the pack trains could not be used. Even when new men were obtained, their lack of experience caused frequent delays in spite of the fact that they were doing their very best. The mules and horses also became sick; nevertheless, the exigencies of the service required that they should be kept going until they dropped in their tracks. As there were barely enough pack trains and wagons to supply the command under favourable circumstances, naturally these delays caused a great deal of discomfort and some suffering. Of course there were complaints, some of them just; but most of the grumbling and complaining was done, not by regular soldiers, but by newspaper correspondents, who, though they pictured vividly and truthfully the hardships and sufferings, often failed to perceive the real causes of this condition of affairs, or to appreciate the difficulties that were being overcome by this sweltering, struggling army of earnest men.

It soon became evident that only bread, meat, coffee, and sugar could be supplied to the troops with certainty; the rest of the ration — potatoes, onions, beans, canned tomatoes, and other things — only occasionally. There were instances where a few regiments were without any rations for a day or two. These cases arose, however, not from any fault in the system of supplying the troops, but from the failure of some of the regimental commanders to carry out the order to take three days'

rations on going to the front. For example, one regiment took scarcely any rations, another only one day's rations. As it took nearly two days for these regiments to reach their camping places, their condition upon arrival was almost desperate.

Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, the Chief Engineer of the Fifth Corps, had charge of road building and reconnoissance. At first General Bates' brigade furnished the details for the repair of the Sevilla-Siboney road; but on the 27th this work was turned over to the Engineer Battalion, under Captain Burr, which up to this time had been building piers at Aserraderos and Siboney. Additional details for this work, mostly from volunteer regiments, were also furnished Captain Burr. These details cleared away the brush on both sides of the roads, corduroyed the swampy portions, improved the drainage, opened up new roads and trails so that all portions of the army could be reached by wagons or pack mules, and built a few small bridges and culverts with such material as was at hand, which was often bad and difficult to procure. This work, however, was greatly retarded by the lack of transportation. Had the engineers been able to bridge the larger streams, they could have improved greatly the carrying capacity of the roads, but having brought no transportation with them and having received none after their arrival, they could not bring forward the bridge material which was on board the steamer *Alamo*.

As early as the 26th General Shafter directed Wheeler to make a careful reconnoissance to the right and left of the main road leading from Sevilla to Santiago; he also directed him to examine carefully the road leading to El Caney, as he thought it probable that he might send a division to assault that place. This work was done by Wheeler with the assistance of Lawton and especially of Chaffee, whose brigade was occupying an advanced position. The work of reconnoissance was deemed of so great importance that Lieutenant-Colonel Derby gave his entire attention to it. He and six officers explored the roads and trails in front of the army, worked their way each day nearer and nearer to the enemy's outposts, questioned carefully the inhabitants, made rough maps of the country and roads and trails, and took notes of what they saw and heard. The information thus gained was daily systematized and charted by civilian assistants. By this means General Shafter and his division and brigade commanders received pretty accurate knowledge of the roads and trails,¹ the positions occupied by the Spaniards, the size of the garrison at El Caney, the weakness of the enemy in artillery, and his lack of supplies.

During these days the Chief Signal Officer,

¹ There was, however, little or nothing learned about the roads and trails behind the Spanish outposts, which were posted a half mile or more in front of San Juan Heights. A reconnoissance in force would have been necessary to gain this information.

Major Greene, constructed a telephone line from Daiquiri through Siboney to army and division headquarters; and, subsequently, whenever the troops moved, it was quickly extended to stations directly in rear of the commands, so that the Commanding General was able at all times to talk with his division commanders or with officers at Daiquiri or Siboney. Some time before July 1 a coastwise cable running from the terminus of the ocean cable at Playa del Este, Guantanamo Bay, to Santiago was picked up and cut, and the end carried to Siboney. This cable, together with the telephone line, gave General Shafter direct communication with Washington.

It was General Shafter's desire to attack the enemy at Santiago at the earliest possible moment. As early as the 26th he had written Admiral Sampson that he would begin his advance towards Santiago on Tuesday, the 28th, and asked him to prevent any Spaniards from crossing the San Juan River at Aguadores, but on the very day he wrote the letter he learned that Duffield's brigade was on the way from Camp Alger to reënforce him; he therefore decided to await its arrival. As already stated, a part of the brigade arrived on the 27th; the remainder was expected in three or four days.

Such was the situation when late on the afternoon of the 28th Shafter was informed that eight thousand Spanish regulars were advancing at the

rate of twelve miles a day from Manzanillo to Santiago.¹ It was reported that they were already within fifty-four miles of Santiago, and that they had with them an abundance of beef cattle and other supplies. After receiving this information Shafter was unwilling to wait any longer for the reënforcements. Although the equipment of his corps was still far from complete and scarcely any rations had been accumulated at the front, nevertheless he believed that the time had come to fight.

On the 29th he came ashore and established his headquarters about a mile east of El Pozo near the Sevilla-Santiago road, along which the troops were camped. At this time his outposts were on a line running north and south through El Pozo, which lies about three miles east of Santiago. Directly north of El Pozo, at a distance of about three miles, is the village of El Caney, through which passes the main road from Santiago to Guantanamo. About half-way between El Pozo and Santiago is a range of hills known as San Juan Heights, which cover the eastern approaches to the city. The highest point of the range is San Juan Hill, which has an elevation of about one hundred and twenty-five feet above the surrounding valleys. Along the east side of the ridge the San Juan River² flows southward to the sea.

¹ This was Escario's column; it left Manzanillo with thirty-six hundred and sixty officers and men.

² According to a number of authorities, that portion of the stream in front of San Juan Heights is known as Purgatorio

The Aguadores River, which flows westward from the high ground near Sevilla, empties into the San Juan River about five or six hundred yards southeast of San Juan Hill. Las Guamas Creek flows nearly south from El Caney and empties into the Aguadores River near its mouth. From El Pozo the Sevilla-Santiago road runs along the south side of the Aguadores River, and, after crossing that stream at a ford about four hundred yards above its mouth, crosses the San Juan River at another ford, and thence, ascending about one hundred feet, cuts through the San Juan Hill and passes on to Santiago. From El Pozo another road runs northward through Marianage to El Caney; and from Los Mangos, near which were General Shafter's headquarters, there is also a hill trail to El Caney. The Sevilla-Santiago road passes through a dense thicket of trees and undergrowth¹ until it reaches the crossing of the Aguadores River; beyond that point the country is much more open. Little San Juan Hill, known since the battle as Kettle Hill, is on the right of the road and on the right bank of the San Juan River; the highest point of San Juan Hill, upon which there was a blockhouse, is on the left of the road. Between San Juan Hill and Kettle

Creek, San Juan River having its origin at the junction of this creek and the Aguadores River. But whatever doubts there may be as to the correct name of the stream in front of San Juan Heights, it was known to the Americans as San Juan River.

¹ See Map 10.

Hill there is a shallow lake about one hundred yards in width and two or three hundred yards in length.

Early on the morning of June 30 General Shafter, accompanied by several members of his staff, rode along the Sevilla-Santiago road as far as El Pozo. From a hill near this place he obtained an excellent view of the city of Santiago, San Juan Heights, San Juan Hill, and the country about El Caney. At the same time Generals Lawton and Chaffee, with some of their staff officers, were also making a reconnoissance of the country immediately about El Caney. They returned to General Shafter's headquarters about noon and reported that their investigations led them to believe that there were at El Caney only five or six hundred soldiers, and that the place could be captured in about two hours.

After hearing these reports General Shafter assembled his division commanders and communicated to them the following plan of battle for the next day: Lawton's division, supported by Capron's battery, was to assault El Caney at day-break the next morning, or as early thereafter as possible, and, as soon as this division was well engaged, the other two divisions, supported by Grimes' battery, were to move directly forward into position, and upon Lawton's arrival after the capture of El Caney, were to attack the Spaniards on San Juan Heights. Wheeler's division was to

deploy to the right of the Sevilla-Siboney road and Kent's division to the left. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to march directly towards Santiago along the El Caney-Santiago road, to take position on the right of Wheeler, and to join him and Kent in an attack on San Juan Heights. Duffield, at four o'clock the same morning, was to send the Thirty-third Michigan along the railroad from Siboney and attack Aguadores.

Preparatory to carrying out this plan Lawton's division with Capron's light battery, on the afternoon of June 30, took the hill trail to El Caney and bivouacked for the night near that place, ready to begin the assault at daylight. Wheeler's division, with Grimes' light battery, moved along the Sevilla-Santiago road as far as El Pozo, where they camped for the night. Kent's division moved on the same point, but did not arrive until the morning of July 1. Bates, at Siboney, was directed to proceed to the front at once with his brigade, and to report to the Commanding General upon arrival. Duffield, who was left in command at Siboney, was directed to send the Thirty-third Michigan along the railroad at four o'clock the next morning and make an attack upon Aguadores. Major Rafferty, with the mounted squadron of the Second Cavalry, was to remain near headquarters until the morning of July 1, when he was to move forward to El Pozo and wait for further orders. Major Dillenback, with the two remaining light batteries, Best's and

Parkhurst's, was directed to hold himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice on the morning of July 1. General Garcia was requested¹ to move his command along the El Pozo and El Caney road on the morning of July 1, to pass to the left and rear of Lawton's division, that is, between El Caney and San Juan Heights, to take up a position covering the El Cobre road, which enters Santiago on the northwest side, and to prevent any Spanish reënforcements from entering the city. He was to send a detachment of about fifty men with Lawton's division, and to leave about the same number with Wheeler's and Kent's divisions. Admiral Sampson was informed that a battle would be fought the next day, July 1, and was requested to bombard the Spanish position at Aguadores, and also to make a demonstration at the mouth of the harbour.

Up to this time the health of the American troops had been excellent. The camps had been located along the streams where there was an abundant supply of good water. The food supplies, though scarce at first, had now become ample. The result of the action at Las Guasimas had greatly encouraged the soldiers; they were eager for the struggle, and as they marched forward to take their positions for the coming battle, little realizing what

¹ General Shafter had no authority to exercise any direct military control over General Garcia; whatever he wished him to do was therefore "requested," instead of "directed" or "ordered."

desperate fighting was in store for them, their blood quickened, their spirits rose; already they seemed to feel the thrill of victory.

After the fight at Las Guasimas and the retirement of Rubin's command to Santiago, General Linares made only a few changes in the disposition of his forces. As the Americans pressed forward he felt greatly the need of more troops to defend the city, especially to take the place of the sailors, who would have to reëmbark should Admiral Cervera receive orders to sail out of the harbour. Escario's column was expected at any moment, and instructions had already been given that a part of the troops occupying the cultivated region and inland towns north of Santiago should join this column as it passed through Palma Soriano on its way to Santiago. Linares might have obtained additional reënforcements from the troops at the mouth of the harbour and on the west side of the bay in the vicinity of Punta Cabrera and El Cobre, if he had known that Garcia's command had embarked at Aserraderos and been transported to Siboney; but being ignorant of this important movement, he felt that it would be hazardous to withdraw any part of his army from the west side of the bay or the mouth of the harbour.

On June 30 the Spanish forces in the immediate vicinity of Santiago and the harbour occupied the following positions:

Officers
and men.

At Punta Cabrera, Monte Real, El Cobre, and Mazamorra connecting with Socapa, eight companies of the Asia regiment and one mobilized company ¹	1233
Between Mazamorra and Monte Real, two companies of sailors ²	250
At Socapa, one company of the Cuba regiment, one mobilized company, and one company of sailors	399
At the Morro, three companies	411
At Aguadores, two companies	274
Between Aguadores and the heights of San Juan and along the railroad to Las Cruces, six companies of the Cuba regiment	822
At various points along the shores of the bay and in the mountain passes surrounding Santiago, six mobilized companies and five companies of the Cuba regiment	1507
At El Caney, three companies of the Constitución regiment and one company of dismounted guerillas	520
The city of Santiago and the line of intrenched positions immediately surrounding it were occupied as follows: At Dos Caminos del Cobre and adjacent trenches, four companies of sailors commanded by Captain Joaquin Bustamante, of the Spanish navy	500

¹ The average strength of the companies of the Spanish army at Santiago was 137 men. See Appendix F.

² The eight companies of sailors that had been disembarked averaged 125 men per company.

Officers
and men.

At and near San Antonio, Santa Inés, and El Sueño, four companies of the Talavera regiment and two mobilized companies	822
Near the junction of El Caney and El Pozo road, one company of the Talavera regiment, one company of the Porto Rico regiment, and two rapid-fire guns	324
On San Juan Hill and Kettle Hill, one company of the Talavera regiment	137
At Cañosa, one hundred and forty mounted guerrillas	140
At Santa Úrsula and Cañades, three companies of the Porto Rico regiment and one mobilized company	548
In intrenched positions on the heights in front of Santa Úrsula and along the roads to the lagoons, three companies of the San Fernando regiment	411
At Las Cruces, a company of engineers and a company of sailors	262
In the city, the following volunteers and firemen:	
First battalion: Colonel Manuel Barrueco .	630
Second battalion: Lieutenant-Colonel José Mariñón	485
Firemen: Colonel Emilio Aguerrizábal . .	324
Company of guides: Captain Federico Bosch	200
Company of veterans: Captain José Pratt .	130
Troop of cavalry	100
Total	10,429

The Spaniards had no field artillery except two rapid-fire 3-inch Krupp guns belonging to the section of mountain artillery; and the only modern artillery for defence consisted of the ten pieces¹ mounted in the batteries of the harbour, two 3-inch Placentia guns, which were brought into the city by Colonel Escario on July 3 and afterwards mounted near Cañosa, and one 3.5-inch Hontoria gun and two 3-inch Maxim guns, which were held in readiness for use within the city limits. There were, however, in Santiago about two dozen old rifled bronze cannon of various calibres, seventeen of which were mounted at important points² on the outskirts of the city.

THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY³

The defensive works at El Caney consisted of four wooden blockhouses, situated along the west and north side of the village, a stone church, which had been loopholed for rifle fire, and a stone fort called El Viso, which occupied a commanding position on a hillock about five hundred yards

¹ Later, on July 6, the two 3.5-inch breech-loading Krupp guns, which had been mounted at Punta Gorda during the latter part of April, were removed to the city of Santiago.

² At Fort San Antonio, one 6.3-inch, two 3-inch; at Fort Santa Inés, one 6.3-inch, one 4.7-inch; at Sueño, one 6.3-inch, one 4.7-inch, two 3-inch, at entrance to El Caney road, one 6.3-inch, one 4.7-inch; at Fort Santa Úrsula, one 6.3-inch, two 3-inch; at Fort Cañadas, one 6.3-inch; at Fort Centro Benéfico, one 4.7-inch; at Fort Horno, one 4.7-inch.

³ See Map 9.

southeast of the town. In front of and partially connecting the blockhouses and stone fort were rifle pits and deep narrow trenches protected by barbed-wire entanglements. These works covered all the approaches to the village, but El Viso was the key to the position. As the Spaniards had neither artillery nor machine guns, they were compelled to rely wholly for defence upon their small arms, their stone fort, blockhouses, trenches, wire entanglements, and the great natural strength of their position. The garrison of the place, not including about one hundred inhabitants who participated to a greater or less extent in the fighting, consisted of three companies of the *Constitución* regiment and one company of guerillas—a total force of about five hundred and twenty soldiers. Brigadier-General Joaquín Vara de Rey was in command.

At the opening of the battle Lawton had with him the brigades of Chaffee, Miles, and Ludlow, Capron's battery, and Troop D, Second Cavalry. Bates' independent brigade, having arrived at General Shafter's headquarters that morning from Siboney, was sent to El Caney at ten o'clock A. M. Thus reënforced, Lawton had under his command about 6653 officers and men.

The three brigades of Lawton's division left their bivouacs between four and five o'clock on the morning of July 1, to begin the attack. Chaffee's brigade, consisting of the Twelfth, Seventh, and Seventeenth Infantry, took up a position six or

eight hundred yards from El Viso, on the east side of the village. Ludlow's brigade, consisting of the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and Second Massachusetts, marched to the southwest side of the town to seize the El Caney-Santiago road and cut off the escape of the garrison. Miles' brigade was held in reserve, two regiments of which, the Fourth and Twenty-fifth, proceeded to the south side of the village near the Ducoureau House; the Third regiment, the First Infantry, together with Troop D Second Cavalry, was held in support of Capron's battery.

At half-past six the battle was begun by Capron's battery from the top of a hill a little more than a mile south of El Caney. Chaffee's brigade then opened fire, followed almost immediately by Ludlow's brigade. The Spaniards replied from their blockhouses, trenches, and rifle pits, and from El Viso and the village. So deadly was the fire that the Americans, who were within about six hundred yards of the enemy's position, found it impossible to go farther. For the next four or five hours the fighting was a great rifle duel with heavy losses on both sides. Capron's battery continued at intervals to bombard the enemy's position, but the fire was not very effective. Meanwhile the Americans, fighting in the open while the Spaniards were in a fortified position, were suffering far greater loss than they were able to inflict. But in spite of their losses the men of Lawton's command, inspired by

the example of brave leaders, were making every effort to push forward and drive the enemy from his intrenchments. Hugging the very earth for protection, these determined men fastened their eyes upon El Caney and, as the long hours of that fierce struggle passed by, they, amidst dead and dying comrades, crawled and crept and dragged themselves unflinchingly nearer and nearer to their death-dealing foes. "I have never seen," said a staff-officer of General Vara de Rey, "anything to equal the courage and dash of those Americans, who, stripped to the waist, offering their naked breasts to our murderous fire, literally threw themselves on our trenches — on the very muzzles of our guns. We had the advantage of position, and mowed them down by the hundreds; but they never retreated or fell back an inch. As one man fell, shot through the heart, another would take his place, with grim determination and unflinching devotion to duty in every line of his face. Their gallantry was heroic."

The courage of the Spaniards was magnificent. As the shrapnel burst over the village or crashed into the stone fort, as the hail of lead swept over the intrenchments, searching out every loophole, every crevice, every corner, the soldiers of that incomparable hero, Vara de Rey, coolly and deliberately continued for hours to rise in their trenches and pour volley after volley upon the oncoming Americans. Their numbers grew fewer and fewer,

their trenches were filled with dead and wounded, but still, with a determination and courage beyond praise, they resisted the attacks, and for eight hours held at bay more than ten times their number of as brave troops as ever trod a battlefield.

About one o'clock Miles' brigade, which was in reserve, was ordered up on the right of Ludlow's brigade, and Bates' brigade was placed in position between Miles and Chaffee. About two o'clock Capron's battery, which had until this time kept up almost a continuous fire, was moved forward to within about a thousand yards of the enemy's lines, where its fire became much more effective.

In the meantime, while Chaffee, with great difficulty and heavy losses was drawing nearer and nearer to El Viso and the village on the east side, Ludlow was gradually closing in with his two regiments of regulars, the Eighth and Twenty-second, upon the blockhouses and intrenched positions on the southwest side. His third regiment, the Second Massachusetts, though it suffered severely, took little part in the battle. Like all the volunteer regiments except the Rough Riders, it was armed with the old Springfield rifle and black-powder cartridges, the smoke of which drew such a heavy return fire that the regiment was ordered early in the engagement to withdraw from the firing line.

By this time General Shafter had become much worried at the desperate and prolonged resistance of the Spaniards at El Caney, and now felt the

imperative need of having Lawton's division push forward to the heights of San Juan, where the bulk of the American army had been fighting hard for the last four or five hours. Accordingly, at about two o'clock in the afternoon he sent Lawton the following order:

July 1st.

LAWTON: I would not bother with little blockhouses. They can't harm us. Bates' brigade and your division and Garcia should move on the city and form the right of the line going on Sevilla road. Line is now hotly engaged.

SHAFTER.

But at the time this order was received, Lawton's command was engaged in the final assault upon El Caney, and it was then impossible to withdraw the troops.

At about half-past two or three o'clock, Capron's battery got the range of El Viso, shot away its flagstaff, and began to make breaches in its thick walls. General Chaffee, believing that the enemy had not now sufficient strength to resist an assault, ordered the Twelfth Infantry to charge, whereupon this regiment, followed closely by several regiments of Bates' and Miles' brigades on the south side of the fort, swept up the hill, drove the Spaniards from their trenches, and took the fort by storm.

El Viso had fallen, but the fighting continued for nearly two hours longer. The Spaniards still

held the village and a number of intrenched positions, but in the face of an overwhelming fire they were soon compelled to fall back from position to position and from house to house until, finally, they were forced out of the village and driven westward along the San Miguel Trail.

The battle ended at about five o'clock. The American loss was four officers and seventy-seven men killed, and twenty-five officers and three hundred and thirty-five men wounded; total, four hundred and forty-one.¹

The loss of the Spaniards, not including those captured or the inhabitants of the village who were killed and wounded, was about two hundred

¹ The following table shows the strength and losses by organizations as given in the Adjutant-General's Office at Washington:

American Forces at El Caney.	Strength June 30.	Killed July 1.	Wounded July 1.
Lawton's Division, headquarters and staff	8	..	..
Ludlow's Brigade, headquarters and staff	11	..	..
Eighth U. S. Infantry	506	6	46
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry	496	7	42
Second Massachusetts Infantry	907	5	40
Miles' Brigade, headquarters and staff .	13	..	..
First U. S. Infantry	452	..	1
Fourth U. S. Infantry	465	7	35
Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry	527	8	25
Chaffee's Brigade, headquarters and staff	20	..	..
Seventh U. S. Infantry	916	33	99
Twelfth U. S. Infantry	584	8	31
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry	506	4	27
Bates' Brigade, headquarters and staff .	11	..	..
Third U. S. Infantry	485	2	3
Twentieth U. S. Infantry	596	1	8
Capron's Battery	82	..	..
Troop D, Second Cavalry	68	..	..
Signal Corps and Hospital Corps	Few men	..	3
Total	6653	81	360

and thirty-five.¹ Of the survivors Lieutenant-Colonel Puñet, who succeeded to the command after the death of General Vara de Rey, was able to take back to Santiago on that night only about one hundred men; about one hundred and twenty were captured, and the remainder were so widely dispersed that they were unable to regain their command for several days. General Vara de Rey was shot through both legs while rallying his men in the village square after the storming of the fort, and as his men were carrying him to the rear on a stretcher, he was instantly killed by a shot through the head. The Americans, filled with admiration for this brave man, buried his remains with military honours.

THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN HILL²

Early on the morning of July 1, when it became evident to General Linares that the Americans had not only begun an attack against El Caney but were massing their forces in front of San Juan Heights, he established his headquarters about eight hundred yards in rear of San Juan Hill, near the junction of the El Pozo and El Caney roads, and made the following changes in the disposition of his forces: He sent forward the two companies and the two rapid-fire Krupp guns that had been occupying the position near the junction of the El Pozo and El Caney roads, to reënforce the Talavera

¹ See Appendix V.

² See Maps 9 and 10.

company, which was in position on San Juan Hill and on Kettle Hill. The troops sent forward were under the command of Colonel José Vaquero, who placed them in position on San Juan Hill and along the San Juan Heights on both sides of the Santiago-El Pozo road. At eleven o'clock, a little more than two hours before the assault on San Juan Hill, the Spaniards at that point were reënforced by sixty volunteers taken from the city. The three companies mentioned above, the two rapid-fire guns, and the detachment of volunteers, numbering all told about five hundred and twenty-one men, formed the first line. Three companies of the Talavera regiment from the vicinity of San Antonio and Santa Inés were ordered to take the place of the troops that had been sent forward from the junction of the El Caney and El Pozo roads. One company was placed to the right of the El Pozo road, one to the left of the El Caney road, and one at the junction of the two roads. These three companies, together with the 6.3-inch gun and the 4.7-inch gun that had been mounted there on June 13, formed the second line. The troops of this line, numbering about four hundred and eleven men, were commanded by General Linares in person. One hundred and forty mounted guerillas, protected by a hillock near Cañosa, formed the third line. Back of this line, within the city and surrounding it from the cemetery on the northwest side to Las Cruces on the bay on the

southwest side, there were about 4352 regular soldiers, sailors, volunteers, and firemen. Of this number probably about eight hundred or a thousand were sick in the hospital.

About one o'clock, when the Americans began a heavy fire upon the Spanish trenches with cannon, Gatling guns, and small arms, just preceding the assault on San Juan Hill, Linares, realizing that his first line could no longer hold its position, sent forward the mounted guerillas to cover its withdrawal. To take the place of the guerillas one hundred convalescents from the hospital in the city were given arms and sent to Cañosa as a reserve. A little later in the afternoon a company of sailors, under Captain Bustamante of the navy, was ordered to the battlefield.

During the morning hours of July 1 the divisions of Wheeler and Kent were waiting at El Pozo for Lawton to defeat or capture the enemy at El Caney before moving forward to take the position already assigned them for an attack on San Juan Heights. Nearly two hours had passed since Lawton had begun his attack; he was heavily engaged, and all indications pointed to the fact that he was meeting with stubborn resistance. There was great danger that Linares might reënforce Vara de Rey at El Caney, and even defeat Lawton before Wheeler and Kent could make an attack along the San Juan Heights. Accordingly, it was decided to push forward these two divisions with all possible

haste, and place them in position to engage the enemy.

The principal road available for this movement was the El Pozo-Santiago road, which passed through such a dense jungle of trees, thorny bushes, underbrush, and trailing vines, that no deployment was made until the more open country beyond the ford of the Aguadores was reached. Moreover, for half a mile or more before reaching the ford, which is only about twelve hundred yards from San Juan Hill and less than half that distance from Kettle Hill, the road was within easy reach of the fire of the enemy's guns and small arms.

Sumner, who was in temporary command of Wheeler's division, was directed to move forward at once, cross the Aguadores River, turn to the right, and deploy his division in front of what is now known as Kettle Hill, with his left resting on the El Pozo-Santiago road. Kent was to follow Sumner, and after crossing the Aguadores and San Juan Rivers was to turn to the left and deploy his division directly in front of San Juan Hill, with his right resting on the El Pozo-Santiago road and his left extending beyond the south extremity of San Juan Hill.

General Shafter had selected El Pozo as the place for his headquarters during the battle, but being ill, he was not able to proceed there. He sent, however, his Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, as his representative to issue

orders, and to give such instructions as might become necessary. By means of orderlies and a telephone, McClernand kept in as close touch as possible with General Shafter, who during the greater part of the day was on a hill about a mile in rear of El Pozo, where he could observe the movements at El Caney as well as those at San Juan. Lieutenant Miley, one of Shafter's aides, was sent to the front with the troops to supervise the attacks. General Wheeler, on account of sickness, was not in command of the cavalry division during the forenoon; but with his usual indomitable pluck he went to the front at the sound of the guns, performed valuable and dangerous service during the battle, and about two o'clock resumed the command of his division.

At 8.20 A. M., Grimes' battery, which had taken up a position on a hill to the left of the El Pozo-Santiago road at a distance of about twenty-five hundred yards from San Juan Hill, opened upon the enemy. At this range the fire was not very effective, and the smoke of the black powder used in the guns disclosed the position of the battery and drew upon it a heavy return fire. For three-quarters of an hour there was a heavy artillery duel.

About the time the artillery fire ceased, Sumner's division began to move forward. His first brigade reached the ford at about ten o'clock. To protect his advance, Grimes' battery resumed

firing on San Juan Heights and kept it up at intervals until the troops were ready for the final charge.

When about half of Sumner's division had crossed the Aguadores River and turned to the right, the Signal Corps balloon, which had that morning made an ascension near El Pozo, was, by means of guy ropes, moved through the air directly down the road to the crossing of the Aguadores River. The balloon at once became a target for the enemy's guns; and the musketry fire, which had already become spirited, was greatly increased. Torn by a shell, the balloon soon collapsed, but the heavy fire along the road continued; and as the troops were in a position where they could neither take shelter nor reply to this destructive fire, their soldierly qualities were heavily taxed to meet the situation without becoming demoralized. Before the balloon descended, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, who was in it, fortunately discovered a trail, which, from a point of the main road just opposite the mouth of Las Guamas Creek, leads to the left and crosses the San Juan River just below the mouth of the Aguadores. This discovery enabled a part of Kent's division to take the trail; a movement that not only relieved the congestion of troops along the main road, but enabled the deployment, which was proceeding very slowly, to be accomplished with greater despatch.

After crossing the Aguadores, Sumner turned to the right and moved into position directly in front of Kettle Hill, where, partly sheltered by a sunken road and the irregularities of the ground, he waited for the order to attack; in the meantime Kent's division was getting into position.

General Hawkins, who was in command of the first brigade of Kent's division, had received orders to move forward on the main road with the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, to cross the Aguadores Ford, to deflect to the left, and to form line, preparatory to moving directly upon San Juan Hill as soon as the remainder of the division should form on his left. His third regiment, the Seventy-first New York, and the two remaining brigades of the regiment, Wikoff's and Pearson's, were directed to take the trail discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby while in the balloon. In accordance with this plan Hawkins crossed the Aguadores Ford, and formed his line along a sunken road in a more or less open piece of ground in the angle formed by the junction of the San Juan and Aguadores Rivers.

When the Seventy-first New York was thrown forward into the narrow trail, which for several hundred yards was directly in line of the Spanish guns on San Juan Hill, the heavy fire that was poured upon the advance battalion caused it to recoil in confusion upon the rest of the regiment. At this critical moment a number of Kent's

staff-officers formed a line behind the panic-stricken men and urged them to go forward. But this effort not being successful, the men were ordered to lie down in the thickets at the side of the trail and thus clear the way for the second and third battalions of the regiment, which were coming up in somewhat better order.

In the meantime Kent had sent back word for Wikoff's and Pearson's brigade to hurry forward. Owing to the congestion of troops along the main road and to the trail's being blocked by the Seventy-first New York, the progress of the troops in the rear had been very slow. It was twenty minutes past twelve o'clock when Wikoff's brigade, consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth Infantry, entered the trail; but pushing aside the men of the Seventy-first New York, who still blocked the pathway, or stepping over their prostrate forms, these three regiments soon forced their way to the front. As they advanced along the narrow trail, the shot and shell and hail of bullets, and the sight of the dead and wounded, were enough to make the bravest men recoil; but the soldiers of this brigade, with the heroic Wikoff at their head, never for a moment wavered. Arriving upon the left bank of the San Juan, they leaped in, waded the stream, and clambered up the right bank, where they had a clear view of the blockhouse and intrenchments on San Juan Hill, scarcely more than five hundred yards away.

Colonel Wikoff now began to place his brigade in position along the sunken road on the right bank of the San Juan River. Totally oblivious of the destructive fire about him, he was personally directing the deployment of the Thirteenth Infantry, then in the lead, when he was shot through the body and died in fifteen or twenty minutes. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth of the Thirteenth Infantry immediately assumed command of the brigade, and under a terrific fusillade continued the deployment. Almost immediately Lieutenant-Colonel Worth fell, severely wounded; and Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum of the Twenty-fourth Infantry had hardly taken command when he too was disabled by a severe wound. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers of the Ninth Infantry.

In the meantime General Hawkins, from his position along the sunken road between the two converging rivers, had been making a desperate effort to push forward his two regiments. In his front were a fringe of trees, a barbed-wire entanglement, a grassy field, and the San Juan River, — all in clear view of the Spaniards and covered by the guns and small arms on San Juan Hill. The Sixth Infantry finally pushed forward through the trees and entanglement to the open field, and began firing upon the enemy's position. The attack was answered by a terrific fusillade. In ten minutes about a fourth of the men of the regiment were

killed or wounded. To attempt to hold this position until Wikoff's and Pearson's brigades could get into position would have resulted in the annihilation of the regiment. Orders were therefore given for its withdrawal to the protection of the sunken road.

By this time the enemy's fire from Kettle Hill and the heights of San Juan had caused heavy losses in Sumner's division, which was waiting for the order to attack. There was still no indication that Lawton would shortly move forward from El Caney and join his forces on to the right of this division. Evidently it would soon become necessary for Sumner either to advance or to retreat under fire. Appreciating this fact, Lieutenant Miley, who had gone to the front with Sumner's division, had sent back word that "The heights must be taken at all hazards. A retreat now would be a disastrous defeat." McClernand replied that Shafter's orders were for Kent and Sumner to fight all their men if they could do so to advantage, and added, "From present firing I think Lawton is at it hard. Don't let him fight it out alone." Thereupon Lieutenant Miley, representing General Shafter, authorized Sumner to advance.

Sumner at once ordered his first brigade to attack Kettle Hill, and his second brigade to support the attack. The red-roofed house on top of Kettle Hill was pointed out as the objective, and the movement at once began. Crawling along the

ground, taking advantage of every shelter, here and there rushing forward, the troopers steadily pushed on in the face of a galling fire. As they advanced the support pushed forward to the main line, and many of the companies and some of the regiments became mixed; but, regardless of formation, they quickened their pace, rushed across the open field, tore through the thick undergrowth and wire entanglements at the foot of the slope, waded the San Juan River, and charged up the hill. Before they reached the summit the Spaniards had fled toward San Juan Heights.

The assault on Kettle Hill was made principally by the First Cavalry, Ninth Cavalry, Rough Riders, and a part of the Tenth Cavalry; the remainder of the division, the Third Cavalry, Sixth Cavalry, and the greater part of the Tenth Cavalry, deflected to the left and joined themselves on to the right of Hawkins' brigade, which had begun to move forward for an attack on San Juan Hill.

Just at this time, about one o'clock, three Gatling guns, under the command of Lieutenant Parker, opened fire on San Juan Hill. With persistence and courage he had moved forward along the main road, crossed the Aguadores and San Juan Rivers, and taken up a position in a clump of trees near the San Juan Ford, only six hundred yards from the enemy's position. The fire of these guns was so effective that in five minutes the Spaniards were seen running from their intrenchments to the rear.

Simultaneously with the opening of the Gatlings, the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, following the lead of General Hawkins and Lieutenant Ord, crossed the San Juan River and started for San Juan Hill. At about the same moment the men of Ewers' brigade on Hawkins' left, and a part of the cavalry division on his right, arose from the sunken roads and sheltering river-banks and joined in the charge. The valley was soon alive with a multitude of cheering, struggling men advancing in the face of terrific volleys, some halting to fire, some rushing forward, all with eyes intently fixed upon the Spanish blockhouse and intrenchments crowning San Juan Hill. In the lead was that intrepid veteran, General Hawkins. His erect figure, white hair, and inspiring presence, as he charged at the head of those two brave regiments, swinging his hat and calling out, "Come on! come on!" while above the incessant crash of small arms and the drumming clatter of Gatlings, above the roar of cannon and the shriek of hurtling shells, was heard again and again the thrilling note of his bugle sounding the "Advance," form a picture that must quicken the heart-beats of every admirer of heroic deeds as long as the world counts courage and self-sacrifice among the noblest traits of men.

As the line advanced, Sumner's men, who had just captured Kettle Hill, Parker's Gatlings near San Juan Ford, and the batteries of Grimes, Parkhurst,

and Best, on an elevation near El Pozo, fired over the heads of the soldiers and swept the line of the enemy's trenches. In a few minutes the Americans crossed the valley, reached the foot of San Juan Hill, and began climbing its steep slope; but when near the top they encountered such a hail of missiles from the batteries and Gatling guns in their rear that they were compelled to stop. After a few moments of dreadful suspense the fire behind them ceased, and the infantry again sprang forward up the slope and over the crest.

It was half-past one o'clock when San Juan Hill was taken. The trenches were immediately occupied, and a brisk fire was opened upon the fleeing Spaniards, who were attempting to reach the shelter of their second line, some six or eight hundred yards behind San Juan Hill.

Scarcely had the infantry reached the slope of San Juan Hill when the cavalry on Kettle Hill started forward to attack the portion of the San Juan Heights just north of the El Pozo-Santiago road. Under the gallant leadership of Sumner and Roosevelt, they rushed across the intervening valley in the face of a destructive fire, climbed the heights, and drove the enemy from his intrenchments. Here, too, the Spaniards fell back to their second line before coming to close quarters.

Simultaneously with this movement Colonel Pearson, with the Second and Tenth Infantry, which formed the left of Kent's division, crossed

the valley and captured the heights just south of San Juan Hill.

Having driven the enemy back to his second line of intrenchments, some six or eight hundred yards in rear of his first line, the Americans began to strengthen their position. Best's battery was brought forward and placed in position about two hundred yards north of the San Juan blockhouse; but the smoke of the guns drew such a heavy return fire that the battery was compelled in a few minutes to withdraw to Kettle Hill. As Lawton had not arrived, and as there were no available reserve forces, the right of the American line was left without support. In response to urgent messages from Sumner and Wood, Kent moved the Thirteenth Infantry, the only regiment he could spare, from the centre to the right to support the cavalry, which was holding a long line with very few men. About this time, too, Parker's battery of Gatling guns arrived on the right of the line and at once began firing upon the Spaniards, who were sweeping the American trenches with a heavy fire of cannon and small arms. The light battery of Hotchkiss guns under Lieutenant Hughes of the Tenth Cavalry was also brought forward and effectively handled.

The fight between the two lines, which were now facing each other at a distance ranging from three hundred to eight hundred yards, continued at intervals until dark. In the course of the afternoon

the Spaniards, with a part of their infantry, a number of mounted guerillas, and the company of sailors under Captain Bustamante, attempted an offensive movement; but they had advanced only a few yards when a heavy fire drove them back to the cover of their intrenchments. During this movement Captain Bustamante was fatally wounded. A little earlier in the afternoon General Linares, having been shot through the arm, was succeeded in command by General José Toral.

During the fighting at El Caney and San Juan on July 1, General Duffield, with the Thirty-third Michigan, supported by the fire of two of Sampson's vessels, attacked the Spaniards at Aguadores, and on the following day the attack was resumed by a battalion of the regiment. This attack was intended merely as a feint for the purpose of detaining the Spaniards at Aguadores, and thus preventing any of them from reënforcing Linares.

Though the capture of San Juan Heights was a decided victory, the situation in the evening was such as to cause the Americans no little anxiety. More than a thousand men had been killed or wounded; all were greatly exhausted; most of the soldiers, while fighting in the dreadful heat, had thrown away almost everything they had except guns and ammunition. And then, too, the thinness of the American line, so close to the enemy, and no reserves whatever to fall back upon

in case of a repulse, gave General Shafter the greatest concern. General Wheeler mentions the fact that a number of officers urged him to abandon San Juan Heights and take a position farther back; but he refused to consider the suggestion, and fearing that the same appeal would be made to General Shafter, he sent a message to headquarters protesting against such a movement. During the night intrenching tools were sent forward, and Wheeler's and Kent's weary soldiers began to fortify their position.

As night drew on and the precarious situation of Wheeler's and Kent's divisions was reported to General Shafter, he became more and more anxious that Lawton and Bates should finish the work at El Caney and join the main part of the army on San Juan Heights.

The fighting at El Caney having practically ceased at about 4.30 P. M., General Bates withdrew his brigade, hoping that he could reach the heights of San Juan in time to take part in that battle; but night coming on before he had proceeded very far, he halted his command and hastened in person to General Shafter's headquarters for further orders. He was directed to march his brigade to the extreme left of the line and take up a position on the left of Pearson's brigade. He immediately moved forward and reached his position about midnight. With the exception of six and a half hours spent near General Shafter's headquarters, Bates' brigade

had been continuously marching or fighting for twenty-seven and a half hours.

Having left five companies of the Seventh and one company of the Seventeenth Infantry to occupy El Caney, Lawton at about sunset started his tired troops, who had been fighting all day and marching much of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalry division on San Juan Heights. Night came on before the movement could be accomplished. In the darkness the enemy's pickets were encountered just beyond the Ducoureau House, and Lawton being uncertain as to what troops were in his front and not deeming it safe to advance farther in the darkness, halted his command and sent a messenger to report the situation to General Shafter. The messenger arrived at headquarters about midnight and returned immediately with instructions for Lawton to take the El Caney hill trail back to corps headquarters, and from that point proceed to the front. This long and circuitous march occupied the remainder of the night. At half-past seven the next morning Chaffee's brigade, which was in the lead, reached San Juan Heights, and by noon Lawton's whole division was in position to the right of Wheeler's division.

During the same night the batteries of Grimes, Best, and Parkhurst were sent to occupy the position which Best's battery had attempted to hold the day before; and the Thirty-fourth Michigan

and Ninth Massachusetts were ordered forward from Siboney and reached the front the next morning. The Thirty-fourth Michigan was placed in rear of Kent's division, and the Ninth Massachusetts was assigned to Bates, who placed it in position on the left of the line.

+ The concentration of the American forces on San Juan Heights during the night caused the Spanish commander, General Toral, great anxiety, for it was evident that the purpose was to close in immediately upon Santiago. The Americans were already within cannon shot of the city, and only one line of Spanish defences was between them and their goal. The water supply of the city was cut off, and it was no longer possible to receive vegetables and fruits from the cultivated region. Escario's column, which had been hourly expected, had not yet arrived, and Cervera had received positive orders to reëmbark at once all the sailors of his squadron preparatory to sailing out of the harbour.

The Spanish commander having become aware early on the morning of July 1 that Garcia and his command was in front of the Spanish lines near Dos Caminos del Cobre and not at Aserraderos, as he had heretofore believed, ordered the companies of the Asia regiment to proceed from the vicinity of Punta Cabrera, El Cobre, and Monte Real to Santiago. The next morning these companies took position on the northeast side of the

city and relieved the five companies of sailors, who were reëmbarked on that same day.

At daylight on July 2 the batteries of Grimes, Best, and Parkhurst opened upon the centre of the Spanish position and the city of Santiago; but after firing for about an hour, during which time they were greatly hampered¹ by the smoke of their own guns, they were compelled by a heavy return fire to withdraw. They fell back to El Pozo, where they were joined by Capron's battery, which had just returned from El Caney. During the second of July the firing was kept up almost continually between the two armies, but neither attempted an assault against the other's intrenched position. Both sides met with severe losses during the day. The American casualties numbered about one hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Among the wounded was General Hawkins.

Though Shafter's intrenched line had been strengthened by the arrival of Bates and Lawton, it was still very thinly held, and another anxious day followed. Lying in the trenches without shelter, now drenched by the rain, now scorched by the sun, under a continual fire and in constant expectation of an assault, the officers and men began to feel severely the strain of the situation.

¹ Lieutenant Aultman, who succeeded to the command of Parkhurst's battery after Captain Parkhurst was wounded early in the morning, says: "Our fire was unaimed, and the results could neither be observed nor ascertained, as our view was absolutely obscured by our own smoke."

Moreover, the rains having made the roads almost impassable, it was extremely difficult to supply the command with food.

In the rear, too, the outlook was most gloomy. The losses having been greater than was expected, much difficulty was found in caring for the great number of wounded, whose sufferings were pitiable. "The battle before Santiago," says George Kennan, "began very early on Friday morning, July 1, and the wounded, most of whom had received first aid at bandaging-stations just back of the firing-line, reached the hospital [the field hospital at El Pozo] in small numbers as early as nine o'clock. As the hot tropical day advanced, the numbers constantly and rapidly increased until, at nightfall, long rows of wounded were lying on the grass in front of the operating tents, without awnings or shelter, awaiting examination and treatment. The small force of field surgeons worked heroically and with a devotion that I have never seen surpassed; but they were completely overwhelmed by the great bloody wave of human agony that rolled back in ever increasing volume from the battle-line. They stood at the operating tables, wholly without sleep, and almost without rest or food, for twenty-one consecutive hours; and yet, in spite of their tremendous exertions, hundreds of seriously or dangerously wounded men lay on the ground for hours, many of them half-naked, and nearly all without shelter from the

blazing tropical sun in the daytime, or the damp, chilly dew at night. No organized or systematic provision had been made for feeding them or giving them drink, and many a poor fellow had not tasted food or water for twelve hours, and had been exposed during all that time to the almost intolerable glare of the sun."

As there were only a few ambulances, most of the wounded who were not able to walk had to be carried back to the field hospital at El Pozo and the general hospital at Siboney in heavy army wagons. The jolting of these springless vehicles over the rough roads caused frightful suffering.

But in spite of these unfavourable conditions it should be noted that the mortality among the wounded treated in these field hospitals was much less than in any other war in which the United States has ever been engaged. This was due partly to improved antiseptic methods of treatment and partly to the small clean, clear-cut perforation made by the Mauser bullet.

About six o'clock on the evening of July 2, General Shafter summoned to El Pozo Generals Wheeler, Lawton, Kent, and Bates to obtain their opinion as to the advisability of withdrawing his line from San Juan Heights and taking up a position farther back nearer his base of supplies at Siboney. The four officers did not agree upon the question of withdrawal, and after an hour's dis-

cussion Shafter expressed his intention of making no change in his position until he had considered the matter further. On the following morning he telegraphed the Secretary of War:

“We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character and the defences so strong, it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles, and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies, to a large extent, by means of the railroad, which we could use, having engines and cars at Siboney.”

On the same morning, at about ten o'clock, General Shafter sent to the Spanish commander under a flag of truce a communication demanding the surrender of the Spanish army. This act, which inaugurated the negotiations for the capitulation, caused the temporary suspension of active hostilities, and marked the beginning of the siege of Santiago de Cuba.

The Spanish forces actually engaged in the battle of San Juan on July 1, exclusive of two or three detachments in charge of the big guns on the east side of the city, were five companies of the Talavera regiment, one company of the Porto Rico regiment, one battery, sixty volunteers, one hundred and forty mounted guerillas, and one

company of sailors, in all about 1197¹ officers and men. Prior to the capture of San Juan Hill practically all the fighting on the part of the Spaniards was done by their first line, which consisted of about 521 officers and men. On the second and third of July, after the sailors had been withdrawn, the following additional troops took more or less part in the fighting: eight companies of the Asia regiment, three mobilized companies, three companies of the Porto Rico regiment, three of the San Fernando regiment, and one of the Talavera regiment, — all told, exclusive of the sick in the hospital, probably about twenty-eight hundred or three thousand officers and men. Of these about three hundred and sixty² were killed or wounded on the first, second, and third of July.

The American forces actually engaged in the attack on San Juan Heights on July 1 were Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry, Kent's division of infantry, three batteries of artillery, and three troops of the Second Cavalry, a total of about 8412³ officers and men. The arrival of

¹ If to this number there be added the five hundred and twenty Spaniards who were engaged at El Caney, we have a total of 1717 officers and men who fought at El Caney and San Juan on July 1. It will be noted that this number corresponds almost exactly to the number given in the Spanish government's statement: "En los combates de San Juan y El Caney tomaron parte 1700 hombres." See Appendix A.

² See Appendix V.

³ There were also on the battlefield, not included in the above number, a few men belonging to the Hospital Corps, Signal Corps, and Engineer Battalion. The following table shows the

Bates and Lawton on the night of July 1 and the morning of July 2 increased this number to about thirteen thousand five hundred. The total loss on the first, second, and third of July was one total strength of the Americans at the battle of San Juan on July 1, and the losses during the first, second, and third of July as given in the Adjutant-General's Office at Washington :

American Forces at San Juan.	Strength June 30.	Killed July 1-3.	Wounded July 1-3.
Major-Gen. Shafter, headquarters and staff	17	..	..
Wheeler's Division, headquarters and staff	13	..	..
Sumner's Brigade, headquarters and staff .	9	..	..
Third U. S. Cavalry	456	3	52
Sixth U. S. Cavalry	451	2	57
Ninth U. S. Cavalry	219	3	18
Wood's Brigade, headquarters and staff .	10	..	3
First U. S. Cavalry	523	13	47
Tenth U. S. Cavalry	480	7	74
First Volunteer Cavalry	583	15	73
Kent's Division, headquarters and staff .	11	..	..
Hawkins' Brigade, headquarters and staff	12	2	1
Sixteenth U. S. Infantry	679	14	115
Sixth U. S. Infantry	492	12	114
Seventy-first New York Infantry	969	12	68
Pearson's Brigade, headquarters and staff	14	..	..
Second U. S. Infantry	638	6	53
Tenth U. S. Infantry	455	5	40
Twenty-first U. S. Infantry	467	6	31
Wikoff's Brigade, headquarters and staff .	5	1	..
Ninth U. S. Infantry	466	5	27
Thirteenth U. S. Infantry	465	18	91
Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry	539	7	83
Grimes' Battery	82	2	6
Best's Battery	80	1	..
Parkhurst's Battery	79	1	2
Three troops Second U. S. Cavalry . .	198	..	1
Signal & Hospital Corps & Engineers .	Few men	..	2
Total	8412	135	958

Besides the above casualties Lawton's division lost on the second and third of July seven killed and thirty-four wounded, and Bates' brigade, one killed and eighteen wounded.

See Appendix R for total strength of Fifth Corps on June 30, and for losses at Las Guasimas, El Caney, San Juan, and Aguadores.

hundred and forty-three killed and one thousand and ten wounded.

Two small detachments of about fifty men each were the only troops of Garcia's command that fought in the battles of El Caney and San Juan. One of these detachments fought bravely with Colonel Miles' brigade at El Caney, but the other at El Pozo fled precipitately at the first fire.

THE MARCH OF ESCARIO'S COLUMN

On the afternoon of June 22 Colonel Federico Escario, with two battalions of the Isabel la Católica regiment, a battalion of the Andalusia regiment, a battalion of the Alcántara regiment, a battalion of the Porto Rico Chasseurs, a battery of two 3-inch Placentia guns, a company of transportation troops, two or three organizations of mounted guerillas, a detachment of sappers, five medical officers and thirty men of the medical department, and about two hundred pack animals loaded with rations, left Manzanillo for Santiago. This column numbered thirty-six hundred and sixty officers and men. The route followed was through Bayamo, Baire, and Palma Soriano to Santiago.¹ Along almost the entire route the column was harassed by small bands of insurgents, and several spirited engagements took place; but it continued to push on, and on the afternoon of

¹ See Maps 1 and 7.

July 2 arrived at Palma Soriano, where it was reënforced by a company of the San Fernando regiment, a company of the Constitución regiment, two troops of the King's regiment (cavalry), and a number of mounted guerillas. At this place Colonel Escario learned that the American forces had landed and were then surrounding a part of the city, and that it was therefore urgent that he should reach Santiago at the earliest possible moment. Accordingly, leaving his sick and wounded at Palma Soriano, he resumed his march early on the morning of July 3 and arrived at the pass of Bayamo, six miles northwest of Santiago, at eleven o'clock A. M. on the same day. Here Colonel Escario organized a flying column, consisting of a battalion of infantry, all the cavalry, and two guns, with which he hurried to Santiago, while the main column with the train followed. The flying column reached the city about four o'clock in the afternoon, and the main command arrived between nine and ten o'clock that night. The column had lost during the march eighty-one officers and men. Though Garcia with almost his entire command was guarding the roads on the northwest side of Santiago, Escario marched from Bayamo Pass into the city practically without opposition.

On the afternoon of July 3, at about the same hour that Escario's flying column reached Santiago, General Shafter received the following reply to the

telegram which he had sent the Secretary of War that morning:

"Of course you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your present position, especially San Juan Heights, the effect on the country would be much better than falling back."

Shafter's answer, received at Washington at a quarter past one o'clock on the morning of July 4, was: "I SHALL HOLD MY PRESENT POSITION."

COMMENTS

OUT of a total force of 18,218¹ men, equipped and present for duty, General Shafter concentrated at El Caney and San Juan, on July 1, 15,065 men, while General Linares, out of a total force of 13,096 soldiers and sailors, at and in the vicinity of Santiago, brought on these battlefields only about seventeen hundred men. General Shafter concentrated on the vital points eighty-six per cent of his army. He brought there practically every available man that could be spared from other important points in the theatre of operations, leaving but two or three thousand men to protect his line of communications, to guard his base of operations, and to make the attack at Aguadores. Linares concentrated on these two battlefields barely thirteen per cent of the 13,096 soldiers and sailors which

¹ See Appendix R.

were at and in the vicinity of Santiago, and less than six per cent of the 29,218 troops which were under his immediate command in the district. In other words, he fought the battles of July 1 with less than five per cent of the 36,582 Spanish soldiers in Santiago Province, and with less than one per cent of the 196,820 Spanish soldiers in the island. These figures tell the tale of the American victories; and the marvel of it is, that though Linares occupied strong intrenched positions, which increased enormously the fighting power of his troops, he failed to bring sufficient forces on the battlefields to hold the enemy in check. It may be said without exaggeration that one soldier behind the intrenchments of El Caney or of San Juan Hill was equal in fighting power to six or eight soldiers advancing to attack him. Yet with this enormous advantage Linares allowed his troops at El Caney to be outnumbered twelve to one, and the troops of his first line on San Juan Hill to be outnumbered sixteen to one.

There was nothing whatever in the circumstances that could even partially justify such a lack of foresight and generalship. Early in June it was well known, not only to Linares but to all the world, that the Fifth Corps would in a few days leave Tampa for Santiago. Between June 14, when the expedition finally sailed, and July 1, or even between June 20, when the expedition arrived off the mouth of the harbour, and July 1, there was an abundance

of time for Linares to concentrate at Santiago a large proportion of the troops in the province; but having failed to do this, he could still have brought eight or nine thousand troops on the battlefields of El Caney and San Juan. Nearly all the troops in the cultivated region, the nine companies of soldiers and two of sailors in the vicinity of Punta Cabrera, Mazamorra, and Monte Real, the six companies between Aguadores and the heights of San Juan, the eleven companies along the shores of the bay and in the mountain passes surrounding Santiago, and the company of engineers and company of sailors at Las Cruces, could all have been concentrated at Santiago without endangering a single interest; and from there these troops and those which were already in and around the city could in an hour have been massed on any battlefield in the immediate vicinity. "A general," said Bonaparte, "always has troops enough if he only knows how to employ those he has, and bivouacs with them."

During the campaign of Marengo in April, 1800, Masséna, with fifteen thousand French troops, was besieged in Genoa by thirty thousand Austrians under General Ott. Although the French troops were almost in a starving condition and three thousand of them were in the hospitals, nevertheless Masséna determined to hold out to the last in order to give the Army of Reserve under Bonaparte time to cross the Alps and attack the Austrian general,

Melas, in northern Italy. Part of the twelve thousand men fit for duty were occupying the outlying works and intrenchments, and the remainder within the city were acting as a reserve. On April 30 General Ott, supported by English gunboats in the Gulf of Genoa, made simultaneous attacks on the east, north, and west side of the city. After desperate fighting he met with considerable success. On all three sides the Austrian columns advanced and occupied more favourable positions, and at several points succeeded in capturing French forts. But Masséna did not despair. Throwing his reserve first on one side of the city and then on the other, in order to reënforce his troops occupying the outlying intrenchments, he finally forced back the Austrians from their commanding positions and recovered the lost forts. But the Austrians, continuing to press forward, recovered after repeated efforts a number of the forts, and gradually closed in on the beleaguered garrison. Nevertheless, although the advantages of defensive positions in those days were not so great as they are at the present time, Masséna, by massing his reserve on the attacked positions and by rapidly moving his troops from the comparatively safe to the threatened points, succeeded in holding the city for a month and a half, when hunger finally forced him to capitulate.

In Napoleon's time attacking forces were able to advance to within two or three hundred yards

of the enemy's position before the battle began in earnest, and the contest was frequently decided by assaults and hand-to-hand fighting. But, as already pointed out, it is to-day practically impossible to carry intrenched positions by frontal attacks unless the assailants overwhelmingly outnumber the defenders, and even then only under exceptional circumstances. Masséna's brilliant defence of Genoa under such unfavourable conditions indicates what a splendid opportunity Linares had at Santiago if he had only known how to take advantage of it. It was of course not to be expected that he would display even in small measure the genius of Napoleon's great lieutenant; but it surely was to be expected that he would not permit the Americans to capture San Juan Hill and drive him from San Juan Heights without encountering more than twelve hundred of the five thousand soldiers and sailors then in and immediately around Santiago.

From the time of the landing of the Fifth Corps on June 22 until the morning of July 1, there was not a moment that the Spaniards did not have an excellent chance of success had they been properly handled. Take the most critical time of all, the early morning of July 1, when the fighting began at El Caney, and it became evident to Linares that the Americans were about to attack San Juan Heights. Suppose that Linares had sent forward the following troops to occupy the advanced

position on San Juan Heights: the two companies and two rapid-fire guns at the junction of the El Caney and El Pozo roads, the seven companies at and near Santa Úrsula and Cañadas, the company of engineers and company of sailors at Las Cruces, and the six companies at San Antonio, Santa Inés, and El Sueño. These troops, which, together with the company already in position on San Juan and Kettle Hills, numbered 2504 officers and men, could easily have reached the advanced position and intrenched themselves before the Americans began the attack. Suppose further, that Linares had at the same time sent orders for the eleven companies of soldiers and sailors in the vicinity of Punta Cabrera, Monte Real, and Mazamorra, the six companies of soldiers between the heights of San Juan and Aguadores, and the eleven companies along the shores of the bay and in the mountain passes surrounding the city, to hasten with all possible speed to join him on the battlefield. As none of these troops were farther than ten miles from the city, and the most of them within five miles, they all could have reached the battlefield within four hours. Suppose, also, that the volunteers in the city had been massed as a reserve a few hundred yards in rear of San Juan Heights, where they could have been used either to reënforce any part of the fighting line, or to meet any attempted turning or flanking movement of the enemy. Not to mention the reserve or the five hundred sailors in

the vicinity of Dos Caminos del Cobre, the disposition of the troops here suggested would have brought on the firing line 6316 men, and not a single interest would have been jeopardized. The six companies that remained at Socapa and the Morro could have protected the mouth of the harbour; the two companies at Aguadores could have easily held that position; and the four companies of sailors on the northwest side of the city, reënforced, if necessary, by the mounted guerillas and a part of the reserve, would have been able to hold Garcia's insurgent troops in check.

Even if Shafter had not made an attack on San Juan Heights, this disposition of troops would have been most suitable for meeting any other attack that the Americans could have made, because Linares, while occupying these heights, would have had the advantage of an interior position and could have moved his troops to any point of the intrenched lines surrounding the city more quickly than his enemy could have reached the same point. But while Linares occupied this position there was no likelihood whatever that the Americans would attempt to make a turning movement either around his left, in order to attack the north side of the city, or around his right, in order to attack the south side; for any movement of this kind would have uncovered their base of operations at Siboney and exposed their communications to attack.

Now if Linares, on the morning of July 1, had made the dispositions here indicated, what would have been the result? Instead of having only 521 soldiers on San Juan Hill and Kettle Hill, as he actually had when the battle opened, he would have had 2504, and by noon about 3812 more. Against these troops intrenched on San Juan Heights and Kettle Hill, the Americans could not possibly have made any headway. The divisions of Kent and Sumner would have hardly been able to reach the crossings of the Aguadores and San Juan Rivers; but even if they had, they would have been swept out of existence before they could possibly have got into position to do any fighting. Even in the battle as it was fought, the greater part of the American casualties occurred before the deployments were completed.

In the meantime, what would have been the result at El Caney? With Kent's and Sumner's divisions repulsed at San Juan and a large number of wounded to be cared for, Shafter would have been obliged to stop the attack at El Caney and recall Lawton's division to El Pozo, for it would have been extremely hazardous to allow Lawton to continue sacrificing men against a mere outpost of the enemy, while the main Spanish army, as yet practically unharmed, was in Shafter's front.

The outcome of the battle would have compelled Shafter to take up a defensive position, at least temporarily, in the vicinity of El Pozo. Then

after awaiting two or three days to care for his wounded and to open up paths and roads through the woods and brush for a better deployment of his troops, he would most probably have made another effort to drive the Spaniards from their positions; but, as Escario's column would in the meantime have arrived, this second effort would probably have failed also. This would have compelled Shafter to resume his defensive position at El Pozo and to await reënforcements. With the American and Spanish armies facing each other in these defensive positions, either would have been strong enough to repel any attack of the other, but neither would have been strong enough to take the offensive.

At this stage of the campaign the outcome would have depended in great measure upon the scarcity of provisions, the progress of the fevers, and the rapidity with which each side could have obtained reënforcements. It is, of course, not possible, in this supposititious case, to predict the final result with any degree of certainty; but it may be remarked that had Generals Blanco and Linares been as energetic and resourceful as they should have been, they could even then, at least for a time, have sent reënforcements to Santiago from the cultivated region, and from Guantanamo, Holguin, and Manzanillo as rapidly as Shafter could have obtained them from the United States by transports.

By occupying a line of defensive positions around

the city and bay, Linares evidently thought that he could hold possession of the country. Having, like all Spaniards, a partiality for defensive fighting, he failed to see the wisdom of abandoning his intrenchments even temporarily in order to concentrate a strong force on the battlefield. Though the Americans were drawing nearer and nearer the city, though a battle was about to be fought, he assembled no troops; he sent no orders. Putting his faith in his intrenchments and in the courage of his soldiers, he failed to realize that against odds sufficiently great the strongest positions and bravest troops must succumb. Thus his intrenchments, which should have added to his strength, became in reality a source of weakness.

There was much in the situation at Santiago to inspire Linares. Matters had so shaped themselves that the burden of the entire struggle rested on his shoulders. He had a brave and well-disciplined army ready to respond with alacrity to any call that he might make upon it. Success meant that the campaign would be indefinitely prolonged; for Cervera's squadron could then remain in the harbour without fear of being driven out. On the other hand, defeat meant the probable termination of the war; for Cervera's squadron would then be either captured or driven forth to meet almost certain destruction. Though the generalship of Linares was not equal to the demands of the occasion, yet, in spite of the incompetency that

characterized his management of the campaign, he and the few soldiers whom he did bring on the battlefields fought with a courage that has seldom been surpassed. Spain may well remember with pride the bravery of her sons on that fateful day, and high up on the roll of honour she should inscribe the name of that heroic soul, *Vara de Rey*.

General Shafter made a mistake in fighting the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill at the same time; for it gave the Spaniards the opportunity of massing a superior force against either part of his divided army. Their failure to do so was in no sense a justification of the error. The point is, that at the most vital moment, namely, right on the eve of battle, General Shafter, by dividing his forces, gave his enemy a great strategical advantage. Such a division of forces is always dangerous, and is never justifiable except under circumstances that cannot be avoided without involving a greater risk. How costly this error might have been to the Americans was shown when it was pointed out that had Linares, even as late as the morning of July 1, massed all his available forces on San Juan Heights, he could have easily repulsed Sumner's and Kent's divisions.

But there were other good reasons why an attack in force should not have been made on El Caney.¹

¹ It should be noted that Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, General Shafter's Adjutant-General, did not favour this plan. In a letter to the author he says: "My understanding was for some

In the first place, the situation of El Caney was such that a successful attack upon San Juan Heights would have isolated El Caney and cut off its communications with Santiago. Unless, therefore, the garrison there had received outside help, it would in time have been compelled to surrender. In other words, a victory on San Juan Heights would have necessarily carried with it a victory at El Caney. It therefore follows that an attack in force upon this strongly intrenched position was to a certain extent a waste of energy; for the same energy expended on San Juan Heights in conjunction with that expended by Kent and Sumner would have made victory there less doubtful, and produced as great if not greater results.

Secondly, it is a well-established rule of war that when an army is moving towards its objective, whether a fortified city or the enemy's army, or both, the advancing army should not under ordinary conditions waste its energy by attacking in

days previous to June 30, that General Lawton would be allowed to attack El Caney. On general principles I did not think the plan a good one, and stated that concentrations to be made after fighting separate battles rarely turned out as was intended. As General Shafter states, it would probably have been better to have left a brigade in observation at El Caney and to have combined the balance of Lawton's division with the cavalry division and the first division in the attack on San Juan Hill. It should not be forgotten, however, as stated in the language of the report, [General Shafter's report] that 'the position of El Caney to the north-east of Santiago was of great importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road,' etc., and as General Shafter states Lawton seemed positive they could reduce the place in about two hours."

force the small forts and fortresses that lie within the front of its operations. The rule is to leave small containing forces to watch them and hold their garrisons in check while the main army presses forward to attack the enemy. The reason for this is, first, that an attack of these strong places requires a larger number of troops than can be spared from the main army without endangering its defeat; and, secondly, that the defeat of the enemy's main army generally causes the capitulation of such places, even if they have not previously been compelled to capitulate through isolation and want of provisions.

Bonaparte, in his first Italian campaign against the Austrians and Sardinians, did not permit the fortresses which were on the line of his operations to delay his advance for a moment, even though on account of having no siege artillery and only a few cannon of small calibre, he could not completely invest them. He left small detachments to hold them in check, then pushed forward past them to attack the main forces of the enemy on the open battlefield, or wherever they might be found.

In reply to this criticism it may be said that Shafter, relying upon the reports of Lawton and Chaffee, expected that Lawton's division would capture El Caney in an hour or two, and then push rapidly forward to San Juan Heights for an attack on that position in conjunction with the divisions of Sumner and Kent. But the answer is that

Shafter had no right to expect this, for he could not know with any degree of certainty the strength of the intrenchments and fort at El Caney. Indeed the most reasonable presumption was that the Spaniards would not attempt to occupy and hold this village in its isolated position so far away from the main forces unless they had it strongly fortified and well defended. After the poor defence which the Spaniards made on the battlefield of Las Guasimas, it was of course not unnatural that both Lawton and Chaffee should have erred in their judgment as to the time it would take to capture El Caney. But the point is that it was not necessary for General Shafter to make the assembling of his divisions for an attack upon San Juan Heights dependent upon the capture of El Caney. There was indeed no good reason why Lawton should not have been instructed that, in case the Spaniards at El Caney offered a determined resistance, he should not delay there more than two hours, but should leave a regiment and battery as a containing force to hold the garrison in check, and then rapidly push forward to San Juan Heights. It was unwise to plan a battle in which all the divisions were to unite before making the main attack, and at the same time to order one division to capture a certain position before it joined the other divisions; for the success of the main operation was thus made to depend upon a contingency which might or might not turn out as was expected.

The fact that it did not turn out as was expected made it necessary for General Shafter to modify his original plan, and compelled him to fight the battle with 8412 men instead of 15,065, as he originally intended. To this modification of his plan was also due in great measure the delays and misunderstandings that occurred during the battle. It will be remembered that soon after Grimes' battery opened fire at 8.20 A.M., Sumner's and Kent's divisions were sent forward, not to attack the enemy, but "to get into position to engage the enemy." The understanding at this time was that the attack upon the Spanish positions was not to be made until Lawton arrived and joined the right of Sumner's division. But the troops suffered so severely while getting into position that it became a pressing necessity for them either to go forward and capture the heights without Lawton's aid or to retire virtually defeated; and not until this fact was made known to General Shafter by Lieutenant Miley and Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, did he authorize the attack. The result was that Sumner, after getting his troops into position to engage the enemy, was compelled to hold them for about two hours under a destructive fire before he obtained authority to go forward.

Of course General Shafter was very anxious to dispose of the garrison at El Caney before making the attack on San Juan Heights; for this fortified village would not only have served as a point of

support for the enemy in any operations he might wish to make in that vicinity, but it commanded the Guantanamo-El Caney road, over which any reënforcements that might be sent from Guantanamo would most probably pass. But a containing force of five or six hundred men and two or three field guns would have been amply sufficient to hold the garrison in check. Indeed, it seems quite possible that had such a containing force taken up a commanding position on the hillocks and high ground on the west side of the village, it might in a short while have rendered the position at El Caney untenable, and have forced a surrender of the garrison.

Had General Shafter adopted the plan of leaving a containing force at El Caney, Lawton's division could have marched, on the evening of June 30, to the vicinity of the Ducoureau House, bivouacked there that night, and been ready early next morning to advance along the El Caney-Santiago road for an attack against San Juan Heights. Thus situated, all the divisions of the army would have been practically within supporting distance of each other; and had Lawton's attack been vigorously pressed, as it undoubtedly would have been, it is not unlikely that early in the forenoon he would have forced back the advanced line of the Spaniards, in which case San Juan Hill would have been taken in reverse. This would have compelled Linares to withdraw his troops from that position and

to fall back to the intrenched lines immediately surrounding the city. In the meantime Sumner's and Kent's divisions would, with small losses, have been able to deploy, move forward, and connect with the left of Lawton's division for an attack upon the main line of Spanish intrenchments. Although there was, of course, no certainty that the Americans would even then have been able to drive the enemy from his position, yet had they on that day expended upon these intrenched lines, which were thinly occupied, the same amount of energy and courage that they expended at El Caney and San Juan Hill, they might have forced their way into the city.

But whatever considerations may have led General Shafter into the error of dividing his forces on the eve of battle, it is certain that he not only was familiar with, but fully realized the importance of, the principle of strategy which he violated on this occasion. A careful study of these operations shows that throughout the campaign his constant aim was to avoid a division of his forces, and to attack the enemy with a united army. During the voyage of the Fifth Corps from Tampa to Santiago, Captain Taylor of the *Indiana*, who was in command of the convoy of naval vessels which were sent to protect the transports carrying the troops, was anxious to hurry forward some of the swifter vessels in order to arrive before Santiago at the earliest possible moment; but General Shafter

objected to this movement because it would divide his army. He saw that the first troops to arrive might, in attempting to land, be defeated before the arrival of the remainder of the army, or might, after landing, so commit themselves to some line of operations that they could not be easily reënforced nor be safely withdrawn. Again, upon his arrival at Santiago General Shafter rejected the plan of campaign which involved a division of his forces, and adopted a plan which permitted him to keep his army united. There were, as has already been pointed out, several objections to the plan of making the principal attack at the mouth of the harbour, but doubtless the one that influenced him most in rejecting this plan was that there was little or no hope of gaining possession of the harbour entrance without dividing his army. Then again, he caused all of General Garcia's Cuban forces at Aserraderos to be transported to Daiquiri and Siboney, where they joined the American troops. And lastly, he brought upon the battlefields of El Caney and San Juan every available man in the theatre of operations, and even went so far as to fight those battles without any reserves whatever. With excellent judgment at the critical moment, when he learned that Escario's column was rapidly approaching Santiago, he decided that success could only be obtained by striking promptly and with all his power. He saw that he had to stake all on one great effort or fail completely;

that it had to be "a dash or nothing," and with the instincts of a born soldier, though his preparations were by no means complete, he decided to strike with all his might. His decision at this critical time was the turning-point of the campaign; and for this decision he is entitled to the gratitude of the American people. Had a less resolute man been in command of the American forces, he would have delayed fighting to complete his preparations, in which case Escario's column would have arrived, and the campaign would doubtless have failed.

For the most part General Shafter carried out correctly the principles of strategy. He advanced along a single line of operations; he manœuvred so as to protect his communications and cover his base of operations; he brought overwhelming numbers against the enemy on the battlefield, and he made his principal attacks before the enemy's reënforcements arrived. Despite the one strategical error that he made, the carrying out of these great principles of war was sufficient to win the victory.

It has already been pointed out that General Shafter's faulty plan of battle was the cause of misunderstanding and delay at San Juan, and compelled him to fight the battle with less than two-thirds the number of troops he had originally intended to bring on the battlefield. But this was not the only tactical error that he made at San Juan. It was a serious and costly mistake to move the balloon down the road along which the troops

were advancing; for this movement not only revealed the precise line of the American advance, but attracted a heavy fire which caused much loss.¹ An eye-witness² of the episode says: "The observation balloon . . . came blundering down the trail and stopped the advance of the First and Tenth Cavalry, and was sent up directly over the heads of our men to observe what should have been observed a week before by scouts and reconnoitring parties. A balloon two miles to the rear and high enough in the air to be out of range of the enemy's fire may some day prove itself to be of use and value; but a balloon on the advance line and only fifty feet above the tops of the trees, was merely an invitation to kill everything beneath it. And the enemy responded to the invitation. A Spaniard might question if he could hit a man, or a number of men, hidden in the bushes, but had no doubt at all as to his ability to hit a mammoth glistening ball only six hundred yards distant, and so all the trenches fired at it at once, and the men

¹ For this costly blunder, General Greely, the Chief Signal Officer, in behalf of the Signal Corps, emphatically disclaims responsibility. In his report to the Secretary of War for 1898 he says: "The forcing of the Signal Corps balloon to the skirmish line, where its position is reported to have caused serious loss to the troops by disclosing their movements and attracting the enemy's fire, was the action of Major-General Shafter, through his chief engineer, Colonel George McC. Derby, in the face of professional advice given him by Lieutenant-Colonel Maxfield of the United States Volunteer Signal Corps, who was charged with the practical operation of the balloon."

² Richard Harding Davis.

of the First and Tenth, packed together directly behind it, received the full force of the bullets. The men lying directly below it received the shrapnel which was timed to hit it, and which at last, fortunately, did hit it. This was endured for an hour, an hour of such hell of fire and heat, that the heat in itself, had there been no bullets, would have been remembered for its cruelty."

Again, it is questionable whether the pushing of all the troops forward along the main road and trail was the best method of getting them to the front. The objections to this method were, first, that the road and trail for a half mile or more before reaching the ford of the San Juan River were not only directly in the line of fire from the Spaniards occupying San Juan Hill, but were also within a few hundred yards of the enemy in position on Kettle Hill; and, secondly, that the open ground beyond the fords, where the troops had to deploy, lay within less than six hundred yards of the enemy's lines and was completely commanded by them.

Even though the woods and brush on both sides of the road were almost impenetrable, it still seems possible that the larger part of both divisions could have pushed through the thickets in single file in a direction perpendicular to the road, then facing the enemy, worked their way through the woods to the open ground directly in front of the enemy's position. That such an operation, though difficult,

was practicable, is shown by the fact that a dismounted troop of the Tenth Cavalry, commanded by Captain John Bigelow, Jr., was deployed and pushed forward in this very manner. In describing this act, and in commenting upon the practicability of this method of deployment, Captain Bigelow in his "Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign" says:

"As one of the regiments with its packs on — I imagine it was the Sixth Infantry — swung heavily by us at double-time, I heard above its rhythmic *thud*, *thud*, *thud*, *thud*, one of the men call out 'Stand aside, and let the infantry go to the front,' and I remembered being nettled by the remark. I wondered why we were standing still and this regiment was going by us to the front. Our loads being disposed of, we were closed up, and made to lie down in the road facing to the left. Bullets kept tearing through the grass, bushes, and branches about us. They seemed mostly to come from the direction of San Juan, enfilading the road in which we lay. I apprehended that the enemy had taken this road as his target, and had its direction about right, if he had not quite gotten our range. I looked around for a field-officer to apply to for permission to take my men to one side of the road, or at least face them in the direction from which the fire was principally coming. My squadron commander had gone towards our right, probably to confer with the regimental commander, and there was no field-officer in sight. I therefore on my own responsibility changed front with my troop to the right. In this position, I was free from the troop lately on my right, in case it should again break to

the rear. I was under the impression that we were much nearer the enemy than afterwards proved to be the case, and expected the regiment to deploy across the road at any minute. From my study of tactics and the drill regulations, together with my limited experience in field exercises, I knew that in dismounted fighting, especially in a densely wooded country, the time comes when the direction of operations is necessarily left to company commanders, and I judged that this time had come or could not be far off. I did not know but that the squadron commander was disabled, and I was determined that my men should not be decimated without doing some execution, through fear of responsibility or lack of initiative on my part. I felt that I would be erring on the right side if I slightly anticipated the proper time for independent action by company commanders. After waiting a minute or two in my new position, the enemy's fire not abating, and no superior officer appearing, I faced my troop to the left, and pushed in single file into the wood far enough to clear the road by about ten or twenty yards with the rear of my column, when I came upon a line of infantry skirmishers, apparently a company without officers. The non-commissioned officers seemed at a loss which way to turn. I had my troop faced to the right, or in the general direction in which the road ran, the direction of San Juan, and prepared to advance. During all this time I could not see San Juan or anything else farther than about twenty yards off. In anticipation of the difficulty of penetrating the dense undergrowth, I took immediate charge of the platoon commanded by my First Sergeant, William H. Givins, leaving the other one to Second Lieutenant A. E. Kennington, Tenth Cavalry,

with instructions to keep this platoon in touch with mine. I then proceeded to advance in a direction parallel to the road which I had just left. I expected that by the time I arrived abreast of the head of my regiment I would find it deployed or deploying.

“As we pushed on under the enemy’s ‘unaimed’ fire, now creeping and crawling through masses of vines and shrubbery, now wriggling through a wire fence, now rushing across open spots from one bush or copse to another, I called out to the men, ‘Move towards the sound of that firing!’ pointing in the general direction of San Juan. ‘We’ll soon get to open ground, where we’ll see the enemy and have a chance to shoot back.’ The woods and thickets of Cuba have been described and spoken of as impenetrable. I have never seen the woods or thickets that I believed or found to be impenetrable for dismounted skirmishers. In my judgment, most of our manœuvring or marching on the field of San Juan might have been off the roads or through the woods. The enemy, of course, had the roads under concentrated fire, especially where they forked or crossed the streams. Woods are generally a greater advantage to the offensive than they are to the defensive, because they favor secret or concealed manœuvring. But if the woods are so dense that they cannot be penetrated, or the offensive has not the enterprise and energy to manœuvre in them, they are an advantage to the defensive, as they confine the enemy to narrow defiles. Such was the case in the operations in which I was now participating. If the offensive does not manœuvre off the roads, and the defensive does, the latter seizes the initiative, and secures the double advantage of having the enemy in long thin

columns, and of attacking him unawares. Such was the case at Chancellorsville; and if there had been a Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee at Santiago, the same would have been the case there."

Then, again, had a reconnoissance in force, accompanied by a fatigue party, been sent out a day or two before the battle, it would probably have located the trail, which was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby from the balloon; and it could have opened up through the woods at least one path perpendicular to the road, and probably others leading from this path to the front. And besides, such a reconnoissance would have discovered the trail leading from Marianage to Kettle Hill; in which case Sumner's division could have been sent to the front over this trail, and in this way, if in no other, much of the crowding, delay, and confusion along the main road would have been avoided. "Five days before the battle of San Juan, General Chaffee, in my hearing," says Richard Harding Davis, "explained the whole situation, and told what should be done, and foretold what eventually happened if certain things were left undone. It was impossible, he said, for the army, without great loss, to debouch from the two trails which left the woods and opened on the country before the San Juan hills. He suggested that it would be well to cut trails parallel to the entire front of the wood and hidden by it, and with innumerable little trails leading into the

open, so that the whole army could be marched out upon the hills at the same moment.

“‘Of course the enemy knows where those two trails leave the wood,’ he said; ‘they have their guns trained on the openings. If our men leave the cover and reach the plain from those trails alone, they will be piled up so high that they will block the road.’ This is exactly what happened, except that instead of being led to the sacrifice through both trails the men were sent down only one of them, and the loss was even greater in consequence.”

There is nothing which tests the discipline, determination, and bravery of troops more than to be subjected in long crowded columns, as the regulars were on that day, to heavy fire to which they cannot reply. This was the critical period in the battle; the charges against the enemy on Kettle Hill and San Juan Hill were more spectacular, they appealed more to the imagination; but the rugged courage and fierce determination of those brave men, while pushing forward along the crowded trails in the face of that deadly fire, meant victory; it meant that the Stars and Stripes would float from the top of San Juan Hill; it meant the forcing of Cervera's squadron out of the harbour to meet destruction; it meant the closing of the campaign and the end of the war.

It will not be out of place to pause here for a moment to inquire what would have been the

result if that little American army at the foot of San Juan Hill had not been mostly regulars; or what would have been the result had five or six thousand Spanish soldiers been intrenched on the heights of San Juan.

General Shafter, in finally deciding to maintain his position on San Juan Heights, after being strongly urged by a number of high-ranking officers to withdraw his troops to the high ground between San Juan River and Siboney on account of the thinness of his lines and the difficulty of sending provisions to the front, showed excellent judgment. First, because it was very improbable that the Spaniards would take the offensive, since from time immemorial they have been wedded to defensive fighting and have seldom had the enterprise and energy to assume the offensive either tactically or strategically. This characteristic of the Spaniards was doubtless taken into account by General Shafter; for a wise general never fails to consider the well-known peculiarities of the people whom he is fighting. "It is one of the gifts of a great captain," says William O'Connor Morris, "to understand the character of an adversary in his front." Secondly, because the American line, though it looked to be weak, could have held its position on the defensive against any force the Spanish commander could have brought against it; for had he taken the offensive with all the troops at Santiago, and been reënforced by Escario's

column, which arrived on July 3, his attacking forces would not even then have outnumbered the defenders. Skobelev once said that a position carried by attack can be held, even if seventy-five per cent of the attacking force have perished. If this was true in the days of Skobelev, there can be no question of its truth to-day, when the modern rifle gives to the soldier behind breastworks so much greater fighting power.

Besides the mistakes already indicated, there were many other instances of bad management. Among them may be mentioned the chaos at Tampa; the confusion during the disembarkation at Daiquiri and Siboney; the want of landing facilities; the scarcity of ambulances and medical officers; the lack of proper arms, equipments, and clothing, and the use of black powder in the field guns and Springfield rifles. But the responsibility for these things rested for the most part upon the American Congress and not upon General Shafter and the officers of the Fifth Corps.

The excellent work done by Lieutenant-Colonel Humphrey, Chief Quartermaster, and Colonel Weston, Chief Commissary, of the Fifth Corps, is worthy of special mention. Theirs was the difficult task. In the face of a heavy surf, with inadequate landing facilities, without anchorage or docks, or the necessary lighters, tugs, or labourers, they had to put ashore the animals, wagons, and supplies; and then, under the most discouraging conditions

due to the heavy rainfall, the sweltering heat, and the weakening fevers, had to assemble the wagons, load them with rations and ammunition, and keep them moving to the front. But in spite of all these difficulties they kept Shafter's army and the Cuban forces well supplied with rations and ammunition, and in addition furnished food for several weeks to fifteen or twenty thousand Cuban refugees. With timely preparation and proper foresight undoubtedly many of the difficulties which were here met and overcome could have been avoided, for the real cause of nearly all these difficulties is to be found, not in any lack of enterprise or ability of the officers, but in a policy which demanded action without due preparation. The truth of the matter is that the United States was not prepared for war; and the marvellous thing is that General Shafter should have succeeded at all. Indeed, his success was little short of the miraculous. Had the Spaniards then at Santiago been properly handled, they could easily have prevented his landing at Daiquiri and Siboney; or failing to attempt that, could have crushed him at Las Guasimas or defeated him at San Juan Hill. Again, had Linares concentrated at Santiago the greater part of the troops which were in the theatre of operations, he could have brought overwhelming numbers against Shafter on every battlefield and still have fought behind intrenched positions.

General Shafter is a very large, fleshy man of

indomitable, rugged energy. He is a strong type of a blunt, brave soldier. It is his habit to call a spade a spade. He has little magnetism, but a great deal of common sense. He has pluck. He is a fighter. He was sent to Santiago to do a certain thing, and, despite the most unfavourable conditions, he did it. He won the battles of El Caney and San Juan, and by so doing drove Cervera's squadron out of the harbour to meet destruction. He was successful because he had a clear comprehension of the principles of war; because he had made a study of previous campaigns in the West Indies; because he was firm, untiring, and decided; because he had able staff officers to assist him; because he had a well-disciplined and thoroughly trained army to do his bidding; and because he was opposed to an adversary who, with the exception of bravery, possessed none of the saving qualities of a soldier. He made mistakes of course. Everybody makes mistakes. Soldiers are no more infallible than other people. "Error," says Napier, "is common in an art which at best is but a choice of difficulties." "Speak to me of a general who has never made mistakes," says Turenne, "and you speak of one who has seldom made war." "In the profession of war," says Napoleon, "the game is always to the one who makes the fewest mistakes."

Owing to the limited amount of sea transportation, which necessitated the leaving behind at

Tampa all the horses of the cavalry division, General Shafter was obliged to carry on the campaign with but a handful of mounted troops. There is little doubt that under the circumstances this was the best solution of the matter; for if he had taken with him more mounted troops, he could not have taken so many men, and as the cavalrymen who sailed with the expedition were nearly all trained soldiers and good shots, they were able to do excellent fighting on foot.

However, had General Shafter had two or three thousand cavalry, they could easily have prevented Escario's column from entering the city; and if Linares had attempted to concentrate at Santiago the troops which were in Santiago province, a strong cavalry force would have been needed to prevent such a concentration. Suppose, for instance, that Linares had ordered three or four thousand troops from Guantanamo to Santiago at about the time General Shafter was considering the matter of withdrawing his lines from San Juan Heights to the high ground near El Pozo. This Spanish column advancing along the main road that passes through El Caney would have threatened the communications of the American army and compelled Shafter to fall back. The defeat of the column before it closed in upon him would have been an imperative necessity; and for this purpose cavalry would have been almost indispensable.

Since the Americans were in the island fighting

to make Cuba free, one would naturally suppose that the Cuban soldiers would have fought with desperate determination and courage, and that they would have been ready and anxious to take the initiative and lead the way in every battle, in order to show to their allies and the world that they were worthy of freedom, in that they knew at least how to fight and how to die. But in only two ways were they of any assistance in this campaign. They supplied General Shafter and his officers with valuable information which would have been difficult to obtain without their assistance, since there were no mounted troops in the American army that could be spared for reconnoitring duty; and by harassing Escario's column in its march from Manzanillo to Santiago, they probably prevented it from reaching Santiago before the decisive battles were fought. But no further praise is due the Cuban soldiers. At the very start, the failure of General Castillo to come to the assistance of General Young at Las Guasimas after promising to do so, created in the minds of the Americans a very unfavourable opinion of the fighting qualities of the Cuban soldiers. General Shafter soon learned that they could not be depended upon, even in conjunction with the Americans, to prosecute in a systematic manner any operation that required severe fighting. There were, of course, many brave men among them; but, taken as a whole, they had neither the

discipline nor the courage to close with the enemy and fight until one side or the other was defeated or crushed. Feeling that Garcia's troops would be a hindrance rather than an aid on the battlefields of El Caney and San Juan, General Shafter intrusted them with the task of preventing Escario's column from entering the city. But though their number at this time exceeded four thousand, they utterly failed to perform the easy task assigned them. While the freedom of Cuba was being decided under their very eyes, they stood by, inefficient, inactive. The reward was theirs, but the Americans made the sacrifice. By the blood of the Americans the victories were won.

CHAPTER XIII

THE DESTRUCTION OF CERVERA'S SQUADRON ¹

THE story of the circumstances leading up to the destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago on July 3 is best told in the telegrams and other official correspondence ² of Admiral Cervera, Captain-General Blanco, and the Spanish Minister of Marine, and Minister of War.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 27, 1898.

I intended yesterday to run the blockade, ³ taking advantage of the storm, but the best pilot was of [the] opinion that [the] *Colon* would run great risk of touching bottom on a rock in the entrance of the harbour where *Gerona* lost false keel. Do not feel justified in running this risk and deferred sortie, second in command and captains being of [the] same opinion except chief of staff and Captain of *Infanta Maria Teresa*, who were of the contrary opinion. There are not at this harbour sufficiently fast vessels to run the blockade.

¹ See Map II.

² This correspondence is obtained from "A Collection of Documents relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies," arranged by Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete; translated from the Spanish and published by the Office of United States Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C.

³ See pages 214, *et seq.*, Chapter IX.

The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, May 28, 1898.

Your telegram of 27th received. [I] notify you that enemy intends to sink hulks in [the] entrance to [the] harbour.

(Extract)

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, May 28, 1898.

Although your excellency has direct news from Santiago de Cuba, [I] believe [it] proper to tell you that that province is the one I have tried to make [the] best provisions for on account of [its] distance [from] Havana and probable attack or blockade [by] Americans and insurgents. Have reënforced it to four battalions, three squadrons, one Krupp mountain battery, four companies [of] engineers, ten field guns, forty-seven siege guns, and corresponding auxiliary troops. Besides provisions paid for here by drafts on ministry have sent there 166,000 pesetas [in] gold, 10,000 [in] silver, 100,000 [in] notes, and placed 100,000 pesos at Madrid and £10,000 at Birmingham. Of all this and other details referring to defence I send your excellency detailed official statement.

[The] appearance of Cervera's squadron [has made] much impression on Americans, who have stationed seven ships off Santiago de Cuba.

"It is certain," says Admiral Cervera in a footnote, "that very much less than is stated in this telegram reached Santiago."

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 28, 1898.

The harbour is blocked by hostile squadron more powerful than ours, and we are on [the] lookout for [an] opportunity to run the blockade. Meanwhile we are vigilant to frustrate enemy's plans. Under these conditions the battle would be unequal. Shall therefore try to elude it if possible. Coal is being shipped slowly.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander-in-chief of
the Army Division at Santiago (Linares).*

HONOURED SIR, — I am in receipt of your official letter of the 26th, in which you transmit to me the ideas of the Captain-General, to whom I beg you will extend in my name many thanks for everything. I must try to get out of this dilemma, but am in despair over the slowness of coaling, and without a reasonable amount of coal nothing can be attempted. We are constantly watching the mouth of the harbour, and I believe any enterprise against us will be prevented by your dispositions and our coöperation. If we only had what we need.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 28, 1898.

The bombardment of the forts at the mouth of the harbour and of the *Cristobal Colon* in the bay by Commodore Schley on May 31 is referred to in the following telegram:

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 31, 1898.

Hostile ships have fired about sixty shots, apparently for [the] purpose of reconnoitring. Firing was done by *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Amazonas* [*New Orleans*], and auxiliary cruiser. Batteries and *Cristobal Colon* answered. Auxiliary cruiser retreated, probably with injuries. From [the] shore it seems two projectiles were seen hitting the *Iowa*. Nothing new from [the] squadron.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 1, 1898.

Blockading fleet has received large reënforcements.¹ To make successful running of blockade possible attempt should be made to draw off armoured cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*,² calling their attention somewhere else.

The following telegram refers to the sinking of the *Merrimac* in the harbour entrance by Lieutenant Hobson.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 3, 1898.

Early this morning a battleship and merchant steamer tried to force [the] harbour entrance. Destroyers and

¹ Admiral Sampson's squadron.

² The cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York* were the two fastest armoured vessels of the American navy.

scouts which are at [the] mouth of [the] harbour opened fire, followed by *Reina Mercedes* and batteries of Socapa where guns of said vessel have been mounted. Merchant steamer was sunk; battleship repulsed. A lieutenant and six sailors [were] taken prisoners; no casualties on our side from hostile fire; slight injuries to installations of 2.95-inch guns of destroyers.

The Minister of War (Correa) to the Governor-General (Blanco).

MADRID, June 3, 1898.

Very serious situation in Philippines¹ compels us to send there ships and reënforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila, it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present [we have] only two warships [to send] there and one of them I believe cannot pass through canal. The only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding, the government wishes to know your opinion as to [the] effect the withdrawal of Cervera's fleet might produce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reënforced.

¹ On May 1 Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish squadron at Manila, and on May 25 the first expedition of General Merritt's army sailed from San Francisco for the Philippines.

The Governor-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, June 4, 1898.

I would be failing in my duty if I concealed from your excellency that [the] departure of Cervera's squadron at this time would be of fatal effect on public opinion. [I] doubt whether the situation that would surely result could be controlled. Volunteers already much exercised over [the] inadequacy [of] Cervera's squadron, and only kept up from one moment to another by [the] hope [of] arrival [of] second squadron. [They] would rise in [a] body upon learning that instead of [receiving] reënforcements the few ships here are withdrawing. The repression would necessarily be bloody. Attitude of army in that case doubtful. Loss of island certain in view of horrible conflagration it would kindle here.

Many of the Spaniards, not only at Santiago de Cuba but throughout the island, believed that a second squadron (Camara's) would speedily be sent from Spain to reënforce Cervera's squadron. Lieutenant José Müller of the Spanish navy, describing in his "*Combates y Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba*" the thoughts which came to him on the evening of July 2 at Santiago, after the sailors who had been ashore with the army had reëmbarked, says:

"Everything indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet [Cervera's squadron] was about to go out; but when and how? It occurred to me (and nobody could have persuaded me from it) that a fleet from the

Peninsula was on its way to Santiago ; that it would pass in sight of the semaphore of Porto Rico ; that consequently Admiral Cervera would know, given the distance and speed of the former and allowing for the difference in time, when it would reach Santiago ; and when fire was opened on the enemy it would leave the mouth free ; then he would go out, and the two fleets combined would defeat the enemy. I remembered everything I had read in newspapers about the purchase of ships, and the date when those building had been launched. Everything became clear to me. We had ships and they were coming. No doubt they were quite near, or perhaps only a few miles distant, but where had the ships come from ? I do not know — from heaven, from earth, from the air, from nothing at all — I do not know. But everything appeared possible to me, except that our fleet should go out alone to fight the ships that were assembled at the Morro.

“The aid of marine, Mr. Dario Leguinia, even more optimistic than I (and that is saying a great deal), could not rest a minute. I shall never forget how during that night of the 2d we were sitting on the doorsteps of the captaincy of the port, making calculations as to the number of ships that might arrive and the probabilities of success that we could count on. Our ships communicating by means of the Ardois [signals] were another proof of this. The event announced was near, and we were to see great things happening. At times we even thought we heard firing out there on the sea at a great distance and in a southeasterly direction. How much desire and imagination can do !”¹

¹ In this extract from Lieutenant Müller's book, the translation by the U. S. Navy Department is followed.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 6, 1898.

Hostile squadron, ten ships strong, has bombarded ¹ this squadron three hours, being answered by [the] batteries at [the] mouth of [the] harbour, among which are guns of [the] *Reina Mercedes*. Our casualties: killed, executive officer of *Reina Mercedes* and five sailors; wounded, Ensign Molins and eleven other sailors, and five bruised. Army has one dead; wounded, a colonel of artillery, four officers, and seventeen privates. I do not know [the] loss of [the] enemy. *Reina Mercedes* has suffered much. *Vizcaya* received two shells, *Furor* one shell in the bunker without serious injury. Works of defence have suffered slight injuries of no military importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bombarded other points on [the] coast.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 6, 1898.

Fear enemy will succeed in obstructing [the] harbour entrance. We cannot prevent them with their great superiority. Beg your excellency to give me instructions.

The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 8, 1898.

As it is impossible to foresee and properly solve from here all cases that may arise in the campaign, the

¹ Admiral Sampson's bombardment of June 6.

government, which knows the means at your disposal, your own high qualities, and the wide scope given you, is confident that you will make of them [the] best possible use in every case, and [it] will consider that you have fulfilled your difficult mission if you satisfy the letter and spirit of our ordinances.

The meaning of "the letter and spirit of our ordinances" is made clear by Admiral Cervera, who quotes from the "General Ordinances of the Spanish Navy," part 3, Chapter I, Article 153, as follows :

"You will fight as far as lies in your power against any superior forces, so that, even though necessary to surrender, your defence will be considered honourable by the enemy. If possible you will run your ship aground on own or hostile coast rather than surrender, if there is no immediate risk of the crew perishing in the shipwreck ; and even after running aground, it will be your duty to defend the ship and finally burn it, if there is no other way of preventing the enemy from taking possession of it."

PROCEEDINGS

On the 8th day of June the Admiral convened in his cabin the captains of the squadron to hear their opinions relative to the situation of said squadron. Being requested to express their opinions, they did so in the following order and manner :

Bustamante, taking into account all the circumstances of the existence of provisions, the superiority of hostile

forces, etc., is of [the] opinion that the squadron should take advantage of the present dark of the moon and resolutely effect the sortie, and as the situation of the hostile fleet at night and the difficulties of the sortie make it impossible for the squadron to go out in a body, the sortie should be effected as follows: The torpedo-boat destroyers should go out first, shaping their course to the south and passing at their utmost speed by the *Texas* and the three large battleships. Shortly after the *Colon*, the fastest of the four ships, should go out with a west-southwesterly course, heading straight for the *Brooklyn*, whose position is usually in that wing of the blockading line. Then should follow the *Teresa* to the east-southeast, and finally the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*. He believes that this would create confusion in the hostile fleet and permit us to save at least fifty per cent of our squadron, which solution, in his opinion, is vastly preferable to that other solution which he foresees and which he does not wish to admit as possible, namely, of the fleet being compelled to surrender from lack of provisions. He is also of [the] opinion that the squadron should prepare for this step by resting a few days, especially the destroyers, upon whose crews such severe demands are being made night after night that it is a wonder they withstand the fatigues of their service. He also deems it of advantage from every point of view (one of them being to wear out the enemy) to keep firing, especially on the searchlights, which explore the vicinity of the harbour entrance during the hours of darkness. And finally, not being conversant with the means adopted by the Admiral, he is of [the] opinion that, before attempting the extreme step which he suggests, the government should be given an accurate idea of the

very serious situation of the squadron. In view of the manner in which the ships would go out, he believes that the point of rendezvous should be Havana rather than San Juan, which latter point he would prefer if the squadron went out in a body.

Captain Concas is of [the] opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, *Brooklyn* or *New York*, should at any time disappear, the sortie should be attempted immediately ; if not, it should be attempted about the time of the new moon ; but in that event, with the whole squadron united and all the ships following the same course, provided the nucleus of hostile forces is stationed, as at the present time, five or six miles from the harbour entrance.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the *Colon*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, in view of the impunity with which the blockading fleet approaches to within a mile of the harbour entrance, counting on the inadequate defences of the harbour, and in view of the present conditions of the harbour, the sortie having been rendered more difficult by the position of the *Merrimac*, so that it would require a certain length of time to effect it, thus giving the enemy an opportunity to concentrate still superior forces off the entrance, even if they should not discover the going out of the first ship that undertook the sortie, are of [the] opinion that the sortie should not be attempted as long as the present situation continues, and in the meantime every military means should be used to reënforce the defences at the harbour entrance, so as to guard against an attack of torpedo boats and small craft, which might appear in the entrance protected by one or more battleships, the squadron in this harbour making the best

possible resistance, keeping in front of it the greater part of the hostile naval forces, this being the most important service the squadron can render toward the general defence of the island.

They also deem it expedient to shelter the torpedo-boat destroyers, not only to permit them to rest their crews, but also to prevent their being boarded by a *coup de main* in a night attack by small craft.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

JUAN B. LAZAGA.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

ANTONIO EULATE.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 9, 1898.

I called a meeting of [the] captains for the purpose of hearing their opinions on [the] future operations. Second in command, captains of *Colon*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and commander of torpedo division, were of the opinion that we should not go out, owing to superior forces of blockading fleet. Captain [of] *Teresa* was of the opinion that, in case of detachment or withdrawal of the *Brooklyn* and *New York*, we should go out immediately, and in any event, at the new moon, even though hostile fleet should remain together. Chief of staff was in favour of effecting sortie immediately, scattering our squadron. The fires of the ships remained lighted so as to take advantage of first

opportunity, but as the blockade is very strict and the hostile fleet four times superior, I doubt much that opportunity will present itself.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander-in-chief of the Army of Santiago (Linares).

HONOURED SIR, — Last evening I made personal observations from the high battery of the Socapa on the position of the hostile squadron, and have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for the squadron under my command to go out without being seen, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, as long as the coast defences do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbour entrance with their electric searchlights.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 11, 1898.

The Commander-in-chief of the Army of Santiago de Cuba (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONOURED SIR, — Since you made personal observations last night on the position of the hostile squadron, and have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for your squadron to leave the harbour without being seen by the enemy, as long as the coast defences do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbour entrance with their searchlights, I beg that you will advise me whether you deem the fire of the 6.3-inch Hontoria guns, which have the longest range of all the guns installed

in the coast batteries, suitable for the purpose stated, so that I may give the necessary instructions to the captain of the high battery of the Socapa.

But as it is not advisable to cause unnecessary alarm in the city and to waste ammunition, nor to let our enemies see how limited are our means of defence and attack in case we should not succeed in facilitating the sortie of the squadron, I beg to represent to your excellency, in order that you may take this fact into account if you deem proper, that the rays of the searchlights are clearly seen over the city, and it would therefore be necessary to add to the distance at which the United States vessels are usually stationed at least the distance which separates the city of Santiago from the coast, namely, 4.35 or 4.97 miles, the total being the distance to which the squadron would have to retire in order that its searchlights may no longer illuminate the harbour entrance.

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 11, 1898.

*The Commander-in-chief of the Army of Santiago
(Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONOURED SIR, — The Captain-General, in a cablegram dated to-day, at 11.25 A. M., says:

“I remind your excellency that in case of an attack on land you may find a powerful auxiliary for repulsing the enemy in landing companies of the squadron with their excellent field-guns, which Admiral Cervera would no doubt be willing to furnish for the defence, which I am sure will be glorious, and the army and navy united will triumph over [the] Americans.”

The foregoing telegram I transmit to your excellency for your information, advising you that I have answered the Captain-General that your excellency had already offered to land the forces. At the same time I beg your excellency, if the case should arise, to permit that one landing company be stationed at the Socapa, one at Punta Gorda, another at Las Cruces Pier, and the remaining one at Punta Blanca, all with such number of suitable guns as you may deem necessary.

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 12, 1898.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commander-in-chief of
the Army of Santiago (Linares).*

HONOURED SIR, — I am in receipt of your communication dated yesterday relative to landing columns of this squadron, and I take pleasure in again assuring your excellency of my entire willingness to lend whatever aid may be necessary for the defence of the city.

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 13, 1898.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 14, 1898.

The enemy fired several shots last night. This morning they again bombarded the defences at harbour entrance for thirty minutes. Ensign Bruquetas and two others in Socapa battery slightly wounded. *Vizcaya* hit by shell without serious results. Army has three slightly wounded.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, JUNE 16, 1898.

During [the] night [a] projectile, apparently dynamite, burst on the water near *Pluton*, causing injuries which are being examined. At daybreak the enemy kept up galling fire for an hour, and slower fire thirty minutes, then withdrawing. Ensign Bruquetas and eight men wounded, two killed; army, one officer and eight men wounded, one killed. *Vesuvius* fired during night. Eight ships in sight this morning.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 16, 1898.

I have a suspicion that the enemy has planted torpedoes in the entrance to the harbour. Have therefore ordered careful investigation in charge of Bustamante. Have purchased provisions, though expensive and bad, which will last until [the] end of July at least.

*The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister
of War (Correa).*

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

It is to be regretted [that the] independence which Cervera's squadron enjoys prevented me from aiding in his operations, although the results are weighing on my mind, because the entrance and stay of the squadron at Santiago has completely changed the objective and aspect of the campaign, the supplying of provisions and

coal, and the provisioning of certain places. If an attempt had at least been made of consulting with me, General Linares, and the Commandant-General of the navy-yard, perhaps between us we might in the beginning have found a better solution than those now awaiting the squadron, namely, either to await the result of unequal battle in the harbour, or break hostile line to go to some other harbour, Haiti or Jamaica, where it would again be closed in. It would perhaps be preferable to go to Cienfuegos or Havana, which is still possible; or if not reënforced to proceed to Spain, which would be the best; anything than to remain closed in at Santiago with the prospect of having to surrender from starvation.

The situation is extremely serious, and I have no doubt that the government under these critical circumstances will order what is best for the good of the country and the honour of our arms. I therefore respectfully suggest the expediency of uniting military action in the present war under one head, ordering that I be invested with the command in chief of all the land and naval forces assigned to these waters.

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

I am much troubled, as your excellency may imagine, over [the] situation of [the] division [of] Santiago, against which is principally directed action of enemy, attracted to that harbour by the presence of Cervera's squadron, whose sortie it is intended to prevent. It is there that is engaged [the] honour of our arms and fate

of our best ships, which must be saved at any price. To counteract their efforts, have prepared for every possible aid. Have organized convoy of ammunition to Manzanillo, where every imaginable effort will be made to get it to Santiago. I reënforce Linares by brigade from this province, which will march through interior in conjunction with forces of said convoy of provisions and ammunition, forming with both divisions Fourth Army Corps, under the command of said general, who will thus have nineteen battalions, five squadrons, seven companies of engineers, mounted artillery, mobilized guerillas, and other forces, to be used as the General deems best against enemy within and without. Hope by these measures to sustain war successfully in that region without stripping Centre, Matanzas, and West, which are also constantly menaced.

“It should not be forgotten,” says Cervera in a footnote, “that Santiago received no aid whatever from the outside world except Escario’s column, which arrived without provisions.”

The arrival of General Shafter’s army was announced in the following telegram:

The Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, June 20, 1898.

Seventy American vessels with landing corps [have arrived] off Santiago. General Linares states if government does not have the means to help them [*i. e.*, the Spaniards at Santiago], by sending a squadron against

[the] United States coasts, [with the] object to draw off part of [the] United States fleet which attacks them, [*i. e.*, the Spaniards] so that our squadron can go out, or squadron to arrive from Spain [to] run the blockade in coöperation with Cervera's sortie, circumstances will take care of solving conflict. I have done and shall do everything within human power to aid him — a difficult undertaking, on account of his being entirely cut off, [the] enemy being in complete control of the sea.

The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HAVANA, June 22, 1898.

The Minister tells me to order ammunition by number, class, and calibre. I advise you so that you may let me know what you require.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 22, 1898.

The squadron being blockaded and the city invested, it is too late to order ammunition, for which I have sent many requests to Spain. It cannot arrive in time, since the question must be solved within [the] next few days. Six-sevenths of the 5.5-inch ammunition is useless, the fuses [are] not reliable, and we have no torpedoes. These are the main deficiencies. If the government could send supplies so that they could arrive this week, it might still be time.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 22, 1898.

The enemy is landing at Punta Berracos. As the question is to be decided on land, I am going to send ashore the crews of the squadron as far as the rifles will hold out. The situation is very critical.

*The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral
(Cervera).*

MADRID, June 23, 1898.

The government approves plan of sortie, taking advantage of first favourable opportunity which presents itself. Provisions have reached Cienfuegos. Expedition to be sent overland to Santiago, and auxiliary cruisers will be sent to hostile coast.

*The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine
(Auñón).*

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 23, 1898.

The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defence. The course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews [of] squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will save city.

As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these circumstances, intend to resist as long as

possible and destroy ships as last extreme. Although others are responsible for this untenable situation into which we were forced in spite of my opposition, it is very painful to be an actor therein.

*The Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola)
to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HAVANA, June 23, 1898.

Captain-General states that your squadron and the city are very short of provisions, the rations of sailors being reduced to hard-tack and those of soldiers to rice, and even this for only [a] short time longer. This being the case, the serious situation might become even worse in case city should surrender from lack of provisions, or the garrisons abandon it and go west, in which case your squadron, being without provisions, the harbour blockaded, and the city in hands of enemy, your situation would be extremely grave.

In view of this I wanted to understand [the] situation [of the] blockade at night, and inquired of commandant [of the] navy. Have learned it to be so strict that I see but one chance in a hundred to elude vigilance, but something must be done. Intend to send three or four small vessels, hoping one or other may succeed [in entering]. But, as you must see matters more clearly than I, do not want to act without consulting you. In case you should know of anything else to be done to change situation, beg you will let me know your opinion.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

[I] believe it impossible for any vessel to run present blockade of this harbour. With provisions we can hold out until end of July, but believe the siege will be terminated before that time. Bustamante torpedoes have been planted, but entrance west of Cay Smith is free. . . .

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

Received C D 4898 (of 23d). Immediately convened second in command, captains [of] battleships, and commander [of] torpedo division, to ask their opinions on what could be done under [the] circumstances. Opinion unanimous that sortie has not been and is not now possible. I then read them my telegram of yesterday, in which they concurred and which I hereby confirm. Have little news of [the] enemy, but our forces continue to fall back upon city.

PROCEEDINGS

On the 24th day of June, in the Admiral's cabin, [there] assembled the second in command of the squadron, and the undersigned captains. The chief of staff was not present, being ashore with landing forces. The Admiral read a telegram from the Minister of Marine dated yesterday (received to-day), in which he says that the government approves of plan of sortie at the first opportunity.

When each officer had stated his opinion on the present situation, it was unanimously agreed that the sortie is now, and has been ever since the 8th instant, absolutely impossible.

The Admiral then read the telegram which he despatched yesterday to the Minister, notifying him of the above fact, and of the possibility of it becoming necessary in a very few days to destroy the ships, in which all present concurred, as being an accurate expression of the painful situation in which these forces are placed.

In virtue whereof they signed the foregoing proceedings on board the cruiser *Infanta Maria Teresa*.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

JUAN B. LAZAGA.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

ANTONIO EULATE.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

Secretary, Acting Chief of Staff.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

The Minister of War (Correa) to the Captain-General of Cuba (Blanco).

With consent of [the] government, Minister [of] Marine will notify Admiral Cervera that squadron under his command, hitherto without definite destination, will coöperate in that island to its defence, and in that case your excellency will exercise over it, as over the other naval forces operating in the territory under your command, the powers with which you are invested by the ordinance of the army and navy, confirmed by royal order of October 29, 1872.

The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 24, 1898.

To give perfect unity to conduct of war in [the] island, your excellency, while operating in Cuban waters, will consider yourself commander-in-chief of the squadron of operations, and in your relations with the Captain-General you will observe royal order of November 13, 1872, dictated by this ministry, and the articles of ordinance therein referred to. You may at once enter into direct communication with the Captain-General and coöperate with the squadron toward the execution of his plans.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Although I have always considered myself under the orders of the Captain-General, I thank your excellency for instructions which give legal force to the relations already established, and by giving unity to the military operations will relieve me from taking on my own responsibility extreme measures of the utmost importance.

The following telegram refers to the engagement at Las Guasimas:

The Commander-in-chief of the Army (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HONOURED SIR, — I have returned to the city. Numerous American troops, in conjunction with rebel parties,

attacked the column under my orders twice yesterday and once this morning with artillery, and were repulsed with many casualties, as we could see, since they were unprotected. We had seven killed, twenty seriously wounded, among them three officers, and several slightly wounded and bruised. We took possession of [some] ammunition and a cloth cape with metal button with eagle [on it]. On the march to-day they did not trouble us, in spite of good positions they might have occupied. By reason of the rain, and the troops being wholly without shelter, there is much sickness among them, and as it is impossible to assume the offensive until reënforcements arrive, I have decided to have the defence fall back on the outer precinct of the city.

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 24, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Minister of Marine commands me to place myself under [the] orders of your excellency in conformity with regulations of royal order of November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest pleasure. I believe it my duty to set forth [the] condition of [the] squadron. Out of three thousand rounds for 5.5-inch Hontoria guns, only six hundred and twenty [are] reliable; rest have been pronounced useless, and were not replaced by others for lack of stores when we left. Two 5.5-inch Hontoria guns of *Vizcaya* and one of *Oquendo* [are] defective; they had been ordered to be changed for others. Majority of fuses

[are] not serviceable. We lack Bustamante torpedoes. *Colon* is without heavy armament. *Vizcaya* is badly fouled and has lost her speed. *Teresa* does not have landing guns, and those of *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* are unserviceable. We have little coal; provisions enough for month of July. Blockading fleet is four times superior; hence our sortie would be positively certain destruction.

I have a number of men ashore reënforcing garrison, of which I consider myself a part. Believe it my duty to tell your excellency that on the 23d I addressed to [the] government the following telegram: "The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Siboney to-day, in spite of brilliant defence. The course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews [of] squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrive in time, agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will save city. As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these circumstances, [I] intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme." The foregoing telegram expresses my opinion as well as that of the captains of the ships. I await instructions from your excellency.

The Commander-in-chief of the Army (Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND, — In a cipher cable received last night the Captain-General says, among other things, as follows: "I beg that your excellency will tell Admiral Cervera that I should like to know his opinion and plans. It is my opinion that he should go

out from Santiago as early as possible whenever he may deem best, for the situation in that harbour is, in my judgment, the most dangerous of all. Last night there were only seven warships there, three at Cienfuegos, and nine here, yet the *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo* had no trouble in running the blockade, going out at two o'clock A. M. If we should lose the squadron without fighting, the moral effect would be terrible, both in Spain and abroad."

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

HIS EXCELLENCY ARSENIO LINARES.

MY DEAR GENERAL AND FRIEND, — I am in receipt of your interesting letter of this date, which I hasten to answer. The Captain-General is kind enough to want my opinion, and I am going to give it as explicitly as I ought to, but will confine myself to the squadron, as I believe that is what he asks for. I have considered the squadron lost ever since it left Cape Verde, for to think anything else seems madness to me, in view of the enormous disparity which exists between our own forces and those of the enemy. For that reason I energetically opposed the sailing of the squadron from Cape Verde, and I even thought that I would be relieved by some one of those whose opinions were opposed to mine.

I did not ask to be relieved, because it seems to me that no military man should do so when he receives instructions to march against the enemy. You are familiar with the history of the squadron since its arrival here. If

I had gone to San Juan de Puerto Rico when a telegram from the government caused me to change, my situation would be the same, only the scene would have been a different one, and the avalanche which has fallen upon this island would have come down upon Puerto Rico instead. I believe the mistake was made in sending the squadron out at all. The Captain-General says that the blockade at Havana has been run, and I will add that I myself, with a 7 knot vessel, entered Escombreras and remained there an hour and a half, although it was occupied by the provincial (cantonal) squadron.

But is there any similarity to the present situation? Certainly not. The sortie from here must be made by the ships, one by one. There is no possibility of stratagem nor disguise, and the absolutely certain result will be the ruin of each and all of the ships and the death of the greater part of their crews. If I had thought there was even the remotest chance of success I should have made the attempt, although, as I said before, it would only have amounted to a change of the scene of action unless we had gone to Havana, where things might, perhaps, have been different. For these reasons, and in order that my forces might make themselves useful in some manner, I proposed to you to send them ashore, just at the time when the Captain-General made the same suggestion.

To-day I consider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not able to resist, after having contributed to its defence, or whether to lose it by sacrificing to vanity the majority of its crews and depriving Santiago of their coöperation, thereby precipitating its fall. What is best to be done? I, who am a man without ambitions, without

mad passions, believe that whatever is most expedient should be done, and I state most emphatically that I shall *never* be the one to decree the horrible and useless hecatomb which will be the only possible result of the sortie from here by main force, for I should consider myself responsible before God and history for the lives sacrificed on the altar of vanity, and not in the true defence of the country.

As far as I am concerned, the situation has been changed to-day from a moral standpoint, for I received a telegram this morning which places me under the orders of the Captain-General in everything relating to the operations of the war. It is therefore for him to decide whether I am to go out to suicide, dragging along with me these two thousand sons of Spain. I believe I have answered your letter, and trust you will see in this letter only the true and loyal expression of an honourable old man who for forty-six years has served his country to the best of his ability.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 25, 1898.

Since despatching my last telegram, received letter [of] General Linares transmitting telegram from your excellency wanting to know my opinion. Have already expressed it in former telegram, and give it more fully to-day. It is incorrect that the blockading fleet has ever been reduced to seven vessels. The six principal ships alone represent more than three times the power of my four.

On account of the lack of batteries to keep the hostile squadron at a distance, it remains constantly near the harbour entrance, illuminating it, which makes any sortie except by main force altogether impossible. In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of the squadron and majority of its crews. I shall never take this step on my own account, but if your excellency so orders I shall carry it out. The loss of the squadron was, in my judgment, decreed when it was ordered to come here. Therefore its painful situation is not a surprise to me. Your excellency will give instructions whether we are to go out to this sacrifice, which I believe fruitless.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

HAVANA, June 26, 1898.

Your two telegrams received. I thank you for the satisfaction you express over being under my orders. I consider myself greatly honoured thereby, and trust that you will see in me a comrade rather than a superior. It seems to me you somewhat exaggerate difficulties of sortie. It is not a question of fighting, but of escaping from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in, and I do not believe it impossible, by taking advantage of favourable circumstances in dark night and bad weather, to elude enemy's vigilance and escape in whatever direction you deem best. Even in case you are discovered, firing is very uncertain at night, and although it may cause injuries, it would mean nothing compared with [the] safety of the ships.

You say that loss of Santiago is certain, in which case you would destroy ships, and this is an additional reason

for attempting the sortie, since it is preferable for the honour of arms to succumb in battle, where there may be many chances of safety. Moreover, the destruction of the ships is not certain, for the same thing might happen that occurred at Havana [the] last century when the English included in the capitulation the surrender of the squadron which was enclosed in the harbour.

For my part, I do not believe that the hostile fleet, no matter how strong, can do so very much damage if our squadron, choosing a dark night and favourable opportunity while part of enemy's ships are withdrawn, steams out at full power in a direction agreed upon, even if discovered. This is shown by the running out of the *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo* from this harbour with nine ships in the blockading line, the *Purísima* from Casilda with three, and the entering of the *Reina Cristina* into Cienfuegos, also blockaded by three ships. I am very well aware that the situation of your squadron is a very difficult one. Still, the preceding cases bear comparison.

If your cruisers are in some manner captured in Santiago Harbour, the effect in the whole world will be disastrous, and the war may be considered terminated in favour of the enemy. The eyes of every nation are at present fixed on your squadron, on which the honour of our country depends, as I am sure your excellency realizes. The government is of the same opinion, and to my mind there can be no doubt as to the solution of the dilemma, especially as I have great confidence in the result.

I leave entirely to the discretion of your excellency, who is so highly gifted, the route to be followed and the decision as to whether any of the ships should be left

behind on account of slow speed. As a favourable item I will tell your excellency that the captain of [the] German cruiser *Geier* has expressed the opinion that the sortie of the squadron can be effected without running great risks.

The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Admiral (Cervera).

MADRID, June 26, 1898.

Government thinks in extreme case referred to in cablegram of the 23d, before ourselves destroying our squadron in harbour, should attempt to save it, in whole or [in] part, by sortie at night, as was [the] opinion of some of the officers of your squadron in meeting [of] May 26 and June 10,¹ and as you stated on May 28. Advise me whether landing of crews was at [the] request [of the] military authority, and whether they were reëmbarked after rendering assistance.

The object of my cablegram of the 24th, for which you thanked me, is not a personal matter, but the best service to the nation. Avoid comments to which are attributed unfavourable interpretations.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 27, 1898.

Have received C D 4097 (preceding telegram). Very sorry I incurred [the] displeasure of [the] government by

¹ Although June 10 is the date as it appears in the original, it refers to the meeting of the 8th, as no meeting was held on the 10th.

[the] opinion expressed long time ago, and to your excellency in cipher telegram dated May 21. With the harbour entrance blockaded, as it now is, the sortie at night is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships being closer inshore.

Landing of crews was at request of military authority, through Captain-General. I have asked [their return] for reëmbarkation, but doubt much if it can be effected before reënforcements arrive. Your A D 0491 (telegram of the 24th), the same as all acts of your excellency, have for object the best service, but inure, nevertheless, to my benefit, because I will not be the one to decide upon the useless hecatomb which is being prepared.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 27, 1898.

I am in receipt of your cable, and thank your excellency very much for [the] kind words in my behalf. I have to respect your excellency's opinions without discussing them, especially after having given you my own opinion formed after mature consideration. I have always believed that there are many sailors more able than I am, and it is a pity that one of them cannot come to take command of the squadron, under whose orders I would be placed. I construe your excellency's telegram as an order to go out, and therefore ask General Linares for reëmbarkation of [the] forces which were landed at your excellency's suggestion. I beg that you will confirm the order of sortie, because it is not explicit, and I should feel very sorry if I did not interpret your excellency's orders correctly.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of the
Army at Santiago (Linares).*

(Extract.)

HAVANA, June 27, 1898.

Tell me candidly your opinion on squadron, whether you believe it can go out, and what solution seems best to you.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 28, 1898.

General Linares answers me that it is not possible to reëmbark my forces until troops arrive from Manzanillo.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera),
Santiago.*

(Personal and confidential.)

HAVANA, June 28, 1898.

Your telegram received last evening. Being desirous of improving as much as possible situation [at] Santiago, am making every effort to forward rations to you. If I succeed I shall be able to send more reënforcements, thus prolonging the defence, perhaps raising [the] siege [which would be the] salvation of [the] squadron. If I do not succeed it is necessary, as you will realize, for [the] squadron to leave that harbour in spite of [the] difficulties, which I appreciate.

Therefore my plan, which I desire your excellency to carry out, is as follows: The squadron will remain in [the] harbour and, without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, will watch for a favourable opportunity to go

out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its fate to the valour and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy. Acknowledge receipt.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 29, 1898.

Your telegram received. Beg repetition from the words "become aggravated" to the end of sentence, this being unintelligible. The rest I shall carry out as far as possible, the scant supply of coal rendering it difficult. It takes these ships twelve hours to get up steam, and if the fires are kept going and the ships in readiness to take advantage of opportunity, each uses fifteen tons a day. But I think I understand [the] meaning [of] your order: If [a] favourable opportunity presents itself, to avail ourselves of it; and if not, to go out at the last hour, even though loss of squadron be certain. Difficulties might also arise by enemy taking possession of [the] harbour entrance.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

HAVANA, June 30, 1898.

In conformity with [the] terms of your excellency's telegram of 24th instant [I] have dictated to Admiral the following instructions: "The squadron will remain in [the]

harbour, and without precipitation, provided it has provisions left, will watch for a favourable opportunity to go out in whatever direction your excellency may deem best. But in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can, intrusting its fate to the valour and ability of your excellency and the distinguished captains commanding it, who no doubt will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy." I tell your excellency of this for your information, and beg that you will advise me whether the foregoing instructions meet with [the] government's approval.

The Minister of Marine (Auñón) to the Commandant-General of Navy-Yard (Manterola).

MADRID, July 1, 1898.

Advise Captain-General that government approves his instructions to Admiral Cervera.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Lieutenant-General, Commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Corps of Santiago de Cuba (Linares).¹

HONOURED SIR, — I have the honour of notifying your excellency of a cablegram which I have received from the Captain-General and which is as follows: "Your telegram received last night. Being desirous of improving as much as possible [the] situation [at] Santiago . . . will confirm by their actions the reputation they enjoy."

¹ This new title was conferred upon General Linares about that time.

I therefore beg that, if at any time you think that the unfortunate situation referred to in the telegram may arise, you will kindly advise me in time, so that I may be able to reëmbark the men I have ashore and put to sea, in compliance with the instructions.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, June 30, 1898.

*The Commander-in-chief of the Fourth Army Corps
(Linares) to the Admiral (Cervera).*

HONOURED SIR, — In reply to your official favour transmitting to me a cable from his excellency the Captain-General, in virtue of which you ask me to advise you when the city may be in danger of falling into the hands of the enemy, I have the honour to state that this being an open city, for whose defence earthworks have been thrown up on the heights and lines of trenches dug along its wire enclosure, it is not possible to determine the moment when to notify your excellency, for as soon as an attack is commenced there is danger that the powerful column will break through the outer line, along which all my scant forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the points which may be threatened the most. Nevertheless, I shall endeavour to keep your excellency posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle should be unfavourable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reëmbarkation of your forces.

Yours, etc.,

ARSENIO LINARES.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

In addition to my cablegram of yesterday I advise your excellency that General Linares replies that, as the city is open, having only earthworks and wire enclosure, it will not be possible to determine the moment for notifying me, as there is danger of the powerful column breaking the line along which all his scant forces are deployed, without reserves to be sent to the most advanced points, but that he will, nevertheless, keep me posted as to the course of the battle, although, if the battle should be unfavourable, the moment would not be propitious for effecting the reëmbarkation of my forces. As these ships cannot go out without the forces, since they must expect a fierce battle at the sortie, and will, in my judgment, be destroyed or captured, as I have already advised you, the case might arise that I could not carry out your orders. I therefore notify you accordingly and beg for instructions.

PROCEEDINGS

The undersigned officers being convened by the Admiral on the 1st day of July, at seven o'clock P. M., said Admiral read to them the telegrams exchanged with the Captain-General at Havana, in which the latter states, in spite of the observations made as to the disaster awaiting the squadron at the harbour entrance, that the sortie should be effected by main force, especially if the loss of Santiago de Cuba is impending. The Admiral then gave an account of the military operations that have taken

place this day, in which the enemy took possession of the town of El Caney and San Juan Hill.

Upon being asked for their opinions as to whether they thought that the case had arisen in which the Captain-General had ordered the sortie, but that it is absolutely impossible to effect it without the reëmbarkation of the men now ashore for the defence of the city, being at present more than two-thirds of the total forces of the squadron, and that at the same time the chief of the army corps, in an official communication, has stated that he cannot do without their aid, being absolutely without reserves and forces with which to relieve the men on the extensive lines to be defended. As the result of the foregoing, it is the opinion of the undersigned that, in order to coöperate in the most effective manner and with some prospect of success in the defence of the city, it would be necessary to obstruct the harbour entrance.

JOSÉ DE PAREDES.

JUAN B. LAZAGA.

FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

ANTONIO EULATE.

EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898. At night.

Through General Toral your excellency knows of the events of this day. He believes it certain that the withdrawal of my landing forces will entail the immediate loss of the city. Without them the sortie cannot be attempted. My opinion is the same as Toral's, and our sortie will look

like flight, which is repugnant to all. My captains are of the same opinion. I entreat you to send instructions I have asked for.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Minister of Marine (Auñón).

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 1, 1898.

The enemy to-day made [a] fierce attack on [the] city with overwhelming forces. Has not accomplished much, as the defence has been brilliant. But we have six hundred casualties, among them Commander-in-chief [of] army seriously wounded, and General of Brigade killed; Captain of Navy, Bustamante, seriously wounded. Crews have not been reëmbarked because it would entail immediate loss of [the] city. Have asked Captain-General for instructions.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

(Very urgent. Key L.)

HAVANA, July 1, 1898. 10.30 P.M.

In view of [the] hostile progress in spite of [the] heroic defence [of the] garrison, and in conformity with opinion [of] government, you will reëmbark crews, taking advantage of first opportunity, and go out with the ships of your squadron, following route you deem best. You are authorized to leave behind any which on account of slow speed or circumstances have no chance of escaping. I will tell your excellency for your information only, not in the nature of instructions, that there are only three ships at Cienfuegos and nine here, none of them of great power.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera).

(Urgent. Key O.)

HAVANA, July 1, 1898. 10.45 P. M.

In addition to my former telegram of this evening, ask you to hasten sortie from harbour as much as possible before enemy can take possession of [the] entrance.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Commander of Army at Santiago (Toral).

(Extract.)

HAVANA, July 1, 1898. 10.55 P. M.

It is absolutely necessary to concentrate forces and prolong defence as much as possible, by every means preventing enemy from taking possession of harbour entrance before sortie of squadron, which is to go out as early as possible, so as not to have to surrender or destroy ships.

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Minister of War (Correa).

HAVANA, July 1, 1898.

Admiral Cervera is troubled about leaving the harbour, fearing squadron will be destroyed in the operation, and asks for new instructions. Have answered, in conformity with your excellency's telegram No. 90, that he is to leave the harbour, taking advantage of first opportunity before enemy occupies entrance.

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco).

(Urgent.)

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 2, 1898. At daybreak.

Your urgent telegrams of last night received. Have sent my chief of staff to show them to General Toral, and have given orders to light fires, so as to go out as soon as my forces are reëmbarked.

*The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera),
Santiago.*

(Very urgent.)

HAVANA, July 2, 1898. 5.10 A. M.

In view of exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral, your excellency will reëmbark troops of squadron as fast as possible, and go out immediately.

July 2 was a day of preparation. The sailors who had gone ashore were hastily reëmbarked, steam was made in all the boilers, the decks were cleared for action, and a pilot was sent to each ship.

As the entrance to the harbour was a long narrow channel slightly obstructed near the upper end by the sunken *Merrimac*, it was necessary that the ships should go out in single column at considerable distance apart. Admiral Cervera's plan was that his flagship, the *Maria Teresa*, should go out first, followed by the *Viscaya*, *Colon*, *Oquendo*, and the destroyers, in the order named. The *Teresa*

was to engage the *Brooklyn* at the western extremity of the blockading line, endeavouring, if possible, to ram her; and while the American warships were grappling with the *Teresa*, the other Spanish ships, with the *Vizcaya* at their head, were to take a westerly course between the *Teresa* and the coast and endeavour to escape. The destroyers were to place themselves under the protection of the larger ships to avoid the fire of the enemy as much as possible and, if the battle was unfavourable, to try to escape. Upon encountering any single ship, however, they were to improve the opportunity to attack. Should any of the ships succeed in escaping, they were to try to reach either Cienfuegos or Havana.

On Sunday morning, July 3, at about 9.15, the Spanish cruisers started to leave the harbour. They moved down the bay and through the channel in column, Cervera's flagship, the *Maria Teresa*, in the lead, followed by the *Vizcaya*, the *Colon*, and the *Oquendo* at intervals of about eight hundred yards. About ten or twelve hundred yards behind the *Oquendo* came the destroyers.

The American warships, which for the past month had closely blockaded the harbour, were arranged in the form of a semicircle around the entrance. The *Brooklyn* held the extreme left or western end of the line; the *Texas* was next, towards the east; the *Iowa* was still farther east and south; then came the *Oregon*, and a little

farther north and east was the *Indiana*. Closer in-shore were the converted yachts *Vixen* and *Gloucester*: the *Vixen* was on the left of the line not far from the *Brooklyn*, the *Gloucester* on the right of the line, almost due north of the *Indiana*. At 4 o'clock that morning the *Massachusetts*, which was in need of coal, had left for Guantanamo, and at 8.55 A. M. the *New York*, accompanied by the converted yacht *Hist* and the torpedo-boat *Ericsson*, had started eastward for Siboney, where Admiral Sampson intended to land for a conference with General Shafter.

Sampson's plan of battle, which had been promulgated in an order¹ issued on June 2, was: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore."

At almost exactly half-past nine o'clock the *Maria Teresa*, with smoke pouring from her funnels, was seen coming down the channel. The *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Oregon* immediately signalled, "Enemy's ships coming out," and the *Iowa* fired two shots to give the alarm. Officers and men sprang to their stations, and the warships started towards the mouth of the harbour; slowly at first, as the *Oregon* alone had steam up in all her boilers. But the engineers, stokers, and firemen, working with might and main, soon had on a heavy pressure of steam, and in a few minutes all the ships were

¹ For a copy of this order in full, see Appendix W,

under good headway. As the *Brooklyn* went forward, she repeated the signal, "Enemy's ships coming out," then flew the signals, "Clear ship for action," and "Close up." Sampson, who was about nine miles eastward of the entrance, immediately put the *New York* about and started for the scene of action, signalling, "Close in towards harbour entrance and attack vessels." The *Vixen*, in order to leave the way clear for the *Brooklyn*, moved farther out to sea; and the *Gloucester*, at the eastern end of the line, waited for the destroyers, which Wainwright, her commander, regarded as his especial prey.

As the *Teresa* moved out of the harbour, she opened fire upon the American ships at a range of about three miles, and immediately became the target of the guns of the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Brooklyn*. The other Spanish cruisers soon followed the *Teresa*, and as they turned westward, each in succession, except the *Colon*, which ran a little closer inshore, received the concentrated fire of the American ships.

Using the full power of their engines upon reaching the open sea, the Spanish cruisers had sufficient speed to carry them past the American ships before the latter could get well under way. But the American ships rapidly gained speed and all except the *Brooklyn* continued to advance, gradually turning westward towards the escaping foe. The *Brooklyn*, when about fourteen hundred yards

from the *Maria Teresa*, suddenly "turned to starboard, with her helm hard aport, and continued so to turn until she headed westward parallel to the course of the Spanish ships."¹ In making this loop the *Brooklyn* came very near colliding with the *Texas*, which was now advancing in a westerly direction almost parallel to the Spanish cruisers.

In the meantime, the shot and shell which the American vessels were pouring into the Spanish ships prevented any accurate return fire. Already the *Teresa* was hopelessly crippled. Two twelve-inch shells had smashed through her armour and exploded. Three eight-inch shells and several others of smaller calibre had penetrated the ship, and some of them had wrought awful destruction; others, without exploding, had passed entirely through the hull. The gunners were driven from their stations; the woodwork was in flames; and from broken pipes steam filled the ship. The decks, slippery with blood, were covered with dying and dead sailors. The cruiser had become a burning hulk, a floating slaughterhouse; and at 10.15 A. M., about thirty minutes after the first shot was fired, she was turned ashore and beached six and one-half miles from the Morro.

The *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* had no sooner appeared than they too were subjected to a terrific fire. The first excitement of the battle was now over, and the coolness of the American gunners

¹ From "Schley Court of Inquiry" in its statement of "Facts."

was shown by the accuracy of their fire. The destruction of the *Oquendo* was only a matter of a few minutes. Several eight-inch shells penetrated the ship, causing frightful havoc. One of these burst under the eleven-inch gun of the forward turret. The gun was totally wrecked, and its entire crew, with the exception of one man, was killed. Another shell exploding in the after torpedo-room killed or wounded every man there. A hail of small projectiles pierced the hull above the armour plate, drove the men from the guns, riddled the smoke-stacks, and set fire to the ship in many places. In a few moments several large guns were dismounted; the rapid-fire battery was almost totally destroyed, and nearly all the gunners were put out of action. With fires raging within and shot and shell piercing her very vitals, the doomed cruiser at 10.20 o'clock turned landward and ran ashore about half a mile westward of the *Teresa*.

About twelve hundred yards behind the *Oquendo* came the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Pluton*. Immediately the secondary batteries of the *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Oregon* opened fire upon them. Wainwright's opportunity had now come. Regardless of the fire of the enemy's shore batteries, regardless of the frailty of the *Gloucester* and her lack of armour protection, he steamed at full speed straight for the deadly destroyers. His gunners soon found their targets, and the fight began in earnest. In a few minutes

both destroyers were riddled with bullets; but the *Pluton* was the first to succumb. At about 10.20 A.M. she ran upon the rocks, four and a half miles west of the Morro, where she soon blew up. The fire of the *Gloucester* was then concentrated on the *Furor*, which in a few moments was so badly crippled that she could not reach the shore. Boats were sent to the rescue, but while the crew was being taken off an explosion sent her to the bottom of the sea. Thus, in less than an hour from the time Cervera's flagship had fired the first shot, four of the six Spanish warships had been destroyed.

Meanwhile the *Viscaya* and *Colon* were fleeing westward, pursued by the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Iowa*. The *Indiana* also started in the chase, but being unable to maintain the speed of the other vessels soon fell to the rear. In passing westward the *Viscaya* had suffered severely from the fire of the *Indiana*, *Iowa*, and *Texas*; but when she was passed by the *Colon* at about 10.30 A. M., she came directly under the concentrated fire of all the pursuing ships. Crippled and burning, she struggled on for about a half-hour longer, then turning landward, ran ashore in the bay of Aserraderos twenty miles west of the Morro.

The only Spanish cruiser now remaining was the *Colon*, which was steaming westward at full speed at a distance of six or seven miles ahead of the leading American ships. During the chase

the *Brooklyn*, which was farther out at sea than the other vessels, was in the lead ; but the *Oregon*, with a speed of about sixteen knots an hour, kept almost abreast of the *Brooklyn*. A few miles behind the *Oregon* was the *Texas*, and still farther behind was the *New York*, which was coming forward at a speed of nearly seventeen knots an hour. Admiral Sampson upon passing the *Indiana* about 11.30 A.M. signalled her captain to return to Santiago and guard the entrance of the harbour. The *Iowa*, not having sufficient speed to keep up with the other vessels, had moved in to rescue the crew of the *Vizcaya*.

The chase had become exciting. The guns had ceased firing. Greater speed was now the desideratum. "More steam! more speed!" were the cries that went from the decks to the engine-rooms; and the firemen and stokers down in the bowels of those mighty, throbbing steel monsters toiled in the awful heat until the very blood in their veins seemed to be afire. As the great ships rushed on, drawing nearer and nearer to their fleeing foe, the sailors on deck, awed by the very intenseness of the situation, stood silently by their guns waiting for the closing scene of that awful tragedy.

For a time it seemed that the *Colon* might escape; but at twenty-three minutes after twelve o'clock the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* were near enough to open fire with their big guns; and when one of

the thirteen-inch shells of the *Oregon* fell just ahead of the doomed vessel, the last hope of escape vanished. At a quarter after one o'clock she ran ashore at the mouth of the Rio Tarquino, fifty-four miles west of Santiago Harbour. As she struck the beach her flag came down, and an officer was sent to take possession of her. As the cruiser was only slightly damaged, it was hoped that she might be saved. But the Spaniards having opened and broken her sea-valves, she began to slip backward into deep water; and while the *New York* was attempting to push her up on to the beach, she turned over and sank. Thus ended one of the most remarkable battles in naval history.

No sooner had the Spanish vessels been driven ashore than the Americans began the rescue of the Spanish sailors. At great peril the crews of the *Gloucester*, and of the *Harvard*, which had just arrived on the scene, toiled with might and main to save from drowning and burning the men of the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*; and the crews of the *Iowa*, *Ericsson*, and *Hist* hastened to the wrecked *Vizcaya* and, amidst the danger of exploding ammunition, and of magazines on the point of exploding, took off the sailors from the red-hot decks.

Of the twenty-one hundred and fifty men of Cervera's squadron, three hundred and twenty-three were killed, drowned, or burned to death, and

one hundred and fifty-one were severely wounded. Including the wounded, seventeen hundred and eighty-two were made prisoners; and sixty-three escaped to Santiago. Admiral Cervera and Captain Paredes, who was second in command of the squadron, were both captured. Among the dead were Captain Lazaga of the *Oquendo* and Captain Villaamil, who commanded the destroyers. Among the wounded were Captain Concas of the *Teresa* and Captain Eulate of the *Vizcaya*. The American loss was one man killed and one man wounded, both on the *Brooklyn*.

Though frequently hit, the American vessels were practically unharmed. The *Brooklyn* was struck by twenty large shot, besides pieces of shells and small projectiles from machine guns. The *Iowa* was struck by two six-inch shells, one of which, exploding in the vessel, did considerable though no serious damage. She was also hit by six or seven smaller projectiles. The *Texas* was struck by a six-inch shell, which injured slightly her ash hoist and forced draught apparatus. The *Oregon* was hit three times, and the *Indiana* twice, by small projectiles and fragments of shells. The *Gloucester*, which went nearer the enemy's guns than any other ship, was not touched by a single shot. Nevertheless, she had a narrow escape. As she closed upon the destroyers, a one-pounder machine gun on the *Furor* was directed upon her; but, fortunately, before the stream of

shot found its mark, the gun was put out of action.

The battle was fought on the American side by the battleships *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, and *Indiana*, the cruiser *Brooklyn*, and the converted yacht *Gloucester*. Though the *Vixen* was present throughout the fight, her part in it was scarcely more than that of a spectator. The *New York*, though she fired a few shots at the Spanish destroyers as she hurried westward, took practically no part in the battle. The *Resolute*, *Harvard*, *Hist*, and *Ericsson* came up only in time to help rescue the crews and receive the prisoners.¹

The seven American vessels engaged at Santiago had a total of 225 guns; Cervera's six vessels had 146 guns. It was impossible, of course, to use all the guns on either side. Lieutenant Wells, United States Navy, estimates that the number of guns actually engaged during the battle was 105 on the American ships and 91 on the Spanish ships, and

¹ The ranking officers and commanders of the American ships at Santiago were: Rear-Admiral William Thomas Sampson, Commander-in-chief; Captain French Ensor Chadwick, Chief-of-Staff and commander of the *New York*; Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, second in command; Captain Francis Augustus Cook, commander of the *Brooklyn*; Captain Robley Dunglison Evans, commander of the *Iowa*; Captain Henry Clay Taylor, commander of the *Indiana*; Captain Charles Edgar Clark, commander of the *Oregon*; Captain John Woodward Philip, commander of the *Texas*; Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, commander of the *Gloucester*; Lieutenant Alexander Sharp, Jr., commander of the *Vixen*; Lieutenant Nathaniel Reilly Usher, commander of the *Ericsson*; Lieutenant Lucien Young, commander of the *Hist*.

that the weight of metal that they could throw per minute was respectively 6720 and 4827 pounds. In this calculation no account is taken of the Socapa and Morro batteries, which during the early part of the battle maintained a brisk but ineffective fire.

During the battle the American ships fired about six thousand shots. The following table, compiled from the official report of the board of survey that was sent by Admiral Sampson to examine the wrecked cruisers, gives the number of hits made on each vessel and the number of hits per gun.

Size of gun.	Number of hits on each vessel.				Total hits by each calibre of gun.	Number of guns of each calibre in action.	Number of hits per gun.
	Teresa.	Oquendo.	Vizcaya.	Colon.			
6-pounder .	17	43	13	4	77	42	1.83
1-pounder .	2				2	13	0.15
4-inch . . .	1	7	4	2	12	3	4.00
5-inch . . .	3	3	7	1	15	6	2.50
6-inch . . .	1	1		1	3	7	0.43
8-inch . . .	3	3	5		12	18	0.67
12-inch . . .	2				2	6	0.33
13-inch . . .						8	
Totals . .	29	57	29	8	123	103	

COMMENTS

AS much of the official correspondence of Admiral Cervera, Captain-General Blanco, the Minister of Marine, and the Minister of War, is in the nature of comment, very little discussion of the events leading up to the sea fight is necessary. There are, however, a few points which deserve notice.

Since there were in the island nearly two hundred thousand Spanish soldiers, who had as yet done practically no fighting, it seems remarkable that General Blanco should have sent the despatch of June 4, informing his home government that Cervera's return to Spain would have a fatal effect on public opinion, demoralize a part of his forces, and render doubtful the attitude of the remainder.¹ To assume, before the campaign had fairly started, that his forces would, upon the departure of Cervera's squadron, falter and fail him, was, to say the least, doing them a grave injustice. The army was strong, the navy was weak. And yet, from this despatch, it would appear that Blanco expected the navy to do the bulk of the fighting, while he looked idly on. He was ready enough to criticise Cervera, or even his own government, but he seems to have utterly failed to realize that he himself was responsible in great part for the desperate situation of Cervera's squadron, and that he alone, after the

¹ See despatch of June 4, page 172.

arrival of the American warships, had the power to save it by concentrating his forces against Shafter's army.

Although on June 4 General Blanco protested strongly against sending Cervera's squadron back to Spain, yet on June 20 he telegraphed that the return of the squadron to Spain would be the best solution of the problem.¹ The strategical situation was practically the same on these two dates. On June 4 Sampson's and Schley's squadrons were blockading Cervera's squadron in the harbour, and the Fifth Corps was on the point of leaving Tampa; on June 20 the two American squadrons were still engaged in the blockade, and the Fifth Corps had just arrived off the mouth of the harbour. Blanco's change of mind must therefore have been due, not to any change in the strategical situation, but to the fact that he had finally begun to see things in the proper light. His despatch of June 20 shows clearly that he had at last reached a fairly correct understanding of the strategical situation. But it was then too late; the harm had been done. Had he seen the truth earlier, or had he had from the start as clear a comprehension of the correct strategy of the campaign as Cervera had, he would never have protested against Cervera's return, but on the contrary would have advised it.

Blanco's despatches of June 28, July 1, and July 2 to Admiral Cervera, and Cervera's communication

¹ See despatch of June 20, page 182.

of July 1 to General Linares, show unmistakably that the land victories of July 1 drove the Spanish squadron out of the harbour. But for Shafter's army Cervera could have remained indefinitely at Santiago; and but for Sampson's warships he could at any time have sailed away. It is therefore plain that the destruction of the squadron was due to the coöperation of the army and the navy. Both deserve the credit, and both should receive the praise.

The reasons given by Admiral Cervera for making the sortie in the daytime, instead of at night, seem to be conclusive. In the first place it would have been very difficult to sail through the long, narrow channel at night, directly in the face of the enemy's searchlight, without running aground; and such a catastrophe to any ship would have blocked the channel and prevented the escape of the vessels coming behind.¹ Secondly, as the American ships

¹ Captain Concas, who commanded the *Maria Teresa*, says: "The entrance to the harbour of Santiago is a narrow channel eleven hundred yards in length, which is made still narrower near its outlet by the location of Diamond Bank, which reduces its width to about seventy-six yards. These narrows take a slight turn, which makes it necessary in coming out to steam at a moderate speed in order not to run upon the rocks on the opposite shore, and therefore it is impossible, when several ships are going out, for more than one to be in the channel at a time, otherwise there is danger of collision, if by chance some damage should be done to the ship which goes out first, or if it should run aground, which would not be strange in view of the difficult character of the manœuvre. The situation would be the same as that of a regiment of artillery passing through the gate of a fortress if one

were close inshore at night, the foremost Spanish ships would have been in great danger of being sunk in the channel before reaching the open sea; or even if they had passed through the channel successfully, each vessel in turn would have been subjected to the concentrated fire of the American warships at a short and very effective range.

However, naval authorities are not all of one opinion in regard to this matter. In discussing this point Commander Jacobsen of the German navy says:

“There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should have been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal investigation of the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practicable for a fleet to leave Santiago Harbour at night. The wreck of the *Merrimac* did not constitute an obstruction. It is true that Admiral Sampson's report on the night blockade states that the lightships were lying from one to two miles from Morro Castle, according to the state of the atmosphere, and that they lighted up the channel for half a mile inside. Even the best search-light, however, does not reach farther than one mile. Therefore the illumination

of its pieces should get caught and the others crowd upon it in case they were not able to draw back nor turn within the walls of the passage. To this natural difficulty of the harbour must be added the obstruction of part of the channel near Cay Smith caused by the sunken *Merrimac*, against which we would not only scrape, but the ships would have to turn before clearing it, for which reason the port screws would pass within three or four yards of the hull of the wreck, with great risk of being entangled in it or its rigging.”

could not have been very effective. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the lightships, could have compelled them to change their positions ; but, strange to say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon would have been best suited to the enterprise. Besides the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant vessels lying in Santiago Harbour might have been taken out in order to deceive the enemy. The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have followed each other out of the harbour entrance, in predetermined order, as fast as possible. They should then have steered different courses, previously determined, with orders not to fight except when compelled to do so by the immediate vicinity of a hostile ship, or when there was no possibility of escaping the enemy in the darkness. A rendezvous should have been fixed for the next day, where the ships that succeeded in escaping were to assemble.

“If the fleet did not attempt a night sortie and was nevertheless compelled to leave the harbour in obedience to orders, then the ships should have been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, including the torpedo and the ram, should have been used. A bold attack in close formation was the only chance of success against the superior hostile fighting forces, who would hardly have had time to form their lines.”¹

In prophetic words Admiral Cervera predicted the result of the sortie. He saw in it nothing but death and destruction. He protested against it

¹ “Sketches from the Spanish-American War,” by Commander Jacobsen of the German navy, translated from the German by Office of Naval Intelligence, United States navy.

with all the earnestness of his soul, declaring that he would "never be the one to decree the horrible and useless hecatomb" which would be the only possible result of the sortie from there by main force. And yet, when the order to go out was received from his superior, he determined that his own flagship, the *Maria Teresa*, should lead the way and bear the brunt of the battle.

To Cervera and his captains, who saw so clearly the inevitable result, the moment of departure was portentous, pathetic, heart-breaking. "We had," says Captain Concas of the *Maria Teresa*, "just finished making the turn at Diamond Bank, amidst deathlike silence, everybody awed by the magnificent spectacle of the ships issuing from the narrow passage between the Morro and the Socapa. It was a solemn moment, capable of making the calmest heart beat faster. From outside the conning tower, which I did not want to enter, in order, if I should fall, to set an example to my defenceless crew, I asked leave of the Admiral to open fire, and, that received, I gave the order. The bugle gave the signal for the commencement of the battle, an order which was repeated by the buglers of the other batteries and followed by a murmur of approbation from all those sailors and marines who were anxious to fight; for they did not know that those warlike echoes were the signal which hurled their country at the feet of the victor, since they were to deprive Spain of the only power still of value to

her, without which a million soldiers could be of no service; of the only power which could have weight in the treaty of peace; a power the destruction of which would place Spain at the mercy of her enemy—the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba alone, as many ignorant persons believed. The sound of my bugles was the last echo of those which history tells us were sounded at the capture of Granada. It was the signal that four centuries of grandeur was at an end and that Spain was becoming a nation of the fourth class."

It now remains to notice the principal causes which led to this great American victory.

First: The Americans had a great tactical advantage in the battle. As Cervera's ships, owing to the long, narrow channel leading out of the harbour, were compelled to go out singly and at considerable distance apart, the Americans were enabled to bring against each vessel successively a concentrated and an overwhelming fire. So great was this tactical advantage, that, had the fighting power of the two squadrons not been unequal, the Americans would still have been almost certain of victory.

Second: The Americans had much greater strength on the battlefield. Admiral Sampson having, in accordance with the correct principles of strategy, concentrated against Cervera's squadron all the battleships and armoured cruisers of

the American navy, was prepared to crush his adversary with greatly superior forces. Even though the *Massachusetts* was absent on the day of battle and the *New York*¹ was too far away to have any effect upon the result, the fighting power of the remaining American vessels was fully twice that of the Spanish vessels.²

Third: The American gunners, owing to their systematic and regular training in target-shooting, and to the practice which they had obtained by the bombardments of the forts at the mouth of the harbour during the blockade, were much better marksmen than the Spanish gunners, who had had scarcely any practice in target-shooting either before or during the war. It is, however, interesting to note that the table compiled from the official report of the board of survey, sent by Admiral Sampson to examine the wrecked cruisers, shows that only one hundred and twenty-three shots of the six thousand fired by Sampson's ships hit the mark. But such a small number of hits is not unusual in sea-fights. The excitement of the

¹ Admiral Sampson, in withdrawing from the blockade, on the morning of July 3, his flagship, the *New York*, — one of the only two fighting units of his command that were known to have sufficient speed to overtake the Spanish cruisers, — committed a glaring tactical error. The *Vixen*, or a steam launch, would just as well have served the purpose of taking him to Siboney for a conference with General Shafter.

² "The American ships engaged possessed a more than two-fold material superiority over the Spanish ships." — PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

occasion; the motion of the vessels; the smoke of the guns; the position of the sun; the clouds, the light, and the condition of the atmosphere; and the varying and constant changes in the ranges, make accurate marksmanship impossible. But the important fact was that the Americans made a greater percentage of hits than the Spaniards. Other things being equal, a larger percentage of hits nearly always means victory. Relative strength is what counts in war.

Fourth: The Americans were imbued with the spirit of aggressiveness. Regardless of consequences, they took the offensive at every opportunity. It was this spirit, this power of daring attack, that captured the blood-stained intrenchments of El Caney, that carried the American soldiers up the heights of San Juan, that sent the unprotected *Gloucester* through a hail of projectiles to grapple with the death-dealing destroyers. No one can fail to admire or to praise the courage that held El Caney, or that carried the Spanish squadron through the narrow channel of Santiago; but this was the courage of despair. It was defensive courage, not the kind that overleaps every obstacle, crushes all resistance, and finally conquers.

In discussing this point and other interesting points of the battle, Commander Jacobsen says:

“Admiral Cervera was in a very difficult position. He was expected to act in some manner. He did not dare

to make the attempt at night, and so he decided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The whole crew fell a victim to this fatal decision. Instructions for the order of the sortie and the taking of the western course had been previously issued by the chief of the fleet. According to the '*Revista General de Marina*,' Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898, the Admiral was entirely convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy or of reaching another Cuban harbour, even if he should succeed in steaming right through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and impotence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else that I attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and a half in the harbour without even attempting to attack the blockading fleet when a favourable opportunity presented itself, or even of harassing it. The two torpedo-boat destroyers were not used for the purpose for which they were intended. This inactivity and lack of initiative must have had a very demoralizing effect on the officers and men. If we add to this the certain knowledge that the opposing forces were much stronger, it will be generally understood that the idea of general flight after coming out of the harbour entrance was the only acceptable one, in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby rendering them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From the very moment that this feeling of impotence took possession of the Spaniards and led to the above reflections, their fate, psychologically speaking, was sealed. We do not mean to disparage their valour and tenacity in the midst of hostile fire; but on the other hand it is quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything was happening as he

had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running ashore. All the other commanders followed this example.

“On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Admiral Sampson’s fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade was being conducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as were also the arrangements in case of the enemy’s attempt to escape. Frequent engagements with the Spanish forts had given commanders and crews that calm and assurance in the handling of their weapons which guarantees success. The long blockade service, exhausting and monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the part of the Spaniards, had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody was anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape. All the passions that had been smouldering under the ashes break forth. The welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had come at last, and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their victims. At the beginning the American fire, owing to the excitement of the personnel and the great distances, was probably not very effective; but when the Spanish Admiral turned to the westward and the other ships followed him, the moral superiority of the Americans reasserted itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had their ships follow the same course, and the Americans, having every advantage on their side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in their total destruction.

“I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish crews, the neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate education of the commanders of the

ships and torpedo-boat destroyers. It is mainly due to these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and that the American ships sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there can be no excuse for having allowed the cruiser *Cristobal Colon* to leave Spain without her heavy armament. It has also been stated that the rapid-fire guns of this cruiser were unserviceable, so that she was really completely defenceless. The training of the engine personnel was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive cruises. The bottom of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long time, and as they had been lying in Santiago Harbour for a month and a half they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers *Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, which in all official books are credited with 18.5 knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from 10 to 12 knots at most, and the *Cristobal Colon*, which is the latest ship and was to run 20 knots, hardly attained a speed of 13.5. Under these circumstances, in every way unfavourable for the Spaniards, whose crews were insufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long inactivity, whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting efficiency, it is no wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy and paid for with insignificant sacrifices." ¹

Notwithstanding the many advantages possessed by the Americans in the battle, the completeness of the victory at so little cost to themselves surpassed all

¹ "Sketches from the Spanish-American War," by Commander Jacobsen of the German navy, translated from the German by Office of Naval Intelligence, United States navy.

expectations. Cervera's squadron totally destroyed and, practically, his entire command killed or captured! Not a ship of Sampson's squadron seriously damaged, and but one American killed and one wounded! "As one tells the story," says Henry Cabot Lodge, "the utter inadequacy of the narrative to the great fact seems painfully apparent. One wanders among the absorbing details which cross and recross the reader's path, full of interest and infinite in their complexity. The more details one gathers, puzzling what to keep and what to reject, the denser seems the complexity, and the dimmer and more confused the picture. The historian, writing calmly in the distant future, will weave them into a full and dispassionate narrative; the antiquarian will write monographs on all incidents, small or large, with unwearying patience; the naval critic and expert will even now draw many technical and scientific lessons from everything that happened, and will debate and dispute about it, to the great advantage of himself and his profession. And yet these are not the things which appeal now, or will appeal in the days to come, to the hearts of men. The details, the number of shots, the ranges, the part taken by each ship, the positions of the fleet—all alike have begun to fade from recollection even now, and will grow still dimmer as the years recede. But out of the mist of events and the gathering darkness of passing time the great fact and the great

deed stand forth for the American people and their children's children, as white and shining as the Santiago channel glaring under the search-lights through the Cuban night.

"They remember, and will always remember, that hot summer morning, and the anxiety only half whispered, which overspread the land. They see, and will always see, the American ships rolling lazily on the long seas, and the sailors just going to Sunday inspection. Then comes the long thin trail of smoke drawing nearer the harbor's mouth. The ships see it and we can hear the cheers ring out, for the enemy is coming, and the American sailor rejoices mightily to know that the battle is set. There is no need of signals, no need of orders. The patient, long-watching Admiral has given direction for every chance that may befall. Every ship is in place, and they close in upon the advancing enemy, fiercely pouring shells from broadside and turret. There is the *Gloucester* firing her little shots at the great cruisers, and then driving down to grapple with the torpedo boats. There are the Spanish ships, already mortally hurt, running along the shore, shattered and breaking under the fire of the *Indiana*, the *Iowa*, and the *Texas*; there is the *Brooklyn*, racing by outside to head the fugitives, and the *Oregon* dealing death-strokes as she rushes forward, forging to the front, and leaving her mark everywhere she goes. . . . On they go, driving through the water, firing steadily and ever getting

closer, and presently the Spanish cruisers, helpless, burning, twisted wrecks of iron, are piled along the shore, and we see the younger officers and men of the victorious ships perilling their lives to save their beaten enemies. We see Wainwright, on the *Gloucester*, as eager in rescue as he was swift in fight to avenge the *Maine*. We hear Philip cry out: 'Don't cheer. The poor devils are dying.' We watch Evans as he hands back the sword to the wounded Eulate, and then writes in his report: 'I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the flag came down, they were as gentle and tender as American women.' They all stand out to us, these gallant figures, from the silent Admiral to the cheering seamen, with an intense human interest, brave and merciful in the hour of victory.

"And far away along the hot ridges of San Juan heights lie the American soldiers, who have been fighting, and winning, and digging intrenchments for forty-eight hours, sleeping little and eating less. There they are under the tropic sun that Sunday morning, and presently the heavy sound of guns comes rolling up the bay, and is flung back with many echoes from the surrounding hills. It goes on and on, so fast, so deep and loud, that it is like continuous thunder, filling all the air. A battle is on; they know that. Wild rumors begin to fly about, drifting up from the coast. They hear that


the American fleet is coming into the harbor; then for an hour that it has been defeated and the Spaniards have escaped; and then the truth begins to come, and before nightfall they know that the Spanish fleet is no more, and the American soldier cheers the American sailor, and is filled anew with the glow of victory and the assurance that he and his comrades have not fought and suffered and died in vain.

“The thought of the moment is of the present victory, but there are men there who recognize the deeper and more distant meanings of that Sunday’s work, now sinking into the past. They are stirred by the knowledge that the sea power of Spain has perished and that the Spanish West Indies, which Columbus gave to Leon and Castile, shall know Spain no more. They lift the veil of the historic past and see that on that July morning a great empire met its end and passed finally out of the New World. . . . And they and all men see now, and ever more clearly will see, that in the fight off Santiago another great fact has reasserted itself for the consideration of the world. For that fight had displayed once more the victorious sea spirit of a conquering race. It is the spirit of the Jomsberg Viking who, alone and wounded, ringed round with foes, springs into the sea from his sinking boat with defiance on his lips. It comes down through Grenville and Drake and Howard and Blake on to Perry and Macdonough and Hull and Decatur. Here on

this summer Sunday it has been shown again to be as vital and as clear as it was with Nelson dying at Trafalgar, and with Farragut and his men in the fights of bay and river more than thirty years before."

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